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    The Sherman Act is a No-Fault Monopolization Statute: A Textualist Demonstration

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    The drafters of the Sherman Act originally designed Section 2 to impose sanctions on all monopolies and attempts to monopolize, regardless whether the firm had engaged in anticompetitive conduct. This conclusion emerges from the first ever textualist analysis of the language in the statute, a form of interpretation originally performed only by Justice Scalia but now increasingly used by the Supreme Court, including in its recent Bostock decision. Following Scalia’s methodology, this Article analyzes contemporaneous dictionaries, legal treatises, and cases and demonstrates that when the Sherman Act was passed, the word “monopolize” simply meant that someone had acquired a monopoly. The term was not limited to monopolies acquired or preserved through anticompetitive conduct. A textualist analysis accordingly suggests that Section 2 should be applied to impose liability and corrective remedies on all monopolies and attempts to monopolize. A textualist approach to statutory construction would not imply or create unstated exceptions. Since Section 2 of the Sherman Act contains no explicit exception for a monopoly acquired or preserved without proof of anticompetitive conduct, none should be implied or created. Current case law requiring plaintiffs to prove the corporation involved engaged in improper conduct should be overturned. This Article also briefly analyzes the practical economic implications likely to follow if the courts adopt a “no-fault” approach to monopolization law. This analysis will demonstrate that the overall economic effects will be uncertain. They will depend upon empirical issues whose net effect is speculative or ambiguous. They nevertheless are likely to be beneficial on the whole, and this provides some support for the no-fault position, and a fortiori demonstrate that the Article’s textualist conclusions should be implemented. Imposing sanctions on all extremely large monopolies could improve economic welfare in many ways. This should increase innovation and international competitiveness. It should prevent the allocative inefficiency effects of monopoly pricing and the form of exploitation that arises when monopolies acquire wealth from consumers. It would be likely to decrease the inefficiencies that result from monopolies enjoying a “quiet life.” It should avoid the waste that can arise as a firm struggles to attain and protect its monopoly, and some of the time and cost of Section 2 litigation. It should improve privacy and decrease income inequality. The new standard would admittedly also cause some costs and difficulties. For example, imposing sanctions on all monopolies could sometimes send a confusing or perverse signal to firms engaging in hard but fair competition, especially as a firm’s market share neared the ambiguous level required for a violation. No-fault liability could also enable competitors to file baseless lawsuits. The transaction costs involved in imposing sanctions on monopolies could be significant. It also could lead to difficult remedy issues in cases involving natural and patent monopolies. We believe, however, that the benefits of no-fault are likely to outweigh the costs. Textualism has been used in more and more Supreme Court analyses in recent years. Moreover, there recently have been many calls, from very different parts of the political spectrum, for imposing sanctions on extremely large monopolies without inquiring into whether the firm engaged in anticompetitive conduct. This issue has not, however, been analyzed seriously either from a legal or an economic perspective in roughly a half century. The purpose of this Article is not to resolve all of the relevant questions. Its goal is to re-kindle debate about the legal and economic issues involved in imposing sanctions on all monopolies and attempts to monopolize under the Sherman Act and also, a fortiori, under Section 5 of the FTC Act. And to demonstrate that its textualism-derived conclusions constitute reasonable policy options

    Female Student Patient Privacy at Campus Health Clinics: Realities and Consequences

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    Recent Developments: Peterson v. State

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    Reevaluating Maryland’s Child Pornography Laws in the “Send Nudes” Era

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    Preventing the Curse of Bigness Through Conglomerate Merger Legislation

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    The antitrust laws, as they are presently interpreted, are incapable of blocking most of the very largest corporate mergers. They successfully blocked only 4 of the 61 largest finalized mergers and acquisitions (defined as the acquired firm being valued at more than 10billion)thatoccurredbetween2015and2018.Theantitrustlawsalsowouldpermitthefirsttrilliondollarcorporation,Apple,tomergewiththethirdlargestcorporation,Exxon/Mobil.Infact,todayeveryU.S.corporationcouldmergeuntiljust10wereleftsolongaseachownedonly1010 billion) that occurred between 2015 and 2018. The antitrust laws also would permit the first trillion-dollar corporation, Apple, to merge with the third largest corporation, Exxon/Mobil. In fact, today every U.S. corporation could merge until just 10 were left – so long as each owned only 10% of every relevant market.Even though the Congresses that enacted the anti-merger laws did so in part to limit the political power of corporations, today the federal antitrust agencies and courts interpret these laws only in terms of price and other consumer effects within discrete markets. Under current merger practice, the enhanced political power of corporations is irrelevant.However, from Senators Elizabeth Warren and Bernie Sanders on the left, to President Trump and many others on the right, there is a renewed interest in using antitrust to control corporate size, structure, and practices. There is popular desire both to prevent large mergers and to break up existing companies, such as Facebook and Google, that achieved their dominant positions in part due to acquisitions.In light of recent developments along most of the political spectrum, this Article proposes model conglomerate merger legislation suitable for our era. This legislation would target every merger that exceeds clearly specified asset thresholds. We are proposing a law that would block every merger in which both firms have assets exceeding 10 billion. This threshold would block approximately 15-25 of the largest mergers each year.This Article undertakes a legal, economic, and political analysis of conglomerate merger legislation. This demonstrates that our proposed legislation would:1. Produce no significant losses in corporate efficiency;2. Be clearer and more predictable than the existing anti-merger laws and thus would enhance the rule of law; and3. Help prevent significant increases in corporate political power and other forms of non-economic power caused by the largest mergers

    Recent Developments: Lewis v. State

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    Formal and Informal Constitutional Amendment

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    The constitutional search for greater justice is the animating principle that guides or should guide constitutional amendment and constitutional change whenever and wherever it occurs. Almost all states and governments formally declare their constitutional commitment to justice, liberty, and the rule of law. Yet reports on constitutional amendment from nations throughout the world remind us that we live at a moment of constitutional peril. The general trend of constitutional government in many states has been towards greater corruption, violence, and arbitrary action. This illustrates the dual and parallel importance of constitutional principles and constitutional structures in securing the rule of law. Constitutional principles animate the constitutional structures that apply our constitutional principles in practice. Constitutional amendment and constitutional change can be formal, informal, cultural, and even at times, illegal. Which techniques are appropriate will vary according to the circumstances. The failure of widely shared and well-developed formal or structural constitutional arrangements to prevent the decline of the rule of law in the early twenty-first century confirms the important role that informal and cultural constitutional change have always played in the development of constitutional justice. While constitutions can declare the importance of liberty, justice, and the public welfare, and establish constitutional checks and balances to protect them, they cannot guarantee good faith. That depends on the lawyers, judges, and scholars who make the constitution real

    Abolishing Private Prisons: A Constitutional and Moral Imperative

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    Responding Effectively to Trauma Manifestations in Child Welfare Cases

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    This article defines trauma and how it manifests in the dependency court system. Trauma is prevalent in child welfare cases and all of the professionals on these cases can respond to the trauma they see and experience more effectively through a better understanding of how to regulate the nervous system and the body. Trauma often manifests as difficult behaviors in the dependency court world, but there is a lack of information for effective strategies to deal with it. This article discusses how families and professionals experience trauma in dependency court and provides tools rooted in a physiological understanding of trauma. It will help professionals notice and respond to trauma in themselves and others

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