Texas A&M University School of Law

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    3722 research outputs found

    April 2025 Poetry Month Poetry.org Poster Photo

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    Photo of National Poetry Month poster 18 by 24 inches sent to by Poetry.org on display April 2025https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/poetry-month-2025-photos/1002/thumbnail.jp

    Population: The Who of Biodiversity Law

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    This Article investigates the impacts of human population, including distribution and growth, on biodiversity at every level—the biosphere, ecosystems, communities, populations, and individual organisms. It assesses how legal frameworks around the world address the pressures of human population on biodiversity. This Article explores how factors such as population size and migration contribute to biodiversity loss, with a focus on diverse regions around the globe. This Article offers a comparative overview of population-related laws in regions including North and South America, Europe, Oceania, Asia, and Africa. Key legislation, like the U.S. National Environmental Policy Act, the UK’s Environment Act 2021, and Norway’s Climate Change Act, is evaluated for its effectiveness in managing human population-driven biodiversity loss. International agreements like the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change are also reviewed for their role in coordinating global efforts to mitigate the ecological impacts on biodiversity of the human population. Based on this analysis, this Article suggests new legal approaches to integrate population policies with biodiversity conservation more efficiently. It demonstrates the importance of aligning urban planning, resource management, and climate adaptation efforts to reduce biodiversity loss. In conclusion, this Article proposes an updated legal framework to reconcile human population pressures with the protection of biodiversity at every level, including the biosphere, ecosystems, communities, populations, and individual organisms

    Dialing In or Dialing Out? The Relationship Between State Telemedicine Law and Access to Buprenorphine

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    This Article begins by reporting the results of a comprehensive 50-state survey assessing state laws and other state sources governing the telemedicine induction (“tele-induction”) and subsequent telemedicine prescription (“tele-prescription”) of buprenorphine for the treatment of opioid use disorder (“OUD”) following the expiration of the COVID-19 public health emergency (“PHE”). Original, concrete findings include: (1) the glaring patchwork of state law governing the tele-induction and subsequent tele-prescription of buprenorphine for the treatment of OUD in the United States; (2) the variety of primary authorities and secondary sources that house relevant permissions, prohibitions, and affiliated requirements; (3) the number of primary authorities and secondary authorities that were enacted or issued during or after the COVID-19 PHE, suggesting specific state intent to copy—or to counter—pandemic-era federal flexibilities; (4) the number of states that have implied, rather than express, permissions for the tele-induction and/or tele-prescription of buprenorphine; (5) the difficulty I, a veteran multi-state researcher, experienced in finding relevant sources; (6) the constant change in some sources, especially during and since the expiration of the PHE; (7) state indication of future change pending the direction of a final federal rule, which has since been issued; (8) the general lack of clarity in state law, which impedes both provider and patient knowledge of local rules and patient access and continuity of care; (9) the fact that some virtual providers of buprenorphine appear to be operating in violation of state law; (10) the inconsistent association between and among state political mapping, state regulation in other areas of health law, and buprenorphine regulation; and (11) the fact that up to eleven state laws are more restrictive, in whole or in part, than the federal government’s current telemedicine flexibilities, which means that not all prescribers and patients in these states will benefit from federal flexibilities. This Article continues by arguing for additional federal and state reform in the area of buprenorphine tele-induction and tele-prescription. On January 17, 2025, the Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”) and the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (“SAMHSA”) released a final rule that will, unless changed by the new administration, limit buprenorphine tele-induction and subsequent tele-prescription to a six-month period. Then, an in-person medical evaluation (or satisfaction of another exception to the in-person evaluation requirement) must take place before additional prescribing occurs. This Article carefully disputes the safety, efficacy, and diversion concerns relied upon by the DEA and SAMHSA in the final rule, as well as similar concerns relied on by state lawmakers in restrictive state legislation. A conclusion contends that federal and state laws should permit the tele-induction and subsequent tele-prescription of buprenorphine for the treatment of OUD without limitation, consistent with federal flexibilities that applied during the COVID-19 PHE and that continue to apply through December 31, 2025

    The National Bioengineered Foods Disclosure Standard & Absence Claims: The Cost of the Butterfly

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    The National Bioengineered Foods Disclosure Standard (“NBFDS”) is a step in the right direction in providing a uniform labeling standard for genetically engineered organisms (“GEOs”) that meet the statutory definition of “bioengineered.” Importantly, the law provides a consensus that GEOs are safe and that labeling standards should be uniform across the United States. However, the law largely fails to settle the broader debate and the issues associated with GEO labeling. Namely, the NBFDS’s use of the term “bioengineered” causes additional confusion, and terms like “genetic modification” and “genetic engineering” remain ambiguous. Furthermore, the Final Rule promulgated by the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s (“USDA’s”) Agricultural Marketing Service also creates critical grey areas that work against Congress’s intent in passing the NBFDS. This Comment uses research from the areas of biotechnology, psychology, law, economics, and public policy to examine a key failure of the NBFDS and overall labeling framework. Under the current regulations, companies are allowed to use deceptive absence claims, like “Non-GMO,” which causes significant harm to consumers and competitors. Companies using absence claims could also be harmed in the form of costly litigation and legal penalties if they are sued for false advertising. This Comment concludes that additional regulations are needed to better fulfill the NBFDS’s purpose and to mitigate the deception caused by absence claims. Specifically, this Comment recommends that the USDA’s labeling authority be expanded to include absence claims, the “Non-GMO” label be prohibited entirely, and the use of other absence claims be better regulated. This Comment explains how courts, agencies, or Congress could improve the NBFDS to include these recommendations

    Artificial Intelligence, Autonomous Creation, and the Future Path of Copyright Law

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    Most literature at the intersection of copyright and AI has focused primarily on what copyright law is or ought to be. Frequently overlooked is the question of what copyright law will be in the AI space. Understanding this question is crucial because the path of copyright law chosen by the United States will have a major impact on the country\u27s economic and technological future.This article begins by scrutinizing two lines of arguments that have been advanced to deny copyright protection to AI-generated works: constitutional and incentive-based. The article then discusses a third line of arguments—harmonization-based arguments—and identifies select instances in which Congress matched the protection offered by other jurisdictions or declined to do so.This article further shows that global copyright law developments have slowly diverged in the AI space. In view of these growing divergences, U.S. legislators and policymakers are now confronted with a key policy choice at the intersection of copyright and AI: should the United States retain existing approaches, follow other jurisdictions, or work with these jurisdictions to develop harmonized AI-related international copyright standards?To inform the future debate on copyright and AI, the second half of this article highlights the different areas in which substantial copyright law and policy reform may emerge in the AI space. It further discusses four options the United States can take to shape the future path of copyright law: (1) international treaty negotiations; (2) soft law instruments; (3) a global multi-stakeholder dialogue; and (4) choice-of-law principles

    Design Patents in the Fashion Industry: A US Perspective

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    In the US, fashion design can be protected with design patents in addition to trade marks and copyrights. Design patents protect non-functional, ornamental features embedded in an object and are suitable for fashion items meant to last more than one or a few seasons, particularly for accessories like handbags, footwear, and sunglasses. Design patents can be used by both large and small businesses and, to date, have been partially under-utilized in the fashion industry, probably due to the costs of applying for protection and the time it takes to be granted the patent. This chapter argues that fashion designers and lawyers should consider design patent protection because it offers important protection to fashion items, often stronger than any other intellectual property (IP) rights

    Joinder, Not Jurisdiction: Toward a New Theory of Standing

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    This Article builds on an important development in the Supreme Court’s standing jurisprudence to propose a novel theory that would allow more meaningful access to federal courts while vindicating legitimate separation-of-powers concerns. In its recent decision in TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, the Supreme Court endorsed a theory of standing based on Article II, writing that litigation between private parties—even when explicitly authorized by Congress—can run afoul of the executive branch’s interest in “how to prioritize and how aggressively to pursue legal actions against defendants who violate the law.” This Article II move has been justifiably criticized. But it is more plausible than the prevailing notion that a plaintiff invoking a statutorily authorized cause of action against another private party fails to present even a “case or controversy” under Article III if that plaintiff has not suffered some additional “injury in fact.” A proper understanding of this Article II executive-branch interest can yield a more sensible approach to standing than the current Article III framework. When a lawsuit between private parties runs afoul of the Court’s injury-in-fact requirement, the remedy should not be to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction, but rather to allow an opportunity for the executive branch to participate in the litigation. The opportunity for executive-branch involvement was an important feature of pre-TransUnion decisions on standing in litigation between private parties. And this Article shows how the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure—particularly Rule 19’s provisions on required joinder—empower private defendants to prompt that involvement by the executive branch in cases where the plaintiff lacks the concrete injury that is currently viewed as a requirement of Article III. This approach preserves the potential interests of the executive branch, but it also maintains both Congress’s authority to enact private-enforcement mechanisms and the federal judiciary’s core function of interpreting and applying federal law. Standing doctrine would be more coherent from a federalism standpoint as well, correcting some perverse implications with respect to state law and state institutions

    The SEC, Fraud, and Cryptocurrencies

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    The SEC’s Strategic Plan for Fiscal Years 2022–2026 is focused on the impact of the rapidly developing rate of change in new technologies that provide for markets to be more interconnected and interdependent than ever. Because Congress has yet to give the SEC, or any other agency, express authority to regulate cryptocurrency, the SEC has taken a regulation-by-enforcement approach. The SEC’s recent enforcement efforts relating to crypto asset securities were substantial, with enforcement actions addressing a range of alleged misconduct in the crypto asset securities space, including billion- dollar crypto fraud schemes; unregistered crypto asset offerings, platforms, and intermediaries; and illegal celebrity touting. However, with the Supreme Court overturning the Chevron doctrine, thereby limiting agency discretion, enforcement actions may be more tenuous for the SEC moving forward This Article argues that Congress should expressly authorize the SEC to regulate cryptocurrencies as securities in a manner that will pass the scrutiny of courts. This is especially important in light of Jarkesy, which limits the SEC’s ability to test any new rules through in-house enforcement actions, because this case requires that any agency action that seeks civil money penalties for causes of action ground in the common law, like fraud, must be heard by an Article III court and conform with the defendant’s Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial. Without clear legislative guidance, this Article suggests that the SEC will have to continue its regulation by enforcement scheme, leading to inconsistent decisions and, ultimately, some crypto fraudsters getting away

    Procedural Justice and Settlement

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    This article discusses the disconnect between mediation’s founding principles and how it is practiced in legal settings. Mediation was originally introduced as an alternative to the legal system, allowing disputants to negotiate resolutions based on their interests rather than legal norms. However, as court-connected mediation has become institutionalized, it has grown to resemble traditional legal negotiations, dominated by attorneys, evaluative interventions, and monetary settlements. This evolution raises concerns about whether mediation is fulfilling its broader purpose beyond mere deal-making. This article argues that court-connected mediation should incorporate principles of procedural justice to ensure that disputants experience fairness, dignity, and meaningful participation. Research on procedural justice reveals that disputants value opportunities to tell their stories, influence outcomes, and be treated with respect, which, in turn, affects their perceptions of fairness, compliance with outcomes, and trust in the judicial system. While some changes in mediation, such as attorney participation and evaluative interventions, may enhance procedural justice, others—such as sidelining disputants and bypassing joint sessions—undermine it. The article applies procedural justice theories to mediation’s current trajectory, demonstrating that balancing bargaining efficiency with procedural justice is essential to maintaining public confidence in court-connected mediation. Without deliberate choices to preserve procedural justice, mediation risks devolving into just another legal bargaining session, eroding its legitimacy and effectiveness. The article concludes by recommending strategies for ensuring that mediation serves both dispute resolution and justice, reinforcing its role as a meaningful alternative within the judicial syste

    The Brilliance of Explaining Mandatory Arbitration as a Choice Between Saturns and Rickshaws

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    This article posits that the arbitral forum might be preferable to court litigation because it is considerably more accessible to workers who cannot afford or do not have claims interesting enough to attract private counsel or in many cases administrative agencies as well This article questions whether the existing justice system truly serves most employee claimants better than a private arbitration system. The author supports these claims with available empirical evidence, which establishes that arbitration is faster than litigation and that employee claimants win more frequently in arbitration, albeit receiving lower awards. The article leverages this information to support the theory that courts offer “Cadillac” justice to high-income employees with claims large enough to attract a private lawyer. The high costs and long delays inherent in the court system leave lower-paid employees with few options—the proverbial rickshaw. This article concludes that, while the result of the existing system works for well-off claimants, it does not provide any form of justice for an average claimant. This article suggests that arbitration’s critics reconsider the arbitration process. Properly designed employment arbitration is cheaper and faster than litigation, like the old Saturn automobile (a mid-priced automobile in the 1990s), and, perhaps more importantly, is more accessible to most workers workers.

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