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Culpable Kids
Get PDFWhen a child commits a crime, how do states determine if that child is culpable? There are procedural rules that determine the forum for a minor’s trial and doctrines that limit children’s exposure to the most severe sentencing. But when it comes to culpability, states employ the same substantive law whether the defendant is 50 or 15. As this Article explains, that approach is profoundly flawed. In the early 21st century, in a series of cases known as the Miller trilogy, the United States Supreme Court established that youth are fundamentally different from adults and state sentencing practices must recognize that fact.
This Article argues that all of the constitutionally significant ways in which children are different for purposes of punishment are equally relevant to kids’ culpability. As a result, when kids are charged with a crime, the substantive law should be tailored to recognize their status as minors. This Article proceeds in five Parts. Part II provides a brief overview of how the criminal system delineates juvenile from adult culpability, highlighting that these distinctions are procedural rather than substantive. Part III outlines the core Eighth Amendment cases in which the Supreme Court developed its “kids are different” jurisprudence. Parts IV and V are the heart of the Article and argue that, because “kids are different,” when they are charged with a crime, the substantive law should be tailored to recognize their status as minors. Part IV articulates necessary substantive changes to criminal law when it comes to the state’s burden to prove the elements of a crime. Part V demonstrates how the law should account for the defining features of youth when kids mount affirmative defenses. Part VI addresses both conceptual and implementation-related challenges to my proposal. Finally, by way of Conclusion, I argue that tinkering with the sentencing of minors in adult court is an insufficient response to the fundamental ways in which youth are different from adults. Instead, states should tackle head-on the issue of culpable kids through revised substantive law as I suggest herein
The Servicemembers Civil Relief Act Should be Updated to Recognize Remote Courtroom Appearances
Get PDFAllowing military members to continue pending civil litigation so that they can focus their attention on warfighting is sound public policy. Most agree we should protect those “who dropped their affairs to answer their country’s call,” and various federal laws have codified that protection for over a century. But what if the civil matter is com- paratively minor or could otherwise be easily resolved? While the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (“SCRA”) provides essential protections against harassing civil litigation, it should still pro- vide for the ability of deployed personnel to remotely resolve matters. Virtually every military member can easily be reached by e-mail or by some other electronic means. People currently serving in our nation’s armed forces have not depended on regular mail as their primary means of communication during their lifetime. Most courts now allow, or even require, electronic filing. Court appearances, including civil trials, are often completed through video appearances. In the instance of some- one in the National Guard or Reserve who is called to active duty and whose service is exclusively within the continental United States, while they may be technically deployed, their situation is very different from someone deployed overseas. To illustrate the scope of these issues, this Article will briefly summarize the history of the SCRA, what it covers, who is eligible to request its protections, and how it might be modified to account for today’s technological realities. Someone seeking relief under this federal statute generally must establish their military service has a “material effect” on their legal rights. Although the general concepts of the SCRA are well established, a core problem arises from the fact that material effect remains undefined. This ambiguity causes completely foreseeable problems for courts and for litigants. Finally, the authors will propose potential solutions
On Snow’s Intellectual Property and Immorality
Get PDFIn this Essay, I consider the “why” and “how” of Professor Snow’s controversial, countercultural, important, and relevant position that immorality may result in the denial of intellectual property protection. First, I highlight how surprising it is that Professor Snow’s argument springs from the theories underlying intellectual property protection, rather than the theories underlying the morality and ethics he believes ought to be considered in determining intellectual property protection. No one (that I know, at least) goes to the Environmental Protection Agency seeking better regulations to protect the environment and uses the labor desert theory of property rights as an argument. I would expect to see arguments against protective regulations to be based on Lockean theories about ownership of the fruit of labor. But, upon reflection, Professor Snow’s argument is not just surprising, it is persuasive. Second, I consider Professor Snow’s proposal for how morality and ethics might be injected into intellectual property enforcement. Professor Snow and I seem to agree that judicial discretion is not the best way to incorporate morality into the determination of what creative works deserve intellectual property protection. But we part ways with respect to his position that it is prudent for judges to consider morality in intellectual property cases based on the Constitution’s Intellectual Property Clause. In the end, I conclude that Congress and the President should enact legislation—or to be more precise amend the patent statute—when necessary to address moral aspects of inventions with clarity and precision
Regulating AI Therapy Chatbots: A Call for Federal Oversight
Get PDFWhile artificial intelligence therapy chatbots continue to develop and increase in popularity, there is little regulatory oversight for this burgeoning industry. Regulation is needed because there is a high probability for harm when artificial intelligence is used in the mental health therapy industry, yet there is no consensus on standards that apply. Artificial intelligence therapy chatbots are currently only regulated by indirect, suboptimal liability schemes. State governments could regulate them by considering them human practitioners or telehealth services, or the federal government could regulate them as medical devices. This Comment examines the pitfalls of the lack of artificial intelligence therapy chatbot regulation, analyzes methods for regulation at the state and federal levels, and ultimately concludes they should be regulated federally as medical devices
The Purpose of Progress? A Response to Professor Ned Snow’s Intellectual Property and Immorality
Get PDFIn Intellectual Property and Immorality, Professor Snow fearlessly puts forth the proposition of morality in the consideration of IP’s social welfare goals. By doing so, he invites important conversations about the underlying purposes and values of an area of law that powerfully shapes our knowledge-based economies and societies. Towards this end, this Response has three propositions: (1) expansion of the foundational justifications for IP to include the key insights of human development (sometimes referred to as human flourishing) theory; (2) recognition not just of harms to individuals but also harms to communities and societies; and (3) imbuing of greater substantive meaning to the key term “Progress” in the U.S. Constitution’s Progress Clause. Doing so would ameliorate the current immoralities that unfortunately tarnish the promise and potential of IP to increase overall human flourishing and social welfare
Black History Month Book Display 06
No full textClose up of book display created by Black Law Students Association in the law library from February through March 2025.https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/black-history-month-2025-photos/1008/thumbnail.jp
Black History Month Book Display 02
No full textClose up of book display created by Black Law Students Association in the law library from February through March 2025.https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/black-history-month-2025-photos/1004/thumbnail.jp
Black History Month Poster & Book Display
No full textDisplay created by Black Law Students Association in the law library from February through March 2025.https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/black-history-month-2025-photos/1002/thumbnail.jp
Gallery of Heroes Poster
No full textPoster created by Black Law Students Association on display in the law library from February through March 2025https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/black-history-month-2025-photos/1001/thumbnail.jp
April 2025 Poetry Month Display Photo 11
No full textPhoto of display April 2025, of Reginald Dwayne Betts, His book of poetry Felon, an enlarged image of the book cover, and context card. Shelf below contains poem Alabama from the book Felon. Book at the bottom is Redaction opened to a page describing redaction poetry.https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/poetry-month-2025-photos/1014/thumbnail.jp