University of Minnesota, Duluth

University of Minnesota Law School
Not a member yet
    8145 research outputs found

    Distributional Arguments, in Reverse, by Alex Raskolnivoc here.

    Get PDF

    Law Enforcement’s Lochner, by Miriam H. Baer here.

    Get PDF

    Disability Admin: The Invisible Costs of Being Disabled

    Get PDF

    Extraterritorial Damages in Patent Law

    Get PDF

    Secrecy\u27s Emd

    Get PDF
    The United States government runs a massive system of national security secrecy. In 2019, 4,243,937 Americans with security clearances produced tens of millions of newly classified documents. This Article examines this massive yet poorly understood system of secrecy, asking what it aims to achieve, whether it serves those ends, and how it might serve them better. It begins by exploring why the system was created in the first place. It turns out that the now-ubiquitous classification system is a 20th century invention. In an odd twist, the law that provides for criminal law enforcement of the classification rules preceded the rules themselves—the modern classification system did even not exist when the 1917 Espionage Act, which remains in effect today, passed in a fit of xenophobic wartime fear. In the years since World War II, Presidents have enjoyed almost complete control over the classification system, issuing executive orders that set the rules by which not only the executive branch must abide, but anyone who might come into contact with classified information must abide as well. Indeed, Congress itself has been caught in the vise, unable to release, for example, the full contents of a 2014 report on torture committed by the CIA because the CIA refused to declassify the information it contained. This system has produced a number of pathologies—keeping information from the public, intimidating the press, making selective prosecution possible, and subjecting current and former government officials to significant restrictions on their speech. Perhaps most important of all, it has too often undermined the purpose that it is supposed to serve: national security. Overclassification makes our secrets harder to protect, can lead to bad decision-making, and in the end often fails to effectively protect much of the information that really matters. This Article considers whether, given these failures, the system of secrecy as we know it should be brought to an end. If we gave up on the post-war experiment and ended the system of classification, what then? Taking the idea of ending the system of secrecy seriously is a way to think about not just what is wrong about the existing system but what is right and valuable about it as well. Those lessons form the foundation for concrete reform proposals that are more ambitious than reforms of the past and yet still feasible

    The Paradox of Exclusive State-Court Jurisdiction Over Federal Claims

    Get PDF

    Antitrust Policy Toward Patent Licensing: Why Negotiation Matters

    Get PDF

    7,699

    full texts

    8,145

    metadata records
    Updated in last 30 days.
    University of Minnesota Law School
    Access Repository Dashboard
    Do you manage Open Research Online? Become a CORE Member to access insider analytics, issue reports and manage access to outputs from your repository in the CORE Repository Dashboard! 👇