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Mutual Liberation: The Use and Abuse of Non–human Animals by the Carceral State and the Shared Roots of Oppression
Get PDFThe carceral state has used non–human animals as tools to oppress Black, Indigenous, and People of the Global Majority (BIPGM) for centuries. From bloodhounds violently trained by settlers to aid in their genocidal colonial project through the slave dogs that enforced a racial caste system to the modern deployment of police dogs, non–consenting non–human animals have been coopted into the role of agents of oppression. Yet, the same non– human animals are themselves routinely brutalized and oppressed by the carceral state. Police kill several thousands of family’s companion dogs every year in the United States. Law enforcement agencies train animals in a violent and racist manner only to place them in the line of fire against their will. These systems of oppression share many of the same tools, from language that justifies violence to legal instruments like qualified immunity that protect officers of the state when they engage in violence. This paper charts this history, analyzes the intersectional tools and shared roots of oppression, and ultimately concludes that ending the use and abuse of non–human animals by the carceral state is a necessary part of the broader prison industrial abolition project
\u3cem\u3eRamos\u3c/em\u3e Retroactivity and the False Promise of \u3cem\u3eTeague v. Lane\u3c/em\u3e
Get PDFWhen the Supreme Court changes course and announces a new rule of constitutional criminal law, the question remains: what happens to those imprisoned by the old practice now deemed unconstitutional? Since 1989, that question has been answered by Teague v. Lane, a restrictive holding that limits retroactivity by prioritizing judicial resources over the constitutional rights of incarcerated people. But should it matter if the old rule has explicitly racist origins?Convictions by non-unanimous juries emerged in Louisiana and Oregon with the stated intention of rendering Black jurors\u27 votes meaningless. In 2020, the Supreme Court in Ramos v. Louisiana held that non-unanimous juries violate the Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury, recognizing the practice\u27s racist origins. Yet, when deciding the issue of Ramos retroactivity in Edwards v. Vannoy, the Court doubled down on its retroactivity ban, leaving thousands of people imprisoned by a relic of Jim Crow.This Note analyzes the Court\u27s retroactivity framework through the lens of non-unanimous jury verdicts. It explores the history of non-unanimous juries, the role of federal habeas review of state convictions, and the evolution of the Court’s retroactivity doctrine. It proposes adopting a new retroactivity framework: one that accounts for the harmful origins and impacts of an old rule. It suggests that by leaving people incarcerated by a Jim Crow-era procedure, the Court perpetuates systemic racism
The Pledge of Allegiance and Compelled Speech Revisited: Requiring Parental Consent
Get PDFSince the Supreme Court decided West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette in 1943, free speech law has been clear: public schools may not force students to recite the Pledge of Allegiance. Nevertheless, in two states -Texas and Florida- students may decline to participate only with parental permission. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the law on the grounds that the parental requirement furthered parents\u27 substantive due process right to control the upbringing of their children.
The Eleventh Circuit decision is flawed both in its understanding of the First Amendment right to be free of compelled speech and the substantive due process rights of parents. These mandatory pledge laws are viewpoint-based and therefore presumptively unconstitutional. While the free speech rights of students are more circumscribed than adults, none of the established justifications for curtailing student speech rights at school apply in this case. On the contrary, forcing students to pledge against their will exemplifies all the harms of compelled speech. Finally, parents\u27 constitutional right to control the upbringing of their children is meant to protect parents from the state, not to empower parents to trample on the rights of their children. In the end, the parental permission rule is simply a pretext for the state\u27s own viewpoint-based compulsion
“Sorry,” But I Didn’t Release It: How the Court’s Analysis of the Fair Use Doctrine in Chapman v. Maraj Protects Innovation and Creativity in the Music Industry
Get PDFThe fair use doctrine is an important affirmative defense to copyright infringement when a particular use does not interfere with copyright law’s primary goal of promoting creativity for the public good. Artists and songwriters frequently experiment with copyrighted music without permission before seeking licensing approval from the original rights holders to “sample” or “replay” the work. In Chapman v. Maraj—a copyright infringement suit brought by Tracy Chapman against Nicki Minaj—the United States District Court for the Central District of California held that experimenting with a copyrighted musical composition for the purpose of creating a new work with an intent to seek licensing approval constitutes fair use and thus does not infringe the original copyright holder’s exclusive right to prepare derivative works. This Note explores why the holding in Chapman v. Maraj is vital for the protection of songwriting and the music business as well as the continuation of innovation and creativity in music, analyzing this importance in light of the established goals of copyright law
