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COVID-19 Infects the Fishing Industry: The Rise of Illegal Fishing and the Waiver of Fishery Observer Requirements
Amicus (Fall 2022)
Issue at a glance: Commemorates Colorado Law\u27s 130th anniversary with a roundtable discussion featuring seven generations of alumni Highlights the latest research by Professor Margot E. Kaminski Celebrates the opening of the Solidarity Suite, Colorado Law\u27s newest student lounge Shares stories of philanthropy Recognizes milestones and successes of Colorado Law alumnihttps://scholar.law.colorado.edu/amicus/1001/thumbnail.jp
Senate Status Sheet
https://scholar.law.colorado.edu/colorado-house-and-senate-journals/1587/thumbnail.jp
Final Status Sheet
https://scholar.law.colorado.edu/colorado-house-and-senate-journals/1593/thumbnail.jp
Is It Time for a New Civil Rights Act? Pursuing Procedural Justice in the Federal Civil Court System
The United States has recently been engaged in some of the largest civil rights movements since the 1960s—from Black Lives Matter to #MeToo—and calls for justice for marginalized communities are stronger than ever. Many decry the longstanding violence and systemic discrimination such communities experience, and advocate for stronger substantive civil rights. What has received less attention, however, is the violence done to those rights by the U.S. Supreme Court\u27s obstructionist civil procedural jurisprudence. Over the last half century, the Court has systemically eroded Americans\u27 capacity to enforce such substantive rights in the civil court system. This erosion arcs away from the constitutional imperative that everyone has the right to be heard. Thus, the time has come for a new civil rights act, grounded in process.
This Article examines the Court\u27s regressive process-based decisions over the last fifty years, particularly regarding pleadings, class actions, and arbitration. It demonstrates how the Court\u27s jurisprudence has reached a tipping point and concludes that corrective civil rights legislation—rather than caselaw or a federal rule—is the answer. The Article asks whether this is the right time for a new civil rights act, comparing contemporary conditions with those of the sweeping Civil Rights Act of 1991 and the targeted Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act. Having answered the question affirmatively, the article sets forth normatively what a procedural civil rights restoration act should comprise. The Article concludes that its prescription would realign drafters\u27 intentions, institutional competencies and democratic values with the public dispute resolution system
Text is Not Enough
In Bostock v. Clayton County, the Supreme Court held that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 protects gay and lesbian individuals from employment discrimination. The three opinions in the case also provided a feast for Court watchers who study statutory interpretation. Commentators across the ideological spectrum have described the opinions as dueling examples of textualism. The conventional wisdom is thus that Bostock shows the triumph of textualism. The conventional wisdom is wrong. Instead, Bostock shows what those who have studied statutory interpretation have known for decades: judges are multimodalists, drawing from a panoply of forms of legal argumentation. In particular, Bostock shows that judges are inevitably common-law thinkers, even when interpreting statutes