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Theorizing Revolutionary Property: Mexico\u27s Tardive Turn towards Leon Duguit and the Social Function of Property
No full textBuilding Better Species: Assisted Evolution, Genetic Engineering, and the Endangered Species Act
No full textOn December 10, 2020, Elizabeth Ann, a black-footed ferret, was born. This was a momentous occasion, as it was the first time a native species listed under the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”) had been cloned. This is the first major attempt to use biotechnology to aid in the conservation of an endangered species, but it will certainly not be the last. While cloning may only be relevant for a small subsection of species, other forms of biotechnology, like genetic engineering, could be used to restore lost diversity or make novel changes to genomes. Projects to modify coral to withstand warmer oceans, or to create resistance against chronic disease in amphibians, are already in progress in academic and industry labs. Despite the promise, the application of these techniques to wildlife conservation is controversial. The use of genetic engineering to intervene in evolution is contentious because it challenges humanity’s assumptions about the very meaning of Nature. Genetic interventions pit the goals of protection of species and preservation of functioning ecosystems against deeply ingrained views that wildlife should exist apart from our influence. Many threats that listed species face are unlikely to be abated using traditional conservation approaches, forcing us to perpetually manage rather than truly recover.
In this Article, I argue that genetic engineering can facilitate the recovery of biodiversity. Our actions have already permanently modified “natural” genomes, and many of our management strategies clearly impinge upon the “wildness” of these species. With this in mind, taking a more informed and active role in that modification, limiting the temporal scope of management, is important for the future of wildlife conservation. Additionally, even though the Coordinated Framework does a poor job regulating conservation engineering, the ESA could provide regulatory oversight for the creation and release of these organisms through the use of: (1) recovery permits; (2) the Controlled Propagation regulations; (3) the 10(j) experimental population procedures; and (4) special 4(d) rules. I conclude by making recommendations to improve this oversight and suggest factors to guide the Services in using these technologie
Effects of hunting on mating, relatedness, and genetic diversity in a puma population
No full textHunting mortality can affect population abundance, demography, patterns of dispersal and philopatry, breeding, and genetic diversity. We investigated the effects of hunting on the reproduction and genetic diversity in a puma population in western Colorado, USA. We genotyped over 11,000 single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs), using double-digest, restriction site-associated DNA sequencing (ddRADseq) in 291 tissue samples collected as part of a study on the effects of hunting on puma population abundance and demography in Colorado from 2004 to 2014. The study was designed with a reference period (years 1-5), during which hunting was suspended, followed by a treatment period (years 6-10), in which hunting was reinstated. Our objectives were to examine the effects of hunting on: (1) paternity and male reproductive success; (2) the relatedness between pumas within the population, and (3) genetic diversity. We found that hunting reduced the average age of male breeders. The number of unique fathers siring litters increased each year without hunting and decreased each year during the hunting period. Mated pairs were generally unrelated during both time periods, and females were more closely related than males. Hunting was also associated with increased relatedness among males and decreased relatedness among females in the population. Finally, genetic diversity increased during the period without hunting and decreased each year when hunting was present. This study demonstrates the utility of merging demographic data with large-scale genomic datasets in order to better understand the consequences of management actions. Specifically, we believe that this study highlights the need for long-term experimental research in which hunting mortality is manipulated, including at least one non-harvested control population, as part of a broader adaptive, zone management scheme
You\u27ll Grow Into It: How Federal and State Courts Have Erred in Excluding Persons Under Twenty-One from \u27the people\u27 Protected by the Second Amendment
Get PDFAfter more than two centuries of jurisprudential stillness, the United States Supreme Court undertook the task of discerning the Second Amendment’s meaning in District of Columbia v. Heller, holding that the Second Amendment protects the individual right to self-defense. Since Heller, the lower courts have grappled with determining the scope of the Second Amendment. One question of scope—the subject of this piece—is at what age does a person come within the scope of the Second Amendment’s protections? Some federal and state courts have suggested, and in some cases held, that persons under twenty-one do not enjoy Second Amendment rights. However, colonial and founding era history, as well as the Court’s jurisprudence regarding other individual, constitutional rights, suggests otherwise. Research reveals that during the colonial and founding eras, persons as young as sixteen often were required to bear arms not only for militia purposes, but generally and irrespective of military service or purpose. Additionally, the Court’s long-standing First Amendment, Fourth Amendment, and privacy-abortion jurisprudence is clear: Constitutional rights do not vest only when a person attains a particular age. Instead, individual, constitutional rights protect persons of all ages, although the rights of minors under eighteen—while meaningful—are often less robust than their adult counterparts. In light of this history and jurisprudence, courts should begin recognizing that persons eighteen and older enjoy full Second Amendment rights, while minors under eighteen maintain truncated—albeit meaningful—Second Amendment rights
Evolving Privacy Protections for Emerging Machine Learning Data Under Carpenter v. United States
Get PDFThe Fourth Amendment’s third-party doctrine eliminates an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy in information they willingly turn over to third parties. Government scrutiny of this information is not considered a search under the Fourth Amendment and is therefore not given constitutional protections. In the 2018 case Carpenter v. United States, the Supreme Court created an exception to the third-party doctrine. In Carpenter, a case involving the warrantless use of cell site location information (CSLI) in a criminal investigation, the Court held that individuals do have a reasonable expectation of privacy regarding CSLI. According to Chief Justice Roberts, despite the necessary relinquishment of some information by all cell phone users, privacy is guaranteed “[i]n light of the deeply revealing nature of CSLI, its depth, breadth, and comprehensive reach, and the inescapable and automatic nature of its collection….” The Court’s rational in distinguishing CSLI is also applicable to the personal data that is constantly being collected by tech companies through the use of machine learning algorithms. Companies like Facebook and Google use machine learning to specifically tailor each user’s experience to their individual preferences. To do so, machine learning algorithms constantly collect, store, and analyze data about our interactions online to “learn” about our habits, ideologies, likes, dislikes, and affiliations. Given the Carpenter Court’s understanding of the constitutional complexities of high-tech communications, this comment takes the next step to explore individuals’ reasonable expectation of privacy in algorithmic learning data titrated to their personal preferences
