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Heller and “Assault Weapons”
Get PDFA discussion of how Heller has been applied to “assault weapon” bans, with special attention given to the Fourth Circuit’s en banc decision in Kolbe v. Hogan, which held that the popular AR-15 rifle and other “assault weapons” are not protected arms under the Second Amendment.
Moderated by Professor E. Gregory Wallace
Public Confidence in the Courts in the Internet Age: The Ethical Landscape for Judges in the Post-Watergate Age
Get PDFPromoting and protecting public confidence in government institutions is central to continued faith in the rule of law. As a result, when personal scandals or internal failures threaten public trust in government institutions, policy makers have been quick to respond with new measures to increase accountability for misconduct. In the twentieth century, the Watergate scandal of the early 1970s led to significant changes in accountability for misconduct by high-level public officials and in the legal profession generally. For judges, in the years just prior to Watergate, high-profile scandals involving federal judges also led to significant changes in the regulation of judicial conduct. Since the 1970s, however, the types of ethical challenges faced by all public officials have become more complex in the digital age.
This Article explores some of the most common ethical issues facing judges as they interact in the digital world, from the use of social media to Internet research. To put the emerging judicial ethics rules relating to the use of social media and the Internet in context, this Article lays the foundation for preserving public confidence in the courts through discussion of the three core values of judicial ethics - independence, integrity, and impartiality - and how judicial ethics enforcement evolved in the post- Watergate era with the introduction of independent judicial enforcement agencies. Looking to recent disciplinary actions by these agencies involving judicial use of social media and a wave of concern over independent Internet research, this Article posits that prophylactic rules regarding social media use by judges are not necessary to maintain public trust and confidence in the courts. Instead, resort to and strict enforcement of the existing rules that require judges at all times to embrace the core values of independence, integrity, and impartiality are both sufficient and adaptable enough to be applied to the variety of disciplinary issues that can arise when judges engage with the digital world
Find Out Who Your Friends Are: A Framework for Determining Whether Employees\u27 Social Media Followers Follow Them to a New Job
Get PDFNo crevice of society remains untouched by the pervasiveness of social media-including the workplace. Every day, employers and employees become more skilled at cultivating an online network of followers and then turning those contacts into dollars. Employees increasingly use social media accounts to expand their business activities, be it the journalist who breaks news on Twitter or the realtor who advertises open houses on Facebook. While the ever-expanding use of social media in the course of employment provides immeasurable benefits to both the employer and employee alike, it also creates more problems. Perhaps chief among them: Whose account is it? Whereas employers and departing employees used to fight over the rolodex, they now jockey over the password that delivers direct access to thousands of business contacts.
While password disputes are beginning to trickle into courts across the country, early jurisprudence on the issue is wildly inconsistent. Before the floodgates of professional social media account litigation open, courts need to adopt a framework that resolves disputes consistently and fairly. This Comment suggests that the license agreements underlying social media accounts should constitute personal property. Then, the Comment provides a two-step approach for determining whether the employer or employee is the real licensee of the account and, therefore, receives the property rights that attach to the license
Do It in the Sunshine: A Comparative Analysis of Rulemaking Procedures and Transparency Practices of Lawyer-Licensing Entities
Get PDFAntitrust Precedent & Anti-Fraternity Sentiment: Revisiting Hamilton College
Get PDFOver a decade ago, Prof. Mark Bauer wrote an article exploring the antitrust implications of a small college’s decision to forbid fraternities from competing in the student housing market and the ensuing litigation. Expanding this line of research, several key holdings—despite contrary antitrust doctrine elsewhere—have granted universities broad authority to control the residential choices of their students qua consumers, bespeaking a unique relationship between university and student to which the fraternity is an interloper. These core cases casually allude to the ostensibly defunct doctrine of in loco parentis, under which colleges were once seen as proxy parents to their pupils, implying that in housing matters the paradigm of the custodial university retains the force to overcome competitive concerns. Given both costs and benefits to that view, this Article calls for more judicial scrutiny of the relations amongst colleges, students, and fraternities
A Plea to North Carolina: Bring Fairness to the Assessment of Civil Battery Liability for Defendants with Cognitive Disabilities
Get PDFIn certain instances, the courts appear to apply the law of civil battery in a confused and unfair manner to defendants with cognitive disabilities. In cases where there is the appearance of a civil battery-where the defendant causes harmful or offensive contact to the plaintiff-courts appear to assume the existence of the requisite intent and, accordingly, the commission of the tort. As justification, the courts frequently offer that the insane are liable for their torts.
This Article agrees that a cognitive disability, or insanity to employ the terminology often used by the courts, is not an affirmative defense to intentional torts in general or to battery in particular. The Article argues, however, that a relevant and diagnosable cognitive disability may in certain instances have bearing on the plaintiffs ability to meet the burden of proving the necessary, prima facie element of intent. In such instances, fairness and the proper application of the law of battery demand that the plaintiff meet this burden of proof before the case can move forward.
North Carolina cases are among those that appear to confuse the prima facie element of intent with the affirmative defense of insanity. However, these North Carolina cases are now decades old and ripe for a revisit. This timing, coupled with the willingness of North Carolina courts to think innovatively about complex legal issues, makes the North Carolina judiciary an excellent candidate to clarify the law of civil battery as applied to persons with relevant and diagnosable cognitive disabilities. This Article is a plea to North Carolina courts to bring clarity to the law of civil battery and fairness to the assessment of liability in defendants with cognitive disabilities