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The Amazon Argument: An Examination of South Dakota v. Wayfair and a Discussion of its Implications
Get PDFThe Supreme Court\u27s 2018 decision in South Dakota v. Wayfair removed the settled physical presence requirement for state taxation of out-of- state businesses. This kept states from taxing remote-and often small sellers who had no stores, no warehouses, and no other connection to the state other than its sales to the state\u27s citizens. Because the Court has done away with the requirement that businesses be physically located within a state before they can be taxed, states may now impose sales and use taxes on businesses whose only link to the state are predominately online transactions. Big companies like Amazon will no longer be able to hide behind a large online presence to avoid state sales and use taxes, but the real consequence of the decision lies with the underdogs: these taxes will impact small sellers disproportionately hard, as they must now navigate the copious amounts of taxing regulations across the country.
The Wayfair decision will mean confronting new issues in the near future. Its retreat to a substantial nexus requirement remains more ambiguous than ever in an online era and will result in an erosion of the Dormant Commerce Clause. The solution now lies with our democratic process. If the Court does not overturn Wayfair and we do not amend the Constitution-solutions which, though not impossible, are improbable-the responsibility falls on state citizens to ensure that out-of-state businesses are not unduly taxed. This Comment examines the Wayfair decision in light of the Dormant Commerce Clause\u27s history and purpose and argues that the physical presence rule was wrongly overturned, a decision only we can now correct
Who Tells Your Story: The Legality of and Shift in Racial Preferences within Casting Practices
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Article 31(B), Tempia-Miranda, and the Military Defendant
Get PDFWhen military servicemembers in North Carolina who are suspected of a crime make inculpatory statements to their military superiors, and are tried in a military tribunal, they are both statutorily and constitutionally protected against the dangers of involuntary self-incrimination resulting from the military\u27s inherently coercive atmosphere. When those same servicemembers make incriminating statements to military superiors who are not commissioned officers and are later tried in a North Carolina Criminal Court, they are left vulnerable by North Carolina\u27s rule that assigns law enforcement equivalency only to commissioned officers with the authority to order servicemembers into arrest or confinement under military regulations.
This Comment, which concludes with a recommendation that North Carolina adopt a rule fashioned after the more effective rule applied by military courts, begins with an overview of the historical evolution of servicemembers\u27 rights against self-incrimination from the early years of the republic to the United States Court of Military Appeals\u27s ruling in United States v. Tempia extending Miranda\u27s protections to servicemembers. This Comment next considers North Carolina\u27s rule in State v. Davis-discussing the majority\u27s reasoning and highlighting deficiencies. Finally, this Comment proposes a new rule that would ensure servicemembers are adequately protecte
Heller: Past, Present, and Future
Get PDFA wide-ranging discussion of the Supreme Court’s 2008 decision in District of Columbia v. Heller recognizing the individual right to keep and bear arms, whether that decision has been applied properly in the lower courts, and what the Supreme Court is likely to do with the constitutional right to arms in the future
Style, Substance, and the Right to Keep and Bear Assault Weapons
Get PDFAssault weapons have long been a subject of intense controversy. The debate has intensified in recent years after a series of mass shootings in which perpetrators used AR-15 rifles or other military-style weapons, such as the shootings in Newtown, Aurora, San Bernardino, Orlando, Las Vegas, Sutherland Springs, and Parkland While the federal assault weapon ban has expired, some state legislatures have enacted bans. Critics complain that these laws irrationally condemn certain types of firearms simply because they have a military appearance. Gun control advocates argue that these laws are not just about superficial appearances and that the banned weapons are more dangerous than other firearms. This Article contends that even if the controversy over assault weapons ultimately stems from concerns about the look or style of certain firearms, those are not irrelevant considerations. If the military style of assault weapons increases their appeal to disturbed individuals committing the most horrific crimes, and if the intimidating look of these weapons increases the public\u27s perception of the risk of mass shootings, those are legitimate concerns that legislators and judges may take into account
Liberty is Not Loco-Motion: Obergefell and the Originalists\u27 Due Process Fallacy
Get PDFIn an effort to discredit substantive due process, originalists often misinterpret the federal Due Process Clauses. Justice Clarence Thomas\u27s Obergefell v. Hodges dissent illustrates this. In this dissent, Justice Thomas cites Blackstone\u27s Commentaries to argue that Due Process liberty is merely freedom from physical restraint, what Blackstone describes as the power of loco-motion.
This Article challenges Justice Thomas\u27s narrow view of Due Process liberty from Obergefell v. Hodges on its own terms. It distills from the dissent and its sources five assumptions or premises supporting Justice Thomas\u27s view, and it confronts each of these with contrary evidence from the historical record, especially the 1776 to 1789 American state law of the land clauses. Along the way, this Article establishes that Due Process life, liberty, or property is best understood as a single term of art describing all interests to be protected by the state under a Lockean social contract. The Article also illustrates the practical effect of this competing view by examining the pre-Fourteenth Amendment law of the land case law from North Carolina