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Unmaking egalitarianism: Comparing sources of political change in an Amazonian society
Get PDFPolitically egalitarian societies were likely more common in pre-history than in recent millenia. Why did societies become more hierarchical? Answers to this question remain debated, based on evidence largely drawn from archaeological case studies or comparison of societies from the ethnographic record. I suggest that modern small-scale societies transitioning to market economies can provide complementary tests of the sources of political inequality. I first describe moderate variation in men\u27s influence during community meetings (i.e. political inequality) across four relatively egalitarian Tsimane villages in the Bolivian Amazon, as well as within one of these villages over twelve years. I then assess the roles of (1) sharing networks, (2) patron-client relationships, and (3) leadership opportunity in explaining that variation. Greater political inequality does not associate with reduced sharing but does associate with concentration of conflict mediation in the most influential men (per leadership opportunity) and more equivocally with intra-village paid labor (per patron-client models). In general, I argue that we need more micro-scale studies of societies in transition to understand why individuals come to tolerate greater political inequality
Solving SLAPP Slop
Get PDFIn a substantial minority of states, wealthy and powerful individuals can, without much consequence, bring defamation lawsuits against the press and concerned citizens to silence and intimidate them. These lawsuits, known as “strategic lawsuits against public participation” (“SLAPP”s), are brought not to compensate a wrongfully injured person, but rather to discourage the defendants from exercising their First Amendment rights. In other words, when well resourced individuals feel disrespected by public criticism, they sometimes sue the media or concerned citizens, forcing these speakers to defend themselves in exorbitantly expensive defamation actions. In states without anti-SLAPP statutes—statutes aimed at protecting speakers from these chilling lawsuits—these cases can take months, and sometimes years, to resolve. The result is that speakers—those targeted by the lawsuits and otherwise—will be less inclined to criticize the plaintiff in the future, lest they face a devastatingly burdensome and drawn-out (albeit not meritorious) defamation lawsuit.
Even in the thirty-two states that have passed anti-SLAPP statutes, the statutory regimes widely vary. For instance, anti-SLAPP statutes in some populous states like Florida and, until recently, New York are not particularly helpful to the media because they only apply in limited contexts, such as citizens being sued for their comments at public meetings. Other anti-SLAPP statutes, like Virginia’s, lack procedural mechanisms that would require a plaintiff whose lawsuit has been declared a SLAPP to pay the defendants’ legal fees. As a result of these and other differences in anti-SLAPP regimes, plaintiffs strategically forum shop when deciding where to bring their defamation lawsuits, choosing jurisdictions with less protections for defendants whenever possible. However, even where an action is brought in a jurisdiction that does provide strong anti-SLAPP protections, federal courts are split on whether anti-SLAPP statutes conflict with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Consequently, it is currently unclear whether such statutes can be applied in federal cases at all.
Because anti-SLAPP statues are needed to ensure that the public can exercise their First Amendment rights and freely exchange information of public interest, it is vital to fill the gaps that the current statutory regimes have created. In exploring the current legislative landscape, this Article will consider methods for protecting citizens’ First Amendment rights to speak on issues of public interest, such as urging state and federal governments to pass broad anti-SLAPP legislation. In so doing, this Article will suggest specific tools and language that should be incorporated into a federal anti-SLAPP law. Indeed, to date, no federal anti-SLAPP statute has ever been enacted. This Article seeks to change that by outlining provisions for a potential federal anti-SLAPP statute and exploring the benefits and value that enacting strong anti-SLAPP legislation on both the federal and state levels could have on protecting First Amendment rights
“If You Build It, They Will Come”: Reverse Location Searches, Data Collection, and The Fourth Amendment
Get PDFOn January 6, 2021, the world looked on, stunned, as thousands of rioters stormed the U.S. Capitol on live television in support of then-President Donald Trump. In the days and weeks that followed, federal law enforcement scrambled to identify those involved in the attack, in what has become the largest criminal investigation in American history. Whereas even 20 years prior it would have been difficult to identify those involved, as of February 2023, more than 950 people have been identified and charged in relation to the January 6th Capitol attack. Many of these individuals were identified using a wide array of new technology, including automated license plate readers, complex facial recognition searches, and reverse location searches.
The use of reverse location searches dates to at least 2016. Reverse location searches provide law enforcement the ability to reverse-engineer the location of people for the purposes of an investigation. This is accomplished with location data collected by third-party companies from their users’ electronic devices. Many electronic devices, such as cellphones, are equipped with GPS, which determines a device’s location using signals from satellites. Additional information can be used to pinpoint the location of a device through Wi-Fi, mobile networks, and certain device sensors. Google, for example, states that in order to collect the location data, it uses “GPS and other sensor data from your device,” your “IP address,” “[a]ctivity on Google services, such as your searches and places you label like home or work,” and “[i]nformation about things near your device, such as Wi-Fi access points, cell towers, and Bluetooth-enabled devices.”
This Comment examines the two types of reverse location searches in detail, analyzing the constitutionality of each under these three questions: (1) is it a search under the Fourth Amendment? (2) can it meet the particularity and probable cause requirements? (3) does it fall into the category of general warrants prohibited by the Fourth Amendment? Ultimately, it argues that reverse location searches are constitutional, raising the question of whether existing Fourth Amendment doctrine is sufficient to guarantee the Amendment’s protections
CFTC & SEC: The Wild West of Cryptocurrency Regulation
Get PDFOver the past few years, a turf war has been brewing between the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) and the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) over which agency should regulate cryptocurrencies. Both agencies have pursued numerous enforcement actions over the cryptocurrencies they believe to be within their jurisdiction. This turf war has many moving components, but the focus always comes back to one question: which cryptocurrencies are commodities, and which cryptocurrencies are securities? The distinction is important because the CFTC has statutory authority to regulate commodities, whereas the SEC has statutory authority to regulate securities. This Comment rejects the pursuit of defining cryptocurrency and instead proposes a regulatory framework where the two agencies regulate jointly and where the firms can self-designate and register with either the CFTC or SEC
Dobbs in the Context of Intimate Partner Violence: The Case for a Virginia Constitutional Amendment Protecting Reproductive Choice
Get PDFAdvocates for victims of sexual and domestic violence have longunderstood the critical role that reproductive freedom plays in ensuringvictim safety in the aftermath of trauma. Lawmakers, on the other hand, haveused victims of domestic and sexual violence as political footballs, oftentimessupporting “exceptions” to abortion bans, such as for rape and incest, as ameans of distracting from the actual harms these restrictions cause. Theseexceptions fail to meet the needs of victims and are inadequate protectionsagainst the many forms of abuse, such as reproductive coercion and control,that victims in abusive relationships face. This article examines the dynamicsof abusive relationships through the lens of the power and control model,highlighting examples of reproductive control and coercion experienced byvictims of intimate partner violence in Virginia. It also explores previouspolicy attempts to address reproductive coercion and control that have fallenshort. Ultimately, this article proposes a constitutional amendment to ensureunfettered access to reproductive healthcare as the only viable solution forvictims, and all people in Virginia, going forward
“If You Build It, They Will Come”: Reverse Location Searches, Data Collection, and The Fourth Amendment
Get PDFOn January 6, 2021, the world looked on, stunned, as thousands of rioters stormed the U.S. Capitol on live television in support of then-President Donald Trump. In the days and weeks that followed, federal law enforcement scrambled to identify those involved in the attack, in what has become the largest criminal investigation in American history. Whereas even 20 years prior it would have been difficult to identify those involved, as of February 2023, more than 950 people have been identified and charged in relation to the January 6th Capitol attack. Many of these individuals were identified using a wide array of new technology, including automated license plate readers, complex facial recognition searches, and reverse location searches.
The use of reverse location searches dates to at least 2016. Reverse location searches provide law enforcement the ability to reverse-engineer the location of people for the purposes of an investigation. This is accomplished with location data collected by third-party companies from their users’ electronic devices. Many electronic devices, such as cellphones, are equipped with GPS, which determines a device’s location using signals from satellites. Additional information can be used to pinpoint the location of a device through Wi-Fi, mobile networks, and certain device sensors. Google, for example, states that in order to collect the location data, it uses “GPS and other sensor data from your device,” your “IP address,” “[a]ctivity on Google services, such as your searches and places you label like home or work,” and “[i]nformation about things near your device, such as Wi-Fi access points, cell towers, and Bluetooth-enabled devices.”
This Comment examines the two types of reverse location searches in detail, analyzing the constitutionality of each under these three questions: (1) is it a search under the Fourth Amendment? (2) can it meet the particularity and probable cause requirements? (3) does it fall into the category of general warrants prohibited by the Fourth Amendment? Ultimately, it argues that reverse location searches are constitutional, raising the question of whether existing Fourth Amendment doctrine is sufficient to guarantee the Amendment’s protections
Analyzing the Post-Marchand “Expansion” of Mission Critical Risks: Cybersecurity, Climate Change, and Caremark
Get PDFThis Comment undertakes the task of defining the scope of “essential and mission critical” risk categories in the context of directors’ duty of oversight. Although director oversight liability under Caremark seemed like an impossible standard, Delaware jurisprudence suggests a growing trend in Caremark claims surviving a motion to dismiss. Indeed, “within thirteen months in 2019–2020, four Caremark claims succeeded in surviving the motion to dismiss (Marchand, Clovis, Hughes, and Chou).” As of December 15, 2021, “five of 17 Caremark claims raised in the Court of Chancery have survived a motion to dismiss—an approximately 30% success rate. It remains to be seen whether the Delaware courts will continue to sustain Caremark oversight claims with increased frequency.”
This Comment, which proceeds in three Parts, proposes that emerging and atypical areas of risk in the context of directors’ fiduciary duty of oversight—specifically, cybersecurity and climate change—are not “mission critical” for most corporations. The directors of such corporations, therefore, are unlikely to face oversight liability for failure to address cybersecurity and climate change risks. In other words, it is unlikely that a Caremark claim, in this scenario, would survive a motion to dismiss. Ultimately, the standard for director oversight liability under Caremark has not changed post-Marchand