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Innovative Master Teachers, Chapter 13, in Innovative College Teaching: Tips & Insights from 14 Master Teachers (Perry Z. Binder ed., 2024)
No full textInnovative College Teaching is intended for new or seasoned professors, lecturers, instructors, professors of practice, part-time (adjunct) professors, and graduate teaching assistants, as well as curious high school teachers. You will learn what makes the best teachers tick and read easy-to-replicate tips on taking your skills to the next level
In Part II, Innovative Master Teachers, the author interviewed over a dozen accomplished colleagues including a star adjunct professor for readers who teach part-time. They bring diverse teaching styles from varied disciplines, including Education, Entrepreneurship, Law, Science, Technical Education, and several Business departments. These individuals are curious and innovative. Their passion for teaching is contagious. Students gravitate to them—and you will be inspired by their tips and insights on teaching.https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/fac_books/1216/thumbnail.jp
\u3cem\u3eIn Loco Reipublicae\u3c/em\u3e and the Parental Duty to Expose Children to Ideas Outside the Home
No full textIn Loco Reipublicaie boldly centers children’s rights and adeptly fills an existing jurisprudential gap by infusing parental rights with important duties to respect and facilitate children’s exercise of their own citizenship rights. It is a children’s-rights-forward shot across a heavily prioritized parents’ rights bow. It’s about time
Delegated Corporate Voting and the Deliberative Franchise
Get PDFStarting in the 1930s with the earliest version of the proxy rules, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has gradually increased the proportion of “instructed” votes on the shareholder’s proxy card until, for the first time in 2022, it required a fully instructed proxy card. This evolution effectively shifted the exercise of the shareholder’s vote from the shareholders’ meeting to the vote delegation that occurs when the share-holder fills out the proxy card. The point in the electoral process when the binding voting choice is communicated is now the execution of the proxy card (assuming the shareholder completes the card without error); proxy-holders merely transmit the shareholder’s instruction as a formality.
This shift is more significant than generally recognized because, as this Essay explains, it restores the potential for deliberative shareholder governance to the large, publicly held corporation. Furthermore, the shift has occurred at a moment in history when technologies exist to facilitate new processes of deliberative shareholder governance. Market actors now are leveraging technology to create such innovations as pass-through voting and advance voting instructions, and academic support is building for new rules that would require intermediaries to provide their beneficial holders with choice infrastructure. This is the realization of the New Deal project to make shareholder preference-satisfaction the crux of the share-holder franchise, and it holds real promise to move corporate governance beyond shareholder wealth maximization
Unshielded: How the Police Can Become Touchable
Get PDFThis Review proceeds in three Parts. First, Part I examines Shielded’s text, highlighting Schwartz’s analysis of the problem of unaccountable police, the many barriers to holding police accountable, and her proposed solutions. Part II then critically examines Schwartz’s work, examining pieces of the problem she left undiscussed and the relative shortcomings of her discussion of possible solutions. Finally, Part III takes an abolitionist approach, delving into potential nonreformist reforms and the solution of full abolition, as well as examining the most significant objection to abolitionist approaches: the problem of violence
Unprincipled All the Way Down
Get PDFIn 2006, the Supreme Court issued an emergency stay order in Purcell v. Gonzalez. Sparing in words and inattentive to the realities on the ground, the opinion nevertheless made a reasonable and understandable assertion: prior to issuing relief, courts presiding over elections should take into account any harms that judicial orders might cause, particularly in the lead-up to voting, alongside other considerations unique to elections. The statement was general enough to mollify the masses in the short-term. But over the long haul, it has proven to be a vehicle through which important election decisions might be made in less than principled ways.
This Paper examines two important dimensions of what Purcell omitted: how the guidance relates to principles of federalism and equity. In the years since the opinion’s issuance, the Supreme Court has elaborated on the Purcell principle, suggesting that it binds federal courts alone. Yet state courts have drawn on Purcell to justify their own decisions to rule or abstain from ruling in election disputes. In those decisions, furthermore, they have attempted to fit Purcell into their states’ equitable regimes. There is no uniformity among the states, as one might expect, but one also observes the absence of doctrinal clarity, coherence, and consistency in its application. Based on a survey of state election cases, this Paper, which is part of a larger project devoted to examining the Purcell principle, contends that the problem of Purcell is far more diffuse and potent than one could have predicted
Guess Who?: First-Time In-Court Identifications and Due Process
Get PDFJuries believe eyewitnesses. When an identifying eyewitness takes the stand and points to a defendant in a courtroom, the jury is more likely to render a guilty verdict. But how reliable is that identification? What if the eyewitness is on the stand identifying a perpetrator for the first time, in the court room, rather than at the police station with a lineup or photo array? How do those suggestive circumstances implicate a criminal defendant’s due process rights?
First-time in-court identifications are inherently suggestive. While the Supreme Court has acknowledged the suggestive nature of similar identifications, it did not directly address first-time in-court identifications in its most recent eyewitness identification case, Perry v. New Hampshire. State and lower federal courts have filled the void in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, but they remain divided on how to handle identifications occurring for the first time in the courtroom. Some courts opt to require a preliminary screening to assess the reliability of the identification prior to in-court admission, while other courts maintain that traditional trial procedures, such as cross-examination, the right to counsel, and jury instructions, adequately protect defendants.
After Perry, some state courts have provided defendants with additional protections. The high courts of Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, and Michigan all recognize the inherent suggestiveness of first-time in-court identifications and have adopted different procedures to protect defendants against the risks of misidentification.
This Note explores the problems with first-time in-court identifications, the inadequacy of the Supreme Court’s current jurisprudence, and several states’ approaches to offering additional protection for defendants facing a first-time in-court identification. This Note calls for state and federal courts to adopt a more stringent standard of admissibility for first-time in-court identifications, and also urges courts to construe Perry broadly to encompass actions by prosecutors. Additional protections are necessary, and even critical, to prevent misidentifications that lead to wrongful convictions. Reforming the way trial courts handle first-time in-court identifications is one way to protect the rights of criminal defendants
Supplementing the Record: The Life and Career of Judge Edmund L. Palmieri
Get PDFFor approximately ninety years, lower federal court judges have hired law clerks to process the work of the courts. While the law clerks typically go on to successful careers as attorneys, law professors, government officials, and judges, it is rare that the former apprentices become so famous that their mentors are lost in their oversized shadows. This is the case, however, for former federal district court judge Edmund L. Palmieri. A highly respected jurist who sat in the Southern District of New York for over three decades, Palmieri has seemingly become the answer to the following trivial pursuit question: “What federal judge hired a young Ruth Bader Ginsburg as his law clerk?
The Fiduciary Duty of Combatting Global Climate Change
Get PDFAncient Roman Law codified the concept that there are certain resources that are so great and so important to human survival, that intuitively, no person should own them. Further, the government must protect these resources for the people. Today, this concept is known at the public trust doctrine. According to the contemporary doctrine, the seas, oceans, shores, and submerged lands cannot be privately owned, but shall be held in trust by the government for public use. Relying on the public trust doctrine, climate change litigants have brought a tirade of lawsuits—which have largely been unsuccessful—alleging that the government has a fiduciary duty to protect trust resources, and thus must take steps to mitigate the effects of climate change. Despite the backdrop of the current climate crisis, courts have declined to impose such an affirmative duty on the government.
This Note analyzes the viability of the public trust doctrine as a litigation tool to combat global climate change. It examines the doctrine’s history and purpose dating back to ancient Roman Law. Further, this Note advocates for an expansion of the doctrine and for the establishment of an affirmative fiduciary duty on the government to protect the resources held in trust. Ultimately, it offers a solution to give the doctrine the necessary teeth to enact meaningful environmental change
Brnovich: Extratextual Textualism
Get PDFThis Article provides a comprehensive analysis of Brnovich v. Democratic National Convention, which purports to create a new standard for Section 2 claims under the Voting Rights Act, by situating the critique in the ratifying-era history and original intentions of the VRA’s constitutional counterpart, the Fifteenth Amendment. Brnovich is necessarily examined through a historical and political framework, identifying throughlines from the Reconstruction Era original intentions for the Fifteenth Amendment, distilled from Congressional debates, the VRA’s initially expansive Supreme Court interpretation in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, and Congress’ Section 2 amendments in 1982, rebuking the Court’s attempts to erode the legal force of the VRA in Mobile v. Bolden.
In Brnovich, the Court effectively nullifies the VRA’s Section 2 by erecting ultra vires legal standards and “guideposts” to evaluate voting qualifications, prerequisites, standards, practices, and procedures which were intended to, and do have a disparate impact and discriminatory effect on VRA protected classes. The Court’s newly created “guideposts” are not based on the rich legislative history of the Fifteenth Amendment or Voting Rights Act and its five subsequent bipartisan reauthorizations through 2006 or properly applied cannons of statutory interpretation. Instead, these “guideposts” are judicially fabricated to end the so-called “racial entitlement” the Act purportedly creates, bearing little resemblance to the Fifteenth Amendment’s original racial equity purpose and the Court’s prior legal precedents.
As a result, the Article advocates for a constitutional amendment to cement the right to vote as a fundamental right subject to strict scrutiny analysis in Constitutional jurisprudence to indemnify democracy against further erosion of the right by the Court. The multi-part amendment would guarantee the right to vote as fundamental (without regard to status as a state or federal correctional facility), constitutionalize same-day voter registration, expand the definition of protected classes, and mandate nonpartisan non-legislating independent redistricting commissions to ensure the promise of “one person, one vote,” to undo the combined effects of Shelby County v. Holder, Rucho v. Common Cause, and Brnovich
Using State and Local Governments’ Purchasing Power to Combat Wage Theft
Get PDFRegulatory efforts to curb wage theft are failing. And for good reason: these laws generally empower individual workers to pursue their rights when employers neglect to pay them what they are owed and deter employers with substantial penalties. But the vast majority of workers do not take formal action against their employers. So, when the penalties for committing wage theft are almost entirely triggered by claims workers do not bring, they do not deter employer behavior. Instead, because the likelihood of being penalized at all is so low, some employers make profit-maximizing decisions to commit wage theft on a large scale. In addition to being against the law, these practices impose substantial costs on taxpayers and distort the competitive labor market, as law-abiding employers struggle to compete with others who cut costs by underpaying workers.
This Article explores government contracting initiatives at the state and local level as a supplemental tool for deterring wage theft. In addition to deterring unlawful behavior, conditioning government contracts and other public business relationships on recipients’ past and continued compliance with existent wage payment laws ensure that public funds are not used to subsidize wage theft’s public harm. Furthermore, publicly labeling wage-theft offenders as ill-fit government partners or providers of public goods and services challenges industry practices that have normalized this one particular kind of property “theft.”
While contract-based initiatives are an increasingly popular government tool for promoting certain workplace activities, these initiatives are specifically well suited for promoting wage-payment obligations and addressing the economic and logistical shortcomings of existing anti-wage-theft laws. Rather than relying on individual worker complaints to spur the enforcement process, contract-based initiatives make self-enforcement and rigorous disclosure obligations the price tag for lucrative public works and publicly subsidized opportunities. And because the potential penalty (or cost) of committing wage theft is contract ineligibility, contract-based initiatives turn employers’ cost-benefit analyses inside out. Instead of using low enforcement rates and predictable penalties to determine whether wage theft is likely the most profitable course of action, conscious employers must make these decisions with an added cost variable—the potential loss of public business opportunities. As the movement towards privatization marches on into new services and industries, more employers than ever should assess these costs as too high to risk having to pay