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A Former Prosecutor Reimagines How the Criminal Justice System Can Serve Victims of Domestic Violence
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Squeeze Blood From Turnip: Abusing Trademark Law\u27s Morality Provision in the TTAB
Get PDFTrademark law prohibits the registration of trademarks that are immoral or scandalous. This Morality Provision in trademark law has been criticized as being an unconstitutional abridgement of free speech and resulting in inconsistency and other problems at the USPTO examination stage. This essay exposes another problem with the Morality Provision, which is its abuse by third parties in the TTAB. This essay explores why the Morality Provision-and not any other provisions in trademark law-is susceptible to this type of abuse and outlines examples of these abusive cases in the TTAB. These cases show that, in inter partes proceedings in the TTAB, the Morality Provision is often asserted by individuals without any real interest in the proposed trademark, but who instead morally disapprove of the trademark owner or its commercial activities. This type of behavior, where third parties use trademark law and the TTAB to direct their moral outrage at individuals or businesses ofwhich they disapprove, overextends trademark law\u27s jurisprudence, disrupts commerce, and inappropriately drains government resources. Yet as long as the Morality Provision is part of trademark law in the U.S., these cases continue to appear in the TTAB and result in years of contentious and unnecessary litigation. The tendency and ease for the Morality Provision to be abused in this way combined with its potential to violate free speech and its other problems at the USPTO examination stage supports the argument that the Morality Provision is flawed and should be overhauled or removed from trademark law
The Rule of Lenity in the State of Montana: Is There Lenity?
Get PDFThis note examines how the rule of lenity is applied in the Montana Supreme Court and ultimately demonstrates that the Court’s understanding of the rule’s application is not always clear. The first application of the rule of lenity occurred in 1922. From 1922 to 1933, the Montana Supreme Court applied the rule of lenity, despite it not being codified in Montana since 1895. In 1934, the Court correctly cited to the statute that abrogated the common law rule of strict construction in Montana by looking to the Revised Codes of 1921. However, only four years later, in 1938, the Court returned to the application of the rule of strict construction until 1993. In 1993, in State v. Turner, the Court notably did not apply the rule of lenity to the penal code in Montana. Defendants continued to challenge the Court’s holding in Turner by raising the rule of lenity, but the Court continued to follow the rule of strict construction, without regard to whether that construction favors the defendant, after Turner. Since 1993, the Court has not actually applied the rule of lenity. The Court allows the rule of lenity to cause commotion in cases but refuses to give it force. Without its application in cases where it has been raised, the rule is simply a noisemaker rather than a tool of statutory interpretation
Martin v. United States
Get PDFIn Martin v. United States, the Federal Circuit Court dismissed a Fifth Amendment regulatory takings and exaction claim for want of ripeness when the claimant failed to apply for a permit, which would have allowed for an assessment of the cost of compliance with governmentally imposed requirements. By finding the claim unripe, the court stood firm on the historical view that federal courts may only adjudicate land-use regulatory takings and inverse condemnation claims on the merits after a regulating entity has made a final decision. However, jurisprudential evolution of the ripeness doctrine and judicial review of takings claims may be forthcoming as the United States Supreme Court is set to deliver a decision in Knick v. Township of Scott
California v. United States Bureau of Land Management
Get PDFAfter President Trump’s Executive Order No. 13783 encouraging relaxing regulatory burdens on energy production, the Bureau of Land Management reevaluated its 2016 “Waste Prevention Rule” which addressed waste of natural gas from venting, flaring, or other leaks resulting from oil and natural gas production activities. The BLM sought to postpone the Rule’s compliance date to give the agency time to promulgate a new rule—effectively overruling the 2016 Rule. Plaintiffs challenged the agency’s compliance under the Administrative Procedures Act, and the court found the BLM did not properly follow APA requirements
Atlantic Richfield Company v. Montana Second Judicial District Court
Get PDFLandowners in Opportunity, Montana sought restoration damages from ARCO, Anaconda Copper Mining Company’s successor, to their property from over a century of processing ore at the Anaconda Smelter. ARCO argued that CERCLA preempted and barred any claim for restoration damages. The Montana Supreme Court held: landowners could bring their state common law claims seeking restoration damages; the state district court had subject matter jurisdiction; and landowners’ proposed restoration fund did not challenge EPA’s selected remedy under CERCLA