2622 research outputs found
Sort by
PREVIEW; \u3cem\u3eDraggin’ Y Cattle Company, Inc. v. Junkermier, Clark, Campanella, Stevens, P.C.\u3c/em\u3e: Abandonment as Breach
This case presents the Court with the question of whether a settlement agreement is unenforceable because it is unreasonable pursuant to Montana law. Within this broad question, the Court must determine whether the district court correctly found NYM had “abandoned” JCCS as well as whether the district court applied the proper reasonableness standard
The Analysis is Simple: A Child\u27s Right to Counsel in Dependency and Neglect Proceedings Under the Montana Constitution
This comment argues that given Article II, Section 15’s text, intent, and development in the courts, children must be appointed attorneys in dependency proceedings. Part II briefly explains the process of dependency proceedings, and the federal and state statutory framework that guides them. Part III first explains the rights implicated in dependency proceedings, which have been complicated by the courts. It then explains the origins of procedural due process in the federal system. Lastly, it discusses Montana’s extension of procedural due process to parents in dependency proceedings, giving parents the right to counsel. Part IV discusses four Montana Supreme Court cases regarding a child’s right to counsel in dependency proceedings. Part V describes how Article II, Section 15 entitles children to appointed counsel in dependency proceedings, both in its plain text and the Montana Constitutional Framer’s intent. Part VI continues the analysis by examining the implications of declaring a child’s right to an attorney under Article II, Section 15, and Part VII concludes that the Court must find Montana’s current dependency statutory framework unconstitutional
Table of Contents
Volume 39 of the University of Montana’s Public Land & Resources Law Review, published in summer 2018, features seven articles across 276 pages. One article was written by a student, while the remaining six were authored by lawyers, academics, and politicians. Jonah Brown served as Editor-in-Chief, Ben Almy and Sarah Danno served as co-Publication Editors, and Jake Schwaller served as Business Editor
United States Citrus Science Council v. United States Department of Agriculture
As our world becomes increasingly more dependent on global trade, issues have arisen with respect to the harm caused to domestic producers. In U.S. Citrus Science Council v. USDA, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California clarified domestic lemon producers’ standing to challenge agency decisions that result in the importation of foreign crops. This decision could create similar pathways for future challenges to the importation of other commodities into the United States
Montana Environmental Information Center v. U.S. Office of Surface Mining
In MEIC v. U.S. Office of Surface Mining, the cost of coal mining’s climate impacts and the agency’s NEPA review obligations are at issue. The United States District Court for the District of Montana found that the Office of Surface Mining and Enforcement failed to adequately consider the need for an EIS and to take a hard look at the indirect, cumulative, and foreseeable impacts of a proposed coal mine expansion in central Montana. In its NEPA analysis, the court concluded that if the benefits of a carbon-intensive project are quantified, then the costs to the climate should be also, using the Social Cost of Carbon Protocol tool. The court held that the Enforcement Office was arbitrary and capricious in its EA of the proposed coal mine expansion and in its consideration of an EIS
Precap: \u3cem\u3eCity of Missoula v. Marcy Jane Kroschel\u3c/em\u3e
City of Missoula v. Kroschel asks the Court to define the parameters of an officer’s lawful questioning during a non-vehicular investigatory stop. Montana’s Terry stop statute, articulated in Section 46–5–401 of the Montana Code Annotated (the “Terry statute”), authorizes an officer to request a person’s name and address and an explanation of the person’s actions when the officer has a particularized suspicion that the person is committing or has committed a crime. Kroschel argues that an officer is limited to the questions specifically enumerated in the statute and an individual may decline to answer free of consequence
PREVIEW; \u3cem\u3eCross v. Warren\u3c/em\u3e: Can Injured Third-Parties Stack Liability Insurance?
This case concerns third-party motor vehicle liability insurance and whether it can be “stacked” under Montana law. Kenneth Cross, Henley Brady, and Roland Redfield (collectively “Appellants”) sustained injuries in a motor vehicle collision. The at-fault driver, Taylor Warren, was insured under a liability policy issued by Progressive. The policy covering the truck Taylor was driving at the time of the accident was covered under one of four liability policies the Warren family purchased to cover their four vehicles individually. The Appellants argue that each of the Warrens’ four Progressive policies should be “stacked” to allow recovery beyond the “per person” limit provided the individual Progressive policy. Taylor Warren, his parents, and Progressive (collectively “Appellees”) respond that Montana law prevents stacking multiple third-party liability policies, and in the alternative, even if stacking of the coverage is allowed, Progressive satisfied the statutory requirements necessary to prevent Appellants from doing so