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(Re)building the Master\u27s House: Dismantling America\u27s Colonial Politics of Extraction and Exclusion
Get PDFOn February 10, 2021, and in the days thereafter, liberal American commentators showered Congresswoman Stacey Plaskett with superlatives and praise due to her masterful takedown of former President Donald Trump during his impeachment trial for incitement of the January 6, 2021 Capitol Riot. Referring to a picture of Plaskett wearing a knee-length blue dress with draped sleeves, the political strategist (and daughter of House Majority Leader Nancy Pelosi) Christine Pelosi took to Twitter to note that “[n]ot all superheroes wear capes. This one does!
By any other name
Get PDFThe use of names to refer to individuals is probably as old as language itself, but many features of naming in the United States are much newer. For the most part, our naming laws and norms derive from England, where the use of surnames, for example, can be traced back to the Norman conquest and did not become a common practice until the 13th or 14th century. The idea of a surname as a family name, permanent and hereditary, is even newer.
The common law method of changing one’s name — simply using a different name, for non-fraudulent purposes — is still valid in most states, including Michigan. However, the practical impact of a common law name change is limited since it may not be sufficient for a name change on identification documents. The Social Security Administration, for example, will not change the name associated with a Social Security number based on evidence of a common law name change.
This column discusses Michigan’s name change laws and the requirements for a name change on one’s driver’s license, Social Security card, and passport. It focuses on two categories of name change and the issues they may present: name changes upon marriage and name changes by transgender or non-binary people
Race-ing Antitrust
Get PDFAntitrust law has a race problem. To spot an antitrust violation, courts inquire into whether an act has degraded consumer welfare. Since anticompetitive practices are often assumed to enhance consumer welfare, antitrust offenses are rarely found. Key to this framework is that antitrust treats all consumers monolithically; that consumers are differently situated, especially along lines of race, simply is ignored.
We argue that antitrust law must disaggregate the term “consumer” to include those who disproportionately suffer from anticompetitive practices via a community welfare standard. As a starting point, we demonstrate that anticompetitive conduct has specifically been used as a tool of oppression while, at other times, minorities are the unintended victims of anticompetitive practices. In turn, this Article leans on Critical Race Theory (CRT) to explore ways that antitrust’s “colorblind” stance has failed communities of color. We also explain why antitrust law is an ideal regime to address systemic racism. Consider that antitrust law is concerned with structures; just as enforcement scrutinizes whether conduct has made a market more or less likely to promote consumer welfare, antitrust should scrutinize whether anticompetitive conduct has made a market more or less likely to benefit all consumers. To put it another way, antitrust’s claimed purpose is to enhance consumer welfare by maximizing allocative efficiency, but it ignores how discrimination is similarly inefficient if resources are misallocated along race lines rather than their most productive uses. Finally, by embracing the intellectual backbone of antitrust law as well as CRT’s lessons about power structures, we make the case that antitrust’s goal should be reimagined to benefit not only the welfare of all consumers but the welfare of communities as well
The Short Unhappy Life of the Negotiation Class
Get PDFOn September 11, 2019, Judge Dan Aaron Polster of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, Eastern Division, approved a novel negotiation class certification in the massive Opiate multidistrict litigation (MDL). Merely one year later on September 24, 2020, the Sixth Circuit reversed Judge Polster’s certification order. While the Opiate MDL has garnered substantial media and academic attention, less consideration has been directed to analyzing the significance of the negotiation class model and the appellate repudiation of this innovative procedural mechanism.
This Article focuses on the development and fate of the negotiation class and considers the lessons to be gleaned from its attempted use in the Opiate MDL. The short unhappy life of the negotiation class raises questions whether its failure was a consequence of implementation or design. This is an important question because if the failure was the result of problematic implementation in the context of idiosyncratic circumstances, then the negotiation class model may live to see another day. On the other hand, if the failure was the consequence of deficient design and judicial overreaching, then the negotiation class may be consigned to the museum of good intentions gone awry.
The novel proposal for a negotiation class did not come out of nowhere but was another chapter in a five-decade struggle between aggregationist attorneys and judges seeking creative solutions to mass litigation, pitted against jurists repudiating adventurous use of the class action rule. This Article provides the definitive narration of the historical evolution of expanding novel uses of Rule 23, anchored in the mass tort litigation crisis that emerged on federal court dockets in the late 1970s. The article illustrates how Judge Polster’s negotiation class was the logical culmination of decades of judicial and academic experimentation with innovative procedural means to accomplish the fair and expeditious resolution of aggregate litigation. It traces the role of the American Law Institute in advancing pro-aggregation initiatives, laying the groundwork for the Opiate negotiation class proposal. The discussion elucidates how the debate over the settlement class concept in the 1990s presaged the same debate over the negotiation class three decades later, and how criticisms of the ALI aggregate litigation proposals resurfaced in opposition to the Opiate negotiation class.
The negotiation class model promised to ameliorate numerous problems inherent in heterogenous group litigation by infusing class litigation with collective action theories and democratic participatory features. The centerpiece of the negotiation class was to bring class claimants to the table and provide them with meaningful voice through group design of a settlement allocation metric, coupled with a franchise vote to approve or disapprove any offered settlement. Its other defining feature was to provide defendants at early juncture in proceedings with an accurate assessment of the class size as an incentive to enable defendants to secure global peace.
The attempted implementation of the negotiation class in the Opiate litigation revealed numerous fault lines in the proposal. The negotiation class as applied failed to provide many claimants with comprehensible information regarding the devised allocation formula. Some claimants believed that it failed to ameliorate the kinds of intraclass conflicts it was designed to remedy. State attorneys general raised the specter of interference with state prerogatives. Furthermore, rather than empowering class members at the negotiation table, the development of the Opiate litigation defaulted to a traditional model of attorney empowerment and dominance in the resolution of aggregate proceedings. The promise of collective action and democratization proved illusory.
The deployment of the negotiation class concept in the Opiate MDL also entailed problematic questions concerning the role of judicial surrogates in aggregate litigation and the increasing power and influence that courts delegate to non-party actors. Judge Polster’s embrace of the negotiation class in the Opiate litigation placed the judge, his court-appointed surrogates, and the array of plaintiff and defense attorneys in tension with the Supreme Court admonition to federal judges, at the end of the twentieth century, to cease adventurous use of the class action rule.
It may well be that the Opiate MDL was a poor vehicle to test the negotiation class proposal and so the problem was one of implementation, rather than design. The failure of the Opiate negotiation class leaves open the question of whether those who crafted it could have done a better job to avoid appellate reversal. Nonetheless, if the array of special masters, expert academic professors, a seasoned senior judge, and highly experienced complex litigation attorneys were unable to successfully shepherd the first negotiation class, this experience raises doubts about its prospects. It should be remembered that the settlement class of the 1990s was a novel procedure in its day, yet it subsequently became a stock device in the class action toolbox. The history of the settlement class may foreshadow better days for the negotiation class or inspire further rulemaking by the federal judiciary to legitimate the negotiation class model
A Comparative Look at Various Countries\u27 Legal Regimes Governing Automated Vehicles
Get PDFNews and commentary about automated vehicles (AVs) focus on how they look and appear to operate, along with the companies developing and testing them. Behind the scenes are legal regimes—laws, regulations, and implementing bodies of different kinds—that literally and figuratively provide the rules of the road for AVs. Legal regimes matter because public welfare hinges on aspects of AV design and operation. Legal regimes can provide gatekeeping for AV developers and operators seeking to use public roads, and they can allocate liability when something goes wrong. Guiding and complementing legal regimes is public policy. Policy documents such as articulations of national strategies are sometimes used to address issues related to legal regimes and to demonstrate a jurisdiction’s support for AV development.
Building on its long history analyzing AV policy issues, RAND (with support of its Institute for Civil Justice) collaborated with the University of Michigan Law School’s Law and Mobility Program to study the nature of different AV legal regimes around the world. It selected countries known to be active in this domain. The research team reviewed and shared scholarly and gray literature (which is a type of scholarship produced by an entity in which commercial publications are not the primary focus, such as white papers from a government agency), and it also consulted experts in these regimes from the public and private sectors. Under the supervision of the Law and Mobility Fellow (a lawyer), law students collected and studied materials associated with country-specific legal regimes and drafted summaries guided by RAND’s enumeration of key factors. Availability of information about legal regimes varies—access to documentation, especially in English, is uneven, even for officials in different countries working collaboratively on these issues. That constrained availability is reflected in published legal comparisons, and it motivated the research team’s systematic research, which drew from materials in English and other languages. This article summarizes the makeup of AV legal regimes of Australia, China, France, Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom. It highlights some key contrasts, which will be developed further as the project continues. It focuses on law and policy relating to highly to fully automated vehicles (SAE Levels 4 and 5). Although guided by a common set of topics for each country, each profile reflects the material available and the factors that differentiate national approaches.
The remainder of this article introduces the legal regimes of the covered countries in turn. It then provides an overview of key points of comparison and outlines future work
Heeding the Voices of Migrant Youth: The Need for Action
Get PDFA Review of Unaccompanied: The Plight of Immigrant Youth at the Border. By Emily Ruehs-Navarro
ReBraiding Frayed Sweetgrass for Niijaansinaanik: Understanding Canadian Indigenous Child Welfare Issues as International Atrocity Crimes
Get PDFThe unearthing of the remains of Indigenous children on the sites of former Indian Residential Schools (“IRS”) in Canada has focused greater attention on anti-Indigenous atrocity violence in the country. While such increased attention, combined with recent efforts at redressing associated harms, represents a step forward in terms of recognizing and addressing the harms caused to Indigenous peoples through the settler-colonial process in Canada, this note expresses concern that the dominant framings of anti-Indigenous atrocity violence remain myopically focused on an overly narrow subset of harms and forms of violence, especially those committed at IRSs. It does so by utilizing a process-based understanding of atrocity and genocide that helps draw connections between familiar, highly visible, and less recognized forms of atrocity violence, which tend to be overlapping and mutually reinforcing in terms of their destructive effects. This process-based understanding challenges the neocolonial, racist, and discriminatory attitudes reflected in the drafting and interpretation of the Genocide Convention and other atrocity laws that ignore the lived experiences of subjugated groups. Utilizing this approach, this note argues that, as applied to Indigenous populations, Canada’s longstanding discriminatory child welfare practices and policies represent an overlooked process of anti-Indigenous atrocity violence. Only by understanding current child welfare challenges facing Indigenous communities as interwoven with longstanding anti-Indigenous atrocity processes, such as the IRS system, can we understand what is at stake for affected communities and fashion appropriate remedies in international and domestic law
Inventing Deportation Arrests
Get PDFAt the dawn of the federal deportation system, the nation’s top immigration official proclaimed the power to authorize deportation arrests “an extraordinary one” to vest in administrative officers. He reassured the nation that this immense power—then wielded by a cabinet secretary, the only executive officer empowered to authorize these arrests—was exercised with “great care and deliberation.” A century later, this extraordinary power is legally trivial and systemically exercised by low-level enforcement officers alone. Consequently, thousands of these officers—the police and jailors of the immigration system— now have the power to solely determine whether deportation arrests are justified and, therefore, whether to subject over a hundred thousand people annually to the extended detention and bare process of our modern deportation system.
This deportation arrest regime—still anomalous in our law enforcement system— has been justified by the notion that immigration enforcement has always been different when it comes to arrest constraints and that the validity of the modern deportation arrest system is evidenced through its history. This Article investigates and ultimately challenges those justifications. It focuses on the advent of administrative arrest authority in the federal immigration scheme and explores how the once “extraordinary” and confined power to authorize deportation arrests became legally trivial and diffuse. It not only provides the first account of the invention and development of federal deportation arrest authority from its inception to the modern day, but also one that differs from and complicates the conventional account in critical ways. Specifically, it reveals an early system of deportation arrest procedures that, even at a time of virulent hostility toward immigrants and overtly racist immigration regulation, was designed to impose significantly greater checks on enforcement officers’ arrest authority and more robust independent review than does the modern immigration scheme. This Article also describes why that eventually changed, providing important insight on why we are where we are today.
Ultimately, this Article contests the conventional narrative that the modern deportation arrest regime is justified by its past and casts doubt on the near-unanimous case law that has relied on it. In so doing, it gives courts a reason to reconsider the constitutional validity of this scheme and provides historical support for calls to fundamentally transform the deportation arrest system
Jack Daniel\u27s Properties, Inc. v. VIP Products LLC: Brief of Amici Curiae 30 Trademark Law Professors in Support of Respondent
Get PDFAmici are 30 law professors who teach and write extensively about trademark law and other intellectual property law subjects. Amici have no personal interest in this case. Amici’s sole interest is in the orderly development of trademark law in a way that serves the public interest, in part by ensuring the proper balance between legitimate trademark interests and strong First Amendment speech interests.\u3c\p\u3e
Trademark law has expanded dramatically in recent decades, opening the door to claims against parties that are primarily selling speech. Those claims would have been inconceivable when the Lanham Act was passed.\u3c\p\u3e
Early courts facing these expanded claims in the 1970s and 1980s tried to do what the government’s brief now suggests and simply apply the new, judicially created multifactor likelihood-of-confusion tests each circuit created in the middle of the twentieth century. The result was a disaster. Many courts declared obvious parodies and commentary illegal. Even the courts that properly protected speech about trademarks did so by mutating or ignoring their own likelihood-of-confusion test. And the fact-specific nature of the inquiry required expensive surveys and made summary judgment difficult, leading numerous defendants with meritorious cases to censor their speech rather than face the cost and uncertainty of prolonged litigation