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Judicial Biography in the British Empire
Get PDFThis article adds to the biographic \u27\u27turn in legal studies. While there is a large body of scholarship examining judges in the United States and the United Kingdom, comparatively little is written on their legal counterparts in the common law world. What can judicial biographies offer for comparative law? Do these studies generate useful information about the movement of law? What can be gained by a better awareness of the lives of those at the top of the colonial legal profession? This article shows that within the common law world, judges, like those in the United States and the United Kingdom, were central figures in the administration of justice and in the colonial socio-political elite. Biographical studies are even more important in understanding the way law moved through the British Empire because the backgrounds of these figures shaped their ability to deal with new social groups and diverse societies, and to create pluralistic solutions to legal problems. As colonial judges had to be geographically mobile to move through the British Empire, they possessed transnational careers and accumulated experiences from different common law based legal systems. Through their role as colonial adjudicators, judges influenced the world around them, in part, due to their experiences and socialization. We argue that judicial biographies provide a new way to see the way law moved across colonial and imperial jurisdictions
Transnational Antitrust Law
No full textProfessor Buxbaum\u27s contribution to this volume is chapter 14 Transnational Antitrust Lawhttps://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facbooks/1257/thumbnail.jp
2021/22 Indiana University Maurer School of Law Faculty
No full textFront Row: I. India Thusi, Lane McFadden, Sarah Jane Hughes, Kenneth Dau-Schmidt, Austen Parrish, Robert Downey, William Henderson, Daniel Conkle, Jeffrey Stake, Victor Quintanilla
Second Row: Charles Geyh, Deborah Widiss, Jennifer Bryan Morgan, Lisa Farnsworth, Michael Maben, Jeffrey Tomain
Third Row: Jody Madeira, Amy Applegate, Laura Dagne, Asaf Lubin, Mark Janis, Susan deMaine, Cindy Dabney, Maggie Kiel-Morse, Ashley Ahlbrand
Fourth Row: Nicholas Almendares, Robert Fischman, Gabrielle Goodwin, Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Kevin Brown, Christian Freitag, Sophia Goodman, Jessica Eaglin
Fifth Row: David Williams, Steve Sanders, Jeannine Bell, João Marinotti, Jayanth Krishnan, Norman Hedges, Mark Need, Marshall Leaffer, Donna Nagy, Christiana Ochoahttps://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facgrp/1027/thumbnail.jp
Compensating Victims of Police Violence
Get PDFVictims of police violence suffer physical trauma and their families suffer mental trauma “born from the violation of a certain social trust.” Their losses are also financial, including medical expenses and mental health treatment, as well as lost income. While scholars and citizens have advocated for accountability and justice, this is the first essay to advocate for the simple act of victims’ compensation for victims of police violence.
To be considered for compensation, victims must first prove that they cooperated with law enforcement and were “innocent” of wrongdoing. Yet, victims of police violence are inordinately and openly blamed for their own injuries in police reports. In incidents of police violence, officers may be incentivized to evade accountability by reporting that the victim was contributorily at fault. If neither police nor prosecutors identify the people harmed as victims, then these injured people will not qualify for Victim Compensation Funds to pay for mental health treatment or medical care.
This Essay explains Victim Compensation Funds, which are available in every state and U.S. territory, and why police violence victims rarely qualify for compensation. The Essay calls upon state legislators and district attorneys to make these victims eligible for consideration of funds, namely by eliminating the requirement of cooperation with law enforcement for victims of police violence and re-examining the “innocence” requirement
Equality, Animus, and Expressive and Religious Freedom Under the American Constitution: Masterpiece Cakeshop and Beyond
Get PDFProfessor Conkle\u27s contribution to this volume, pre-print attached, is the chapter Equality, Animus, and Expressive and Religious Freedom Under the American Constitution: Masterpiece Cakeshop and Beyond.
CHAPTER ABSTRACT: Does the First Amendment protect religious wedding vendors from anti-discrimination laws that require them to provide goods or services for same-sex weddings? The fundamental question is whether equality or religious freedom should prevail in this setting, but the complexities of American free speech and free exercise law—exacerbated by the Supreme Court’s decision in Masterpiece Cakeshop—have obscured the debate with dubious distinctions and highly contentious rationales and arguments. In this Essay, I present and defend three proposals for resolving the wedding vendor controversy and for clarifying and enhancing the law of religious freedom. First, the Supreme Court should reject the wedding vendors’ compelled speech argument even on the assumption that the vendors’ conduct is expressive. Second, the Court should repudiate the restrictive free exercise doctrine of Employment Division v. Smith, which has not settled the law but which instead has been undetermined by ill-defined exceptions and by congressional and state law developments. And third, applying its earlier, pre-Smith interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause, the Court should find strict scrutiny satisfied and therefore should reject the vendors’ free exercise claims. My second and third proposals, taken together, would permit the wedding vendor controversy to be framed and resolved transparently, as the conflict of competing values that it is: equality on the one hand, religious freedom on the other.https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facbooks/1240/thumbnail.jp
How to Measure and Value Wealth for a Federal Wealth Tax Reform
Get PDFOver the last several decades, wealth inequality has exploded, warping economic outcomes and limiting opportunity—for individuals and for the US at large.
Sky-high income inequality and runaway income gains for the nation’s highest earners compound that wealth inequality and are insufficiently taxed under the current tax regime.
Further, wealth in the US has always been heavily skewed by race.
Since the country’s founding, US laws and customs have prevented Black and brown people from receiving fair wages and accruing assets, thereby creating and perpetuating today’s massive racial wealth gap.
While our existing tax systems are ill-equipped to tackle these challenges, a well designed, high-end wealth tax could both help level the playing field and promote shared economic prosperity.
The existing US income tax regime is cash realization–based and thus mostly takes a deferral-based approach to valuation of the economic income derived from wealth accumulations—an approach to valuation that can be politically fragile and extremely vulnerable to gaming.
To achieve meaningful progressive taxation of the very wealthy, we should instead value and tax income and wealth in real time.
Encouragingly, this strikes many as an obvious solution, and governments around the world are now considering wealth tax proposals.
In the US, the 2020 presidential campaigns of Senators Elizabeth Warren (D-MA) and Bernie Sanders (I-VT) brought the idea to the national stage.
Their proposals to tax the wealth of multimillionaires and billionaires generated broad public support—even among many Republicans—and broadened the conversation over the future of progressive tax reform.
Fundamental to the design of a wealth tax is how to measure and value taxpayers’ wealth.
This report outlines a practical approach to doing so that can form the basis of federal wealth tax legislation.
In general, the proposed wealth tax would value assets at their fair market value, the notional price at which the asset would voluntarily change hands between an informed buyer and seller, both operating at arm’s length.
Beyond this general rule, assets and liabilities that are hard to value would be subject to additional rules for measuring fair market value.
As this report will explain, although there are many difficulties involved in designing a valuation and measurement system, these difficulties are not inherently more challenging when it comes to designing and implementing a wealth tax than they are for designing and implementing an income tax.
For either an income tax or a wealth tax, there is no perfect valuation or measurement system, and trade-offs must be made amongst potentially conflicting goals.
Measuring wealth can sometimes be complicated and will require additional funding and capacity for the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) or other additional enforcement mechanisms, along with sometimes complex-seeming rules—but these administrative costs are low compared to the revenue at stake if valuation and enforcement are not taken seriously.
Additionally, so long as a wealth tax is designed with a high exclusion threshold, only the wealthiest taxpayers—those with complicated wealth holdings and excellent legal and accounting help— would face any thorny valuation issues or compliance obligations.
This report will explain the best approaches for valuing the most important categories of taxpayers’ wealth, both for forms of wealth that are relatively easy to value and for forms of wealth that are more difficult to value
The Myanmar Shwe: Empowering Law Students, Teachers, and the Community Through Clinical Education and the Rule of Law
Get PDFMyanmar\u27s attorneys, judges, law officers, and law teachers are slowly emerging from the isolated world they inhabited during decades of military authoritarianism. Almost a decade ago, the country triumphantly burst into an era of disciplined democracy under the leadership of Aung San Suu Kyi, de facto head of state. Yet, the legal education system continues to be marked by hierarchical and bureaucratic practices, infrastructural and pedagogical neglect, and low confidence in the formal justice sector. The authors-two American law professors and practitioners and two students-discuss the direction of legal education in Southeast Asia and how clinical legal education (CLE) methodologies can be used to empower law students, teachers, and their communities, with an emphasis on the rule of law and access to justice. They draw on their experience in developing and piloting Community Teaching and Externship Preparation law school curricula in 2017-19 under the auspices of non-governmental organization BABSEACLE (formerly Bridges Across Borders South East Asia Clinical Legal Education Initiative). They highlight two teaching modules: Community Needs Assessments and peer-to-peer CLE English classes at university law departments in remote regions of the country and the outskirts of Yangon. Along with receptiveness for new approaches to teaching, learning, and mentoring by international experts, the authors faced centralized decision-making and planning, no culture of faculty collegiality or autonomy, risk aversion, reluctance to stand out amongst peers, frequent teacher transfers, inadequate research skills, rote learning, undue reliance on distance education, and limited English proficiency. Lastly, the authors comment on the future potential of this educational initiative and the Development Industry. Warning against a Project World mentality, unwelcome imposition of liberal ideals of individualism, and neocolonial tendencies, they highlight the importance of consultation with educational institutions, awareness of the role of local intermediaries and informal justice sector, and the need for genuine coordination and partnership amongst donor agencies and NGOs