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Foreign Judgments and Foreign Arbitral Awards Enforceability as a Factor and a Guarantee for Foreign Investments: the Case of Saudi Arabia
Get PDFForeign investments are considered an efficient and effective instrument to diversify and strengthen the economy; foreign investors generally need guarantees before entering a new market. One of these guarantees is a stable, transparent, predictable legal and judicial system. Such a system must be open to foreign laws and judgments as well as foreign arbitral awards, and it must also be flexible to increase foreign investments. Saudi Arabia has tried since the 50s’ to be more attractive to foreign investors and investments by enacting legislation and creating a modern court system to diversify their economy. However, the discretion of Saudi judges in applying and understanding Sharia is problematic as Sharia is very broad, and judges tend to use the conservative way when dealing with foreign subjects, laws, or bonds. Therefore, foreign investors, scholars, and practitioners need to know the mechanism of the Saudi enforcement court system; also, Saudi officials need to know how to improve their enforcement system to be more attractive and adaptable.
For this, the research used secondary materials, laws, and court judgments and study the efficiency of the enforcement process in Saudi Arabia as an instrument to enhance foreign investments
Pride in the Practice of Law
No full textTony Prather, JD \u2783, is a senior partner at Barnes & Thornburg, where he has been for more than 20 years. Tony represents management in all aspects of labor and employment law and litigation. Prior to joining Barnes & Thornburg, Tony was in-house counsel for Ameritech Corporation, Firestone Building Products Company, Firestone Industrial Products Company and Firestone Polymers. He twice has served on the Indiana Supreme Court Disciplinary Commission.
On Feb. 4, 2022, Indiana University announced Tony would serve as the university\u27s vice president and chief legal counsel, pending Board of Trustees approval. He is expected to begin his duties in that role on Feb. 22.
With the law school, Tony has been deeply engaged. He has served as a member of the school’s Black Law School Student Association Advisory Board since 2005; twice as a member of the school’s Alumni Board; and as a member of the Maurer School of Law Board of Visitors.
He received the Indiana Lawyer Leadership in Law Distinguished Barristers Award in 2018, the Indiana University Maurer School of Law Distinguished Service Award in 2015, and in 2020 was the recipient Indiana University Bicentennial Medal. He was inducted into the Law School’s Academy of Law Alumni Fellows last year, in 2021, the highest honor the law school can bestow upon an alum.https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/coldcall/1011/thumbnail.jp
Questions the IRS Will Not Answer
Get PDFWhen a taxpayer plans to undertake a transaction and its tax consequences are unclear, the taxpayer can request a letter ruling from the IRS. The IRS issues numerous letter rulings each year. In 2020, for instance, the IRS issued 777 letter rulings. The IRS refrains from issuing letter rulings on certain topics. At the beginning of each year, the IRS publishes an updated list of the topics on which it will not rule. Many of the topics on which it will not rule arise in areas of tax law governed by standards where the tax outcome depends heavily on each transaction’s specific facts. This pattern is consistent with the IRS’s stated position that it ordinarily does not rule in certain areas because of the factual nature of the matter involved.
This Article suggests that a policy against ruling on fact-specific topics sacrifices an opportunity to rule on many of the very topics for which a letter ruling could be particularly useful. Because the fact-specific nature of a topic makes it ill-suited for generally applicable guidance, such a topic is a particularly good candidate for a letter ruling.
Existing literature contains very little examination of the reasons for the IRS’s policy against ruling on fact-specific topics. This Article begins to fill that gap and suggests eight potential concerns that might underlie the IRS’s reticence. This Article analyzes whether each concern could be addressed by means other than simply not issuing rulings. To gauge the validity of some of the concerns, this Article examines letter rulings that the IRS did, in fact, issue on several fact-specific topics prior to adding them to the no ruling list. The previously issued letter rulings illustrate that many of the concerns do not inevitably arise in the case of all letter rulings on fact-specific topics. Some of the previously issued letter rulings also demonstrate steps that the IRS should take, or avoid, in order to mitigate some of the concerns if it does rule on fact-specific topics
Enforcing Interstate Compacts in Federal Systems
Get PDFThe central goal of a federal system is for local government units to retain degrees of independence, specifically over matters of importance to that local unit. A logical corollary to that independence is the ability for local units to negotiate and contract with other local units on matters of importance. Therefore, it is not surprising that almost every federal system allows, either implicitly or explicitly, member states to form binding compacts with other states, the union government, or municipalities.1 Some federal democracies even allow member states to compact with foreign governments. Furthermore, almost every federal constitution includes a provision outlining the settlement of interstate disputes. However, the specific legal authority allowing states to enter into compacts and the system governing the settlement of those disputes vary. This variance is mostly because interstate compacts walk a fine line between the division of powers delegated amongst state and federal actors; because of this, interstate compact disputes can be incredibly complicated.
Additionally, interstate compacts raise another, less obvious, area of difficulty; because one of the main purposes of interstate compacts is to maintain some degree of state independence and because the compacts often exist in the grey areas of shared powers, many states would prefer a compact that can be enforced without federal intervention. However, since federal governments often hold authority over the states, states have few avenues for enforcement that do not involve the union government. A former Center for Constitutional Democracy Fellow, Harrison Schafer, began this research by looking at types of interstate associations and compacts and their relative efficacy. This paper will expand on Schafer’s research and specifically look at the source of authority for creating interstate compacts, the dispute resolution mechanisms for those compacts, how effectively systems settle disputes in practice, and examples of how states settled interstate compact disputes without the union government
The Pretrial Process. 3d.
No full textNow updated to reflect the most recent amendments to the Federal Rules and developments in case law, The Pretrial Process addresses issues associated with basic civil litigation tasks such as drafting pleadings, interviewing and counseling clients, developing facts, preparing interrogatories, taking depositions, and filing motions. The Pretrial Process covers all stages of pretrial litigation comprehensively, pragmatically, and succinctly without being over-simplified.
This book is designed to be useful both to clinical students working on their first cases and to classroom students expecting an intellectually satisfying law school experience. The third edition also includes expanded discussions of virtual conferences, depositions, and hearings. Adopters will have access to a teacher\u27s manual, simulation case files, and other teaching resources.https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facbooks/1290/thumbnail.jp
Compelled Speech and Doctrinal Fluidity
Get PDFEven within the messy and complicated confines of First Amendment jurisprudence, compelled speech doctrine stands out in its complexity and conceptual murkiness— a state of affairs that has only been exacerbated by the Supreme Court’s decisions in NIFLA v. Becerra and Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees. This Essay observes that as the Court’s compelled speech jurisprudence has grown increasingly complex, it has also manifested a troubling degree of fluidity, where the doctrinal framework has grown so incoherent, imprecise, and unstable that it can be readily shaped by courts to plausibly justify a wide range of disparate results. After examining some recent examples of this doctrinal fluidity and identifying its origins, the Essay observes that a true fix to this problem—the development of a fully coherent and stable compelled speech doctrine—is highly unlikely to emerge under the current state of affairs, given the intractable nature of the sources of this fluidity and the Court’s case-by-case, winner-take-all culture of constitutional adjudication.
This Essay therefore argues for a shift in the Supreme Court’s approach to compelled speech doctrine—one that eschews formal complexity in favor of more open-ended, analytically transparent approaches. This proposal is, in essence, a second-best solution. If it is unrealistic to expect that an elegant, fully unified, and consistent doctrinal framework will emerge anytime soon, the Court should, at the very least, avoid obscuring its decisions behind complex and malleable formal doctrines and instead analyze cases in a manner that lays bare the fundamental intuitions and value judgments actually driving its decisions. A useful point of comparison might be to common law courts’ approach to negligence doctrine—an approach that is anchored in a simple, open-ended analysis that forces courts to bring to the fore the fundamental values underlying the doctrine. Such an approach would at least allow courts—and society at large—to discuss and debate these fundamental values openly rather than through a nebulous doctrinal façade that may ultimately serve merely to obscure the contested judgments and intuitions actually driving the result
