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Interstate Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage, the Public Policy Exception, and Clear Statements of Extraterritorial Effect
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Get PDFPart I of this article describes the legal framework for analyzing whether a partner can sue under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ( ADEA ), focusing on two fairly recent decisions in this area: (i) The U.S. Supreme Court\u27s 2003 decision in Clackamas Gastroenterology Assoc., P.C. v. Wells, a case in which the Court had to determine whether director-shareholder physicians in a medical clinic should be deemed employees for purposes of the Americans with Disabilities Act ( ADA ); and (ii) the Seventh Circuit\u27s 2002 decision in a lawsuit brought by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ( EEOC ) against the law firm Sidley & Austin ( Sidley ), in which the agency alleged an age discrimination claim on behalf of 32 demoted former equity partners in the firm. While several years have passed since the courts rendered these decisions, recent developments within the legal community, combined with current economic conditions, have exacerbated significantly the impact of these cases. Part I discusses the holdings of these two cases, describe some of the reactions within the legal community to these two cases, and highlight some potential concerns regarding the outcomes in these cases, particularly when applied to the modem large law firm.
Because this article focuses on the impact of Clackamas and Sidley on law firms, particularly the larger ones, Part II sets forth an analysis of the modem large law firm, describing how modem firms have evolved in terms of their hierarchy, demography, goals and objectives. Part II focuses in particular on recent changes within the structure and culture of large law firms and discusses the impact that these changes might have on firm lawyers.
Part III begins to bring together the above information, describing in greater detail how cases like Clackamas and Sidley might undermine the operations of modem large law firms. Part III will discuss some of the specific steps that firms may take in response to these cases and will describe how those steps might impact lawyers in a firm.
Finally, Part IV proposes some solutions to this dilemma, suggesting ways in which law firms might provide partners with the protections potentially required by Clackamas and Sidley, while still running their firms in an effective, efficient, and profitable manner
Why Appellate Courts Have Rejected the Argument that the Defense of Marriage Act Trumps the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act
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Silencing the Voices of Battered Women: How Arizona\u27s New Anti-Immigration Law SB1070 Prevents Undocumented Women from Seeking Relief Under the Violence Against Women Act
Get PDFFollowing the Money--The Chaotic Kerfuffle When Insurance Proceeds Simultaneously are the Only Rebuild Funds and the Only Mortgage Collateral
Get PDFAnd I Don\u27t Know Why it is That You Threw Your Life Away : Abolishing Life Without Parole, The Supreme Court in Graham v. Florida Now Requires States to Give Juveniles Hope for a Second Chance
Get PDFTerrance Graham pled guilty to armed burglary with assault or battery and attempted armed robbery when he was sixteen years old. He was sentenced to prison for the rest of his life. Like Roe v. Wade made history by forcing this country to consider the morality of abortion, so too will the United States Supreme Court\u27s decision in Graham v. Florida make history by challenging the morality of sentencing juveniles for the rest of their lives. After firmly abolishing the death penalty for all juvenile offenders under the age of eighteen, as a violation of the Eighth Amendment\u27s Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, the Court has once again curbed the punishments permissible for the juvenile offender. Reaffirming that juveniles are less culpable than adults, the Court holds that life without parole is disproportionately harsh for juvenile non-homicide offenders, and is therefore cruel and unusual under the Eighth Amendment.
Standing in agreement with Graham, this Article analyzes two issues left in its wake: (1) the inconsistency in the Court\u27s reasoning when viewed against lengthy term of year sentences, and (2) the implicit requirement to reinstate effective parole boards in light of Graham\u27s new constitutional mandate to give juveniles a meaningful opportunity to reenter society. This Article does not suggest that juvenile offenders escape punishment for committed offenses, but rather concludes that our country acknowledges the historic impact and repercussions of Graham\u27s central premise--juveniles are different from adults. Because of this decision, states must deal with those differences in tangible ways to give juvenile offenders hope to reenter society
