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The Lesbian Wife: Same-Sex Marriage as an Expression of Radical and Plural Democracy
Get PDFThis Paper considers three ideas. The first is recognizing that a reactionary and exclusionary democracy exists in this country today. The second is considering the argument by some gay and lesbian activists that including gay men and lesbians under the rubric of state-sanctioned marriage will actually prevent a radical and plural democracy from occurring by removing the outlaw nature of the queer community and leading to the wholesale movement of gays and lesbians from the anti-subordination project into the mainstream middle-class. The third argues that, despite this concern, the gay and lesbian community can help move the country toward a progressive, pluralistic democracy by embracing the radical notion of redefining the family. Redefinition is a way to displace compulsory heterosexuality from its location as the main state-recognized family in the country. In order to do that, however, it will be necessary to forge, as Chantal Mouffe argues, a chain of equivalences between all the democratic demands to produce the collective will of all those people struggling against subordination. Without the help of others working against subordination, the Right will be successful in its attempt to redefine democracy in a restrictive way to reduce its subversive power. With a group as misunderstood and despised as gay men and lesbians, we will need the help of all people struggling against subordination to radicalize family and citizenship enough to include married gay men and lesbians
Does Privacy Really Have a Problem in the Law of Criminal Procedure?
Get PDFAgreeing with William Stuntz\u27s conclusion that privacy retains a significant position in the law of criminal procedure, the author defends a privacy-oriented procedural regime that can .be reconciled with an activist regulatory state. Part One of this Article suggests that the comparatively light judicial supervision of police coercion owes more to the conditions under which force is used than to what Stuntz views as the Court\u27s indifference to what police do to us, or to its obsession over what police can see and hear. By redescribing questions of privacy, or questions of privacy and coercion, merely as questions of coercion, Stuntz\u27s attempt to correct the law of criminal procedure misfires linguistically and practically. The attempt misfires linguistically because coercion!\u27 is used in an extended sense, and practically because his thesis can contribute only marginally, if at all, to the reduction of police violence. Part Two explores the semantical distinctions between secrecy, privacy, and coercion in order to reclaim what Stuntz rejects: a right to be free from certain modes of police spying. Finally, Part Three argues that regulatory actions are distinguishable from police actions not solely by their lack of violence or coerciveness, but on grounds that Stuntz sloughs off: that groups and individuals are different. The collective power of groups explains why we join them. and why we fear them and also explains why groups are more vulnerable than individuals to meddlesome investigative practices
Lovell v. Poway Unified School District: An Elementary Lesson Against Judicial Intervention in School Administrator Disciplinary Discretion
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