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Can the Liquidity Rule Keep Mutual Funds Afloat? Contextualizing the Collapse of Third Avenue Management Focused Credit Fund
Get PDFIn 2016, the Securities and Exchange Commission adopted Rule 22e-4 (the “Liquidity Rule”) under the Investment Company Act of 1940, as amended, and related reporting and disclosure requirements. One industry analyst described the Liquidity Rule’s objective as making sure that mutual funds implement “effective liquidity risk management programs,” especially in light of mutual funds’ prevalence in the economy and in American households. Yet, as one Reuters analyst suggested, the SEC also seemed to have adopted these liquidity regulations, to avoid a “repeat of the kind of problems that surfaced with the collapse of the [mutual fund] Third Avenue Focused Credit . . . in December 2015.”
This Comment takes a closer look at some of the “problems” that Third Avenue Management Focused Credit Fund (“the Fund” or “Focused Credit”) faced and the complex liquidity implications of some of its investments. The Comment then lays out the roots of the SEC\u27s concern over mutual funds\u27 liquidity and the regulatory standards in this area prior to the adoption of the Liquidity Rule. Thereafter, this Comment distills the elements of the Liquidity Rule, and observes how it could apply, in theory, to help prevent other mutual funds from suffering the same fate as Focused Credit. Lastly, this Comment provides thoughts on more recent market events (i.e., related to the COVID-19 crisis) and how they may present a good opportunity to test the effectiveness of the Liquidity Rule
Will COVID-19 be a Force Majeure Event in Commercial Contracts? A Civil and Common Law Analysis
No full textOn Wednesday, January 13, Contemporary Challenges in American & Global Law began its winter webinar series. Attendees were welcomed by school officials from both The Columbus School of Law and Jagiellonian University in Kraków, Poland. The first program of the winter series, “Will COVID-19 be a Force Majeure Event in Commercial Contracts? A Civil and Common Law Analysis,” was moderated by Professor Emerita Leah Wortham, Director of the American Law Program and the LL.M. Program at Catholic Law. The discussion was led by Vincenzo Senatore (LL.M. ’10), a partner in the London office of Giambrone & Partners, LLP, with comments made by Catholic Law Board of Visitors member Andrew Palmieri ’87, a partner at Saul Ewing Arnstein & Lehr in Washington, D.C
The Future of Antitrust: New Challenges to the Consumer Welfare Paradigm and Legislative Proposals
Get PDFOn November 14, 2019, the Federalist Society\u27s Corporations, Securities, & Antitrust Practice Group hosted a panel for the 2019 National Lawyers Convention at the Mayflower Hotel in Washington, DC. The panel discussed The Future of Antitrust: New Challenges to the Consumer Welfare Paradigm and Legislative Proposals”
(Anti)-SLAPP Happy in Federal Court?: The Applicability of State Anti-SLAPP Statutes in Federal Court and the Need for Federal Protection Against SLAPPs
Get PDFIn recent years, lawsuits known as Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation, or SLAPPs, have become increasingly common. These suits seek to intimidate and punish people for exercising their First Amendment rights. In response to SLAPPs, over half of the states have enacted anti-SLAPP statutes to protect the targets of SLAPPs. They do so by providing a mechanism for the target to dismiss the lawsuit more quickly than they would normally be able to. In federal courts, the question has arisen as to whether anti-SLAPP statutes should be applied in diversity suits given their close alignment to Federal Rules 8, 12, and 56. This question has resulted in a circuit split. Tracing the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on state rules that conflict with Federal Rules and applying it to the current circuit split, this Comment analyzes this question and proposes two methods for balancing the protection of First Amendment rights in federal court and preserving the system that the Federal Rules create
The Miller Trilogy and the Persistence of Extreme Juvenile Sentences
Get PDFIn a series of Eighth Amendment cases referred to as the Miller trilogy, the Supreme Court significantly limited the extent to which minors may be exposed to extreme sentences. Specifically, in this line of cases the Court abolished capital punishment for minors and narrowed the instances when minors may be sentenced to life without parole. Only minors convicted of homicide who are found to be “in-corrigible” may now be subject to a death-in-custody sentence. In limiting extreme sentences for youth in these ways, the Supreme Court relied upon the social and medical science that demonstrates youth are simultaneously less culpable for their acts and more amenable to rehabilitation than adults.
While the Miller trilogy has set in motion many significant juvenile justice reforms, youth in America are still exposed to extreme sentences—sentences that are disproportionate given the nature of the juvenile brain. Two mechanisms operate to maintain this status quo. First, automatic transfer provisions allow children to be charged, tried, and convicted in criminal court as if they were adults. This legal fiction flies in the face of the science on which the Miller trilogy was predicated. Second, once in adult court, youth are subject to mandatory sentencing schemes that were drafted with adults in mind. Again, this automatic sentencing without regard for the mitigating qualities of youth ignores the logic of the Miller trilogy. Indeed, some courts have recognized the disconnect between the Supreme Court’s declaration that “kids are different” for sentencing purposes and the ongoing use of automatic transfer provisions and mandatory sentencing schemes for youth. For the most part, though, courts view correction of these laws as purely a legislative prerogative. In this Article, I argue that, in fact, there is a clear path for courts to find both automatic transfer laws and mandatory minimums as applied to youth unlawful after Miller.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I provides a brief overview of the Miller trilogy and the reforms that this line of cases has set in motion over the last ten years. Part II then discusses how the combination of automatic transfer provisions and mandatory sentencing schemes operates to expose youth to extreme sentences notwithstanding the Court’s recent case law holding that children are not “miniature adults.” In Part III, I make the case that each of these mechanisms—transfer laws and mandatory minimums as applied to youth—are unconstitutional after Miller. Finally, by way of conclusion, I address two recurring criticisms of this thesis
Clarifying the Probable Cause Standard in the Internet Age for Crimes Involving Child Pornography
Get PDFSince the rise of the Internet Age in the early 1990s the distribution of child pornography has increased at a staggering rate. In response Congress has repeatedly enacted legislation with the goal of eliminating the child pornography industry however, to date, a uniform probable cause standard to find evidence of these crimes remains elusive. This article explores the various approaches used to establish a sufficient basis of probable cause to search for evidence of child pornography. Within the last decade a clear divide has formed around the question of whether a prior conviction of child molestation can contribute to a finding of probable cause in crimes involving child pornography. Ultimately, this article aims to clarify this dispute in order to prevent any further confusion in the considerations needed in evaluating the connection between these crimes