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STATE OF UTAH, Plaintiff/ Appellee v. JASON RONALD HULSE, Defendant / Appellant : Brief of Appellee
No full textAppeal from convictions for possession of a firearm by a restricted person, a second-degree felony, and destructive or injurious littering, a class-C misdemeanor, in the First Judicial District, Box Elder County, the Honorable Brandon J. Maynard presiding
LEAH J. ASTON, Counsel for Appellant
NATHAN H. JACK (17074), Assistant Solicitor General, SEAN D. REYES (7969), Utah Attorney General, BLAIR T. WARDLE, Box Elder County Attorney\u27s Office, Counsel for Appelle
Death Star Drones: How Missile Defense Drone Technology Marks the Advent of Contingent Sovereignty
Get PDFAre advances in national security worth pursuing at the expense of sovereign equality? A new U.S. drone program may soon force the world to decide. Thanks to recent technological advances in unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) and directed energy weapons, the United States will soon have a fleet of missile defense UAVs outfitted with advanced laser weapons designed to destroy intercontinental ballistic missiles before the missiles complete their launch phase. While these drones would significantly decrease the threat of a nuclear attack against the United States, they can only function if they are preemptively stationed in the sovereign airspace of other countries — a clear violation of current international sovereignty law. This article explains the technology of the new program, demonstrates how it violates international sovereignty law, and argues that its implementation will move the world closer to an international system of contingent sovereignty that rejects the idea of sovereign equality and subjects weaker states to the objectives of strong states
Dignity and Discrimination
Get PDFDelivered as the Dignity in Law Symposium keynote address, this essay surveys uses of dignity in U.S. constitutional law, with a focus on conflicts between the dignities attached to citizenship and religious conscience. Parts I and II discuss dignity as state sovereignty and hierarchical status. Part III examines the collision of dignities in the Masterpiece Cakeshop decision. Part IV argues that attention to the public or private nature of the site where religious accommodation is demanded clarifies when accommodation is appropriate, using a house of worship and a government office as illustration s. Part V lists other sites of accommodation and briefly discusses how one might use the public/private distinction despite its socially constructed character
STATE OF UTAH, Plaintiff/ Appellee v. JASON RONALD HULSE, Defendant / Appellant : Reply Brief
No full textAPPEAL FROM THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT, BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, FROM THE JUDGMENT, SENTENCE, AND COMMITMENT ON ONE COUNT OF POSSESSION OF A FIREARM BY A RESTRICTED PERSON, A SECOND-DEGREE FELONY, AND ONE COUNT OF INJURIOUS LITTERING ON PUBLIC OR PRIVATE LANDS, A CLASS C MISDEMEANOR, ENTERED ON JANUARY 7, 2020, BEFORE THE HONORABLE JUDGE BRANDON J. MAYNARD
SEAN REYES, Utah Attorney General, Appeals Division, Counsel for Appellee
LEAH J. ASTON (15989), Counsel for Appellan
Engineering the Modern Administrative State: Political Accommodation and Legal Strategy in the New Deal Era
Get PDFAdministrative constitutionalism in the United States has been characterized by tension and accommodation. The tension reflects the unsettled nature of our constitutional scheme, especially with regard to separation of powers, and also the concern with agency discretion and performance. Still and all, we have accommodated administrative constitutionalism in fundamental ways, through a constitutional jurisprudence that, in the main, accepts broad delegations of regulatory power to the bureaucracy and an administrative law that oversees agency actions under procedural and substantive guidelines. This was not always the case. In this Article , part one of a larger project, we revisit the critical New Deal period to look at the strategies the Congress and the Supreme Court used to resolve controversies over the emerging administrative state. We see the political and legal accommodation as a product of a (mostly) coherent interbranch dialogue, iterative and fueled by strategy. Having surmounted some important roadblocks in the first New Deal, this effort ultimately resulted in a scheme that enabled the federal government to accomplish their three critical objectives: to deploy national power to solve new economic problems, to create delegations appropriate to modern needs, and to craft novel administrative instruments to carry out legislative aims aims — all of which required a due amount of legal accommodation, given extant legal doctrine and the interests of the courts
Taxing Parents: Welfarist Theories
Get PDFThe Internal Revenue Code (the Code ) taxes parents inequitably. Couples with a sole earner are undertaxed compared to couples with dual earners and to single parents. Legal tax scholarship (including my own) has identified the many inequities that result from this sole-earner bias and have called for its elimination. But while these arguments have been sufficient for some, they do remain susceptible to the criticism that they are theoretically incomplete.
That critique might proceed as follows. Simply establishing that an inequity exists does not create a full argument for legal reform. After all, it might be argued, the Code plays favorites all the time. To evaluate whether tax preferences are warranted, scholars have traditionally turned to theories of distributive justice. These theories offer competing visions about the way resources should be allocated. Rather than advocating blanket equality, these theories identify higher order principles that justify preferentialism. But, critics might argue, scholars who have asked Congress to eliminate the Code\u27s preference for sole earners have often failed to connect their arguments with this distributive literature.
This Article, the first in a series, begins to respond to this potential criticism by connecting traditional theories of distributive justice with the debate surrounding the Code\u27s inequitable taxation of parents. To do so, I focus on welfarist theories — a body of distributive theories that seek to maximize social welfare — because of the dominant influence they have exerted over tax debates. It shows why welfarism, and in particular utilitarianism, may sometimes support the Code\u27s sole-earner bias despite the inequities it creates. And it shows how, more generally, it may favor parents who have relatively expansive opportunity sets and are, therefore, better positioned to use their income to achieve well-being than other parents with fewer choices.
Some will find these prescriptions counterintuitive and even troubling. For them, the analysis may reveal the limitations of relying too heavily on welfarism to analyze the taxation of parents. Recognizing this, I conclude by identifying other non-welfarist theories that have received less attention in the legal tax scholarship and discussing how they could expand conversations about how parents should be taxed relative to one another