43674 research outputs found
Sort by
Back to the Sources? What’s Clear and Not So Clear About the Original Intent of the First Amendment
Taxing Data
The Article offers a new theory of tax on data collection and transmission as a primary source of government revenue. This tax does not depend on the monetary value of data. This data tax can supplement, and in some instances replace, income taxes. The data tax can (1) mitigate some of the failures of income taxes in a globalized data based economy, and (2) serve to alleviate some of the externalities of a data based economy. The Article advances the following four arguments. First, current challenges to tax systems stem largely from the fact that traditional models of taxation were designed for an economy in which the location of labor, the ownership of capital, and the monetary value of income were identifiable. These assumptions no longer stand in the modern economic environment: the data economy. Today, one the most significant sources of value creation is the analysis, manipulation, and utilization of large quantities of dispersed data. In so called data-rich markets, source, ownership, and value are not only hard to identify — they are not always economically meaningful concepts. Second, current responses to the tax challenges of the digital economy constitute — for the most part — efforts to identify proxies for the location in which monetary profits are created, or to identify the owners of such profits. The results are attempts to keep taxing the economic components of income (consumption and savings). Instead, this Article posits that one must look again at the normative goals of taxation, and question whether taxes on savings and consumption are still the best functional instruments to achieves such goals. The Article argues they are not. Income tax is only theoretically justifiable where it is the best proxy for ability to pay. In a data economy, monetary income is not necessarily the best instrument to measure ability to pay. Third, to address such challenges, the Article offers a framework of tax on data collection and transmission. The tax does not depend on the monetary value of such data. Data ta x is a suitable instrument to achieve the primary normative purposes of taxation. Moreover, tax on data can alleviate some of the challenges that the data economy presents to democratic institutions. Fourth, data tax can be designed to be fair, efficient, and administrable. The Article offers various possible tax instrument designs in which data (rather than savings or consumption) is the tax base
Is Trade Sexist? How “Pink” Tariff Policies’ Harmful Effects Can Be Curtailed Through Litigation and Legislation
Praying for America: The Anti-Theocracy and Equal Status Principles of the Free Exercise, Equal Protection and Establishment Clauses
In this essay I argue that the Constitution’s Equal Protection, Establishment, and Free Exercise Clauses share common principled limits on the role that religion can play in public life. Specifically, drawing on the free-exercise case of Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, the equal protection case of Romer v. Evans, and the establishment clause case of Town of Greece v. Galloway, I propose two principles to describe the proper place of religious justification as a basis for law. The first requirement is that in addition to any religious reasons for laws, the state must have secular reasons available that can appeal to non-religious citizens. I call this the “anti-theocracy principle.” The second, “equal status principle” states that even religious justifications that have secular equivalents must respect the equal status of persons in a democracy regardless of their race, gender or LGBTQ identity. In addition to the limits the anti-theocracy and equal status principles place on legitimate law making, I also argue they also limit state expression. Throughout the piece I draw from the ideal of “public reason” found in the political theory of John Locke and John Rawls. In addition to clarifying the Constitution’s understanding of the role of religion in justifying law and in government sponsored expression, my aim is also to demonstrate how an understanding of public reason can be operationalized in constitutional cases across the Free Exercise, Equal Protection, and Establishment Clauses. I, therefore, demonstrate a common role for public reason across three fundamental parts of the Constitution often thought distinct