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State of Utah v. Omar Jesus Cortez-Izarraraz
Full text linkBrief of Appellee Appeal from convictions for felony discharge of a firearm, first-degree and third-degree felonies; and obstructing justice, a second-degree felony; in the Third Judicial District, Salt Lake County, the Honorable Richard McKelvie presidin
State of Utah v. Omar Jesus Cortez-Izarraraz
Full text linkState’s Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for 23B Reman
Cook Martin Poulson, P.C. v. Daniel G. Smith
Full text linkReplacement Principal Brief of Appellant On appeal from the Second Judicial District Court, Weber County, Honorable Cristina Ortega, District Court No. 22090374
Ordinary Meaning as Last Resort: The Meaning of Undue Hardship in Title VII
Full text linkOrdinary meaning reigns supreme in modern statutory interpretation. Yet that supremacy can cause an interpreter to miss specialized meaning. And the Supreme Court has never fully clarified when ordinary meaning must give way to specialized or technical meaning.
This Article attempts to provide doctrinal clarification as to when one should use ordinary as opposed to other meanings through putting the doctrinal pieces together in a full and coherent way. That doctrinal clarity leads to a methodological refinement: rather than the starting point, ordinary meaning is the ending point of statutory interpretation.
This Article applies this doctrine and methodology, as well as illustrating the fault of ordinary meaning on steroids, through a case study of the term “undue hardship” in Title VII. Doing so shows that the term, long thought to be one of ordinary meaning, is actually a legal term of art that provides greater statutory protection than if interpreted according to its ordinary meaning. Thus, the Court, while moving closer in Groff v. DeJoy, missed an opportunity to restore the statute’s original meaning
MANUEL LOPEZ, Petitioner/Appellant, v. ORWELL PRECAST; WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND,Respondents/Appellees
Full text linkREPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT Appeal From Labor Commission - Appeals Boar
Into the Sunset: Divorcing Families Need Their Slice of the TCJA Reversions
Full text linkOn its path to sufficiently offsetting its major cut to the corporate income tax rate in 2017, Congress turned to a surprising source for funds: the alimony support payments of recently divorced families. Alimony’s inclusion/deduction regime in §§ 71 and 215 of the Code allowed divorcing couples to reach mutually beneficial divorce agreements for over half a century until it was unceremoniously repealed by the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 with a striking lack of satisfying legislative justifications. This Note suggests that in evaluating the impact of the repeal, Congress and others have failed to consider an important piece in the puzzle: the marriage bonus. The marriage bonus, which rewards some couples with better results for filing jointly rather than separately, scaled proportionally with the pre- TCJA alimony subsidy and resulted in most couples receiving inferior tax treatment by choosing to divorce. Now, after the repeal of the subsidy, couples have an even worse result when they choose to separate.
In the wake of the repeal of the alimony subsidy, some have praised the change’s improvements to the simplicity and consistency of the law, while others have mourned the loss of an important tax break that divorcing couples of the past leveraged to ease their transition out of the marriage bonus and into two separate and more expensive households. This Note analyzes both perspectives and suggests that the §§ 71 and 215 regime be reimplemented as part of the TCJA’s 2025 reversions with some minor improvements, including a compliance mechanism and a streamlined alimony calculation procedure. This restoration and improvement will return a much-needed benefit to recently divorced couples as they start their new lives
