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A Losing Mentality: An Analysis of the Duty Owed By Universities to Provide Their Student-Athletes with Mental Health Services
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Unfinished Business: The Continuing Struggle for Equal Opportunity in College Sports on the Eve of Title IX’s Fiftieth Anniversary
Get PDFThe Origins and Unforeseen Implications of the Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act and Recent Developments In Its Interpretation and Implementation
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Restating the Law of Prescriptive Easements
Get PDFPrescriptive easements form an important but often overlooked building block in the architecture of property law. Prescription, the doctrine that allows a long-term user of another’s land to acquire a prescriptive easement burdening that land without compensating the owner, transforms a trespass into a permanent property right good against the world. Of all the elements of prescription, adverse use or adversity is often the most intensely disputed and often proves to be outcome determinative. Given its importance to prescriptive easement claims, courts have developed a number of presumptions to frame their analysis of the adversity element. For many years, leading treatise writers have advised that if a prescriptive easement claimant establishes that otherwise unexplained use of another’s land has occurred in an open and notorious manner and continued without interruption for the statutory prescription period, the claimant’s use is presumed to have been adverse to the owner. The same leading authorities acknowledge that a minority of courts employ the opposite presumption—that otherwise unexplained use is presumed to be permissive
Game On: The Epic Battle Between the FAA and the NLRA in Professional Sports After \u3ci\u3eEpic Systems Corp. v. Lewis\u3c/i\u3e
Get PDFBe Reasonable: The Applicability of Chevron to Agency Interpretations of Split-Authority Statutes
Get PDFThe well-known Chevron doctrine is under siege as courts continue to carve out exceptions to its scope and some scholars and judges question whether it should be overruled entirely. One ongoing battle concerns whether the doctrine, which requires courts to defer to reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes, applies to certain “split-authority” statutes administered by multiple agencies, such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s whistleblower provisions (SOX) and similar employment statutes. Both the Department of Labor (DOL) and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) administer SOX’s whistleblower provisions, with the DOL having formal adjudicative authority and the SEC having rulemaking authority, leading to the risk of the agencies rendering conflicting interpretations. This risk has led some courts and scholars to conclude that Chevron should not apply to these statutes in any circumstance. This Article argues, as both a doctrinal and normative matter, that courts should accord Chevron deference to agency interpretations of SOX and similar statutes where no conflict exists (as opposed to courts constructing their own interpretations with no deference accorded to agency interpretations or applying some lesser form of deference to agency interpretations). This Article further contends that the risk of a conflict occurring is greatly overstated (and certainly does not justify the rejection of Chevron to a whole category of statutes), and if a conflict does arise, it can be easily resolved as set forth herein
