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On the Legality of Defrauding the Public
Get PDFSpeech used to intentionally mislead others to gain a tangible benefit while causing harm to the one deceived or to others is generally labeled “fraud.” This term is used in both legal and nonlegal contexts. Where speech used to defraud satisfies the elements of a tort or a crime, it becomes “actionable fraud.” Categories of actionable fraud include common law deceit, securities fraud, and wire fraud. But taken together, these laws address harmful dishonesty in an inconsistent manner. While they broadly prohibit deceiving individual victims, they often allow deceiving the public at large. As a result, it is often lawful to intentionally spread harmful, false, or misleading messages to the public. Moreover, because such publicly disseminated false speech is often not actionable fraud, it is protected speech under the First Amendment. This gap in the law, whereby one is prohibited from defrauding one person but permitted to defraud millions, gives a green light to those who stand to benefit from the largest and most harmful schemes to deceive. These include, for instance, the fossil fuel industry’s campaign of climate change denial and former President Donald Trump’s stolen election lie. This Article builds on prior scholarship by exploring why current law largely fails to address schemes to defraud the public. It further explores the myriad ways fraud on the public causes economic harm, harm to human health and life, and environmental damage. The Article then argues that this gap in the law should be closed and posits possible ways to do so consistent with the First Amendment. The Article answers critics who claim that imposing such speech restrictions will allow those in power to determine the “truth” and impose it on the public by noting that those in power are already doing this precisely because the law allows it. Those with the public megaphone frequently disseminate self-serving falsehoods and manipulate the public into buying into falsehoods as “truth.” Accordingly, the Article concludes it is urgent we find solutions to this problem that carefully balance free speech rights against the harm from intentional falsehoods spread to the public
What are the Odds? A Comment on the Seminole Tribe of Florida\u27s Ability to Hold Exclusive Gaming Rights in Florida
Get PDFThe Effects of Section 101\u27s Subject Matter Eligibility Requirement on Fintech Patent Valuation Models
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Telecommuting and Workers\u27 Compensation in Wisconsin: Adopting Standards for the Work-From-Home Revolution
Get PDFThe modern trend of telecommuting has gained popularity in recent years, with many employees working from home in lieu of reporting to brick-and-mortar offices. Yet the law has failed to keep up with this trend, particularly in the context of workers’ compensation. And with the rise in telecommuting, a rise in workers’ compensation claims for injuries sustained in the home is likely to follow. While the common law provides a framework for resolving telecommuter claims in Wisconsin, this framework invites inconsistent application and fails to abide by the purpose of Wisconsin’s Workers’ Compensation Act. In anticipation of the inevitable rise in workers’ compensation claims for telecommuter injuries, the Wisconsin Legislature must address telecommuter claims in the state’s workers’ compensation statute.
This Comment recommends that the Wisconsin Legislature amend the Workers’ Compensation Act to create clear standards for the compensability of telecommuter injuries. First, this Comment summarizes the history and background of the Workers’ Compensation Act while discussing how Wisconsin courts and the Labor and Industry Review Commission have resolved telecommuter claims. Next, this Comment will explore how telecommuter claims have been resolved in other jurisdictions. Finally, this Comment will analyze how Wisconsin can effectively adopt clear standards for telecommuter injuries and what those standards should require
An Impossible Burden: A Comment Supporting Revision of Wisconsin’s Parenthood as a Result of Sexual Assault Statute
Get PDFThe Wisconsin statute that regulates termination of parental rights (TPR) as a result of sexual assault is untenable and in need of revision. The current statute is far too stringent to be practically implemented, which is especially true in involuntary TPR proceedings.
This Comment seeks to explain why Wisconsin’s current statute for TPR as a result of sexual assault is flawed. First, this Comment gives background by detailing rape statistics in the United States to explain why the possibility for TPR exists when a conception results from a sexual assault. Second, Wisconsin adopts a position that is at odds with constitutional and state standards regarding TPR law by requiring what is essentially a criminal law “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard for a finding of conception by rape. This standard contrasts with the constitutionally required “preponderance of the evidence” standard that is applied in other TPR cases. Third, while the due process considerations in TPR cases are high because the state is intervening in the parent-child relationship, the current status of these due process considerations would not be a barrier to redefining the statute allowing TPR as a result of sexual assault.
This Comment suggests four small, yet profound, changes to this statute. First, guilty and no contest pleas should be permitted to prove conception as a result of sexual assault. Second, a mother’s ability to be heard during the dispositional phase on her desire for the termination of the father’s rights should be encoded in the statute. Third, the standard for the TPR statute should be a “clear and convincing evidence” standard. Fourth, an example of “other evidence” as to previous sexual assaults of the mother should be added to the statute
How Victim Impact Statements Promote Justice: Evidence from the Content of Statements Delivered in Larry Nassar’s Sentencing
Get PDFWhether crime victims should present victim impact statements (VISs) at sentencing remains a subject of controversy in criminal justice literature. But relatively little is known about the content of VISs and how victims use them. This Article provides a content analysis of the 168 VISs presented in a Michigan court sentencing of Larry Nassar, who pleaded guilty to decades of sexual abuse of young athletes while he was treating them for various sports injuries. Nassar committed similar crimes against each of his victims, allowing a robust research approach to answer questions about the content, motivations for, and benefits of submitting VISs. Specifically, it is possible to explore the question of whether (roughly) the same crimes produce (roughly) the same VISs. The VISs reveal the victims’/survivors’ motive for presenting VISs, their manner of presenting the impact of sexual abuse, their interactions with the sentencing judge and the defendant, and other features of the VISs. Analyzing the VISs’ contents confirms many of the arguments supporting VISs at sentencing and challenges lingering objections to them. The findings support using VISs for informational, therapeutic, and educational purposes in criminal sentencings