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VAVILI REALTY, LLC v. VARGAS
No full textIn this holdover proceeding, the tenant moved to dismiss, arguing the landlord waived its right to enforce the no-pet provision under NYC Administrative Code § 27-2009.1. The tenant claimed openly and notoriously harboring a dog, and the landlord failed to commence an eviction proceeding within 90 days of knowledge. The court found the landlord\u27s emails and notices proved actual knowledge of the pet\u27s presence more than 90 days before commencing the suit. Consequently, the landlord waived its right to enforce the no-pet clause, and the tenant\u27s motion to dismiss was granted
GVS Props. II, LLC v. Walton
No full textA landlord initiated a holdover proceeding, alleging occupants were licensees. The tenants moved to dismiss, contending they were tenants at sufferance or at will, thus requiring a 30-day notice of termination under RPL § 228, not the 10-day notice served. The landlord argued a prior Appellate Division decision, which found tenants were not rent-stabilized, estopped this claim. The court disagreed, holding that prior findings did not preclude the tenants from arguing non-licensee status. Recognizing the tenants had exclusive possession, the court determined they were improperly classified as licensees, rendering the 10-day notice insufficient and dismissing the petition without prejudice
UFH Apartments Inc. v. Vyskovsky
No full textIn this nonpayment proceeding, the court granted the tenant\u27s motion to dismiss due to a defective rent demand. A rent stabilized lease was not in effect for most of the period for which rent was demanded. The court held that rent, per RPAPL § 711(2), must be due under an agreement, and absent a current renewal lease in a rent stabilization scheme, only use and occupancy, not rent, could be claimed. Therefore, the landlord\u27s petition was dismissed without prejudice
Separation-of-Powers Lochnerism
No full textOne hundred and twenty years ago, in 1905, the U.S. Supreme Court rendered one of the single most notorious opinions in history, striking down a New York labor law for violating the right to contract—a right found nowhere in the text of the Constitution. Though the era of Lochner v. New York is well past us, the judicial impulses that gave rise to the case remain. With a new champion in the Roberts Court, Lochnerism is alive and well, deployed in a new context to redefine the relationships between the president, Congress, federal agencies, and the courts.
Bringing together two lines of case law—on the president and the agencies—this Article shows how the Roberts Court is now doing for the separation of powers what the Lochner Court did for rights. In the first line, the Court identifies “core” presidential (super)powers and bars Congress from regulating these by statute. In the second line, the Court crafts unwritten principles that defeat agency action; these include the rule that Congress must give a “clear statement” when it delegates “major” authority and the rule that deference to agencies violates judicial independence. Taken together, the two lines of cases make “the separation of powers” into a collection of judge-made rules no other branch can change, devised by judges who disregard “plain text” for “higher-law” values they alone can see and articulate. One particularly salient consequence has been the aggrandizement of the presidency, now put in full relief by the unprecedented barrage of executive orders issued during President Donald J. Trump’s second term, many of questionable legal grounding.
During the 2023 to 2024 term, the Court’s landmark rulings on presidential immunity and the federal agencies each garnered significant attention. But viewing them through the lens of this new “separation of powers Lochnerism” reveals these decisions to be part of the same judicial project: a judge-led revolution decades in the making. The U.S. Constitution creates three branches of power and gives each tools to mutually check and balance the others. Separation-of-powers Lochnerism distorts this ideal into a judge-made constitutional order requiring interbranch isolation (except on the part of the judiciary), with the Supreme Court increasingly defining the roles of Congress, the president, and the agencies according to higher-law principles of its own making. This Article demonstrates that this scheme is both ahistorical and dangerous, threatening to upend the United States’ tripartite system of government
The Equal Pay Act’s Hidden Loophole: Eliminating Prior Compensation As A “Factor Other Than Sex”
No full textThe Equal Pay Act of 1963 (EPA or the “Act”) prohibits employers from engaging in sex-based wage discrimination. The Act includes four exceptions that allow an employer to circumvent liability, the last of which allows for pay disparities when the “differential [is] based on any other factor other than sex.” The language of this exceedingly broad exception raises questions among courts on what “other than sex” entails—specifically, whether a court can rely on an employee’s prior compensation to justify a pay disparity between employees of the opposite sex. This Note examines how federal circuit courts have interpreted this catchall exception.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has adopted a restrictive interpretation, holding that prior compensation can never qualify as a “factor other than sex,” regardless of context. In contrast, the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Seventh and Fourth Circuits have concluded that prior compensation may constitute a permissible “factor other than sex.” The U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Second, Sixth, Eighth, Tenth, Eleventh, and Federal Circuits have taken a middle-ground approach. This Note advocates for the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation that prior compensation does not qualify as a “factor other than sex” and argues that the U.S. Supreme Court should interpret the statute accordingly
Don’t Black Lives Matter? Confronting the Problem of Disproportionate Black Victimization
No full textReimagining Employment Discrimination Under Title VII: National Origin and Immigration Status After Bostock
No full textIn Re FirstEnergy Corp. Securities Litigation: Where Macquarie Meets Affiliated Ute
No full textThe central question this Article seeks to address is whether there is any world in which the Affiliated Ute presumption can still apply to cases under Rule 10b-5(b) after the Supreme Court’s decision in Macquarie? Put differently, if only half-truths and affirmative misrepresentations remain actionable under Rule 10b-5(b), is the Basic presumption the only pathway left for securities plaintiffs? The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit will likely be the first court to address this issue in In re FirstEnergy Corp. Securities Litigation. The case will test the availability of the Affiliated Ute presumption post-Macquarie in cases based on half-truths under Rule 10b-5(b). If the Sixth Circuit affirms the decision of the lower court, it will drive a further wedge between it and other federal appellate courts—the majority of which have determined that only the Basic presumption can apply to cases based on half-truths. Those circuit courts have reasoned that the problems of proof that plagued plaintiffs in omissions cases do not apply in instances where the defendant has spoken, even if the statements are incomplete. The circuit split could prompt Supreme Court intervention to resolve the question of whether the Affiliated Ute presumption can apply to half-truth cases. Significantly, the answer to this question could signal a paradigmatic shift in the securities fraud class action landscape
Linden 305 LLC v. Miller
No full textIn this licensee holdover, the tenant moved to disqualify the landlord\u27s counsel, arguing a conflict of interest because one of the firm\u27s attorneys previously represented the tenant in a substantially related prior proceeding. The court found that a presumption of disqualification arose, but the landlord rebutted it by demonstrating that the attorney lived out of state, was not involved in the current proceeding, did not possess material information, and the firm had established an ethical wall. The court denied the tenant\u27s motion but prohibited the firm from discussing the case with the attorney in question