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Hadzovic v. Buckley Sch. in the City of N.Y.
Get PDFThe tenant sought declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging rent overcharges and improper deregulation of his apartment. After purchasing the building, the landlord moved for summary judgment, claiming a lawful high-rent deregulation occurred in 2009. The tenant countered that the apartment had been used commercially by a prior tenant, disqualifying it from deregulation. The motion court had granted the landlord summary judgment and ejectment. On appeal, the court reversed, holding triable issues of fact remained regarding the apartment\u27s actual use and whether deregulation was proper. The court emphasized that questions concerning mixed commercial and residential use must be resolved by a factfinder and that the landlord failed to prove lawful deregulation. Practitioners should note the importance of clear evidence of residential use when asserting deregulation, especially under amended Rent Stabilization laws adopting a “totality of the circumstances†standard
685 1st Ave LLC v. Cai
Get PDFIn this lease expiration holdover, the landlord sought possession after the tenant failed to execute a renewal lease offered via an online platform. The landlord claimed exemption from RPL § 226-c\u27s notice requirement, arguing its earlier lease offer (below a 5% increase) precluded the need for further notice. The court disagreed, finding that once the landlord decided not to renew the lease, it was obligated to serve a written nonrenewal notice. The court also held that electronic lease offers did not satisfy statutory notice requirements because they violated the lease\u27s specific notice provision requiring service by mail. Additionally, the lease offer lacked language indicating intent to pursue eviction, thus failing the legal standard of clarity for nonrenewal. The court dismissed the proceeding. Practice Note: Even where a lease offer is made, landlords must serve proper RPL § 226-c notice if they ultimately choose not to renew and must follow contractual notice provisions
BX PK Phase I Preservation LLC v. Murphy
Get PDFIn this nonpayment proceeding involving a tenant in a Section 8 Mitchell-Lama unit, the court dismissed the case for failure to serve mandatory VAWA notices, a required condition precedent under federal law. While the landlord claimed the notices were served, discrepancies between court filings and claimed service documents undermined that assertion. The judge emphasized that only the process server not the landlord\u27s agent could attest to service, and the rent demand\u27s affidavit of service lacked any VAWA mention. As such, the court found petitioner\u27s compliance unsubstantiated and dismissed the proceeding without prejudice. Practice Note: VAWA notice compliance is jurisdictional and strictly enforced in federally subsidized tenancies
Sunset Park LP v. Roberts
Get PDFIn this nuisance holdover proceeding, the landlord alleged two isolated incidents involving the tenant\u27s guests one in October 2023 involving a guest who banged on the apartment door, and one in February 2024 involving a verbal dispute in the lobby. The tenant moved to dismiss under CPLR § 3211(a)(7), arguing that the termination notice failed to state a cause of action for nuisance under Rent Stabilization Code § 2524.3(b). The court agreed, citing the settled principle that nuisance requires a pattern of recurring objectionable conduct. It found that the two incidents, months apart and involving guests rather than the tenant, were insufficient as a matter of law to constitute nuisance. Practice Note: Nuisance claims against rent-stabilized tenants must allege persistent misconduct by the tenant not isolated guest conduct supported by specific, recurring facts in the termination notice
Gomez v. Gomez
Get PDFThe court denied the tenant\u27s motion for a stay and undertaking pending an interlocutory appeal of an order denying dismissal of a holdover petition. The court clarified that CPLR 5519(a)(6) automatic stays only apply to judgments or orders requiring enforcement, such as an eviction. Since the appealed order merely denied dismissal and transferred the case to trial, not directing any specific enforcement action against the tenant, an automatic stay was not warranted
“Fly Me to the Moon . . . & back”: The Intricate Interplay between Copyright Law and Space Law
Get PDFThis research focuses on the intricate interplay between two branches of law: copyright and space law. Through various scenarios, some real and some hypothetical, it underlines the inefficacy of the terrestrial copyright principle, namely the lex loci protection, when applied to outer space endeavors. In outer space, the law where the infringement arises is useful only when the jurisdiction is clear, which is on board of registered space objects; however, that is not even the case for all space objects. On board poli-jurisdictional entities, such as the ISS, the lex loci protectionis fails to provide a clear legal framework, at least within the European Space Agency’s module, Columbus. Thus, the opposite principle, the lex loci originis, might be the most suitable for solving extraterrestrial copyright-related cases. However, the latter principle is not widely accepted by States around Earth. The alternative scenario involves acknowledging the existence of a void in protection within the international legal framework. Many have suggested to amend the international copyright system, or the Corpus Iuris Spatialis, in order to encompass these peculiar issues. Besides academic efforts, this specific request has not had a real impact on policymakers. Furthermore, the presence of new, private players in outer space will add layers of complexities, which require updated rules. In deference to the need for clarity in the application of the law, the research calls for action by international policymakers in order to establish a coherent system capable of encompassing this interplay, maybe adopting a “stand-alone” system, different from the terrestrial copyright principle. In the meantime, the proposition that terrestrial copyright norms are not applicable in outer space appears plausible and, while contentious, is arguably more equitable than a case-specific and discriminative application of opposite principles, which could result in disparate levels of protection. This proposition will also give Earth the chance to experiment and determine whether the lack of protection for artistic creation fosters or hinders creativity
Williamsburg Hous. Preserv. LP v. Khan
Get PDFThe court dismissed the landlord\u27s non-payment proceeding, finding the rent demand defective. The demand merely referred to an attached ledger riddled with fees and adjustments rather than clearly itemizing the rent owed by month. This impermissibly shifted the burden to the tenant and court to calculate arrears, preventing the tenant from understanding the claim and formulating a defense
1616 President St. Assoc. LLC v. Edwards
Get PDFA landlord sought to reargue a prior order granting a tenant a 100% rent abatement for rent-impairing violations under MDL § 302-a, arguing the abatement period should not extend beyond the rent sought in the unamended petition. The court denied the motion, distinguishing a prior Appellate Term decision (1616 President Street Associates, LLC v. Ann Marie Ackie, 84 Misc 3d 128(A) [App Term, 2d Dept])concerning rent deposit requirements from the court\u27s authority to grant a full abatement on the merits. The court affirmed that MDL § 302-a permits a 100% abatement for the entire period a rent-impairing violation remains uncorrected after six months\u27 notice, irrespective of the petition\u27s scope
Separation-of-Powers Lochnerism
No full textOne hundred and twenty years ago, in 1905, the U.S. Supreme Court rendered one of the single most notorious opinions in history, striking down a New York labor law for violating the right to contract—a right found nowhere in the text of the Constitution. Though the era of Lochner v. New York is well past us, the judicial impulses that gave rise to the case remain. With a new champion in the Roberts Court, Lochnerism is alive and well, deployed in a new context to redefine the relationships between the president, Congress, federal agencies, and the courts.
Bringing together two lines of case law—on the president and the agencies—this Article shows how the Roberts Court is now doing for the separation of powers what the Lochner Court did for rights. In the first line, the Court identifies “core” presidential (super)powers and bars Congress from regulating these by statute. In the second line, the Court crafts unwritten principles that defeat agency action; these include the rule that Congress must give a “clear statement” when it delegates “major” authority and the rule that deference to agencies violates judicial independence. Taken together, the two lines of cases make “the separation of powers” into a collection of judge-made rules no other branch can change, devised by judges who disregard “plain text” for “higher-law” values they alone can see and articulate. One particularly salient consequence has been the aggrandizement of the presidency, now put in full relief by the unprecedented barrage of executive orders issued during President Donald J. Trump’s second term, many of questionable legal grounding.
During the 2023 to 2024 term, the Court’s landmark rulings on presidential immunity and the federal agencies each garnered significant attention. But viewing them through the lens of this new “separation of powers Lochnerism” reveals these decisions to be part of the same judicial project: a judge-led revolution decades in the making. The U.S. Constitution creates three branches of power and gives each tools to mutually check and balance the others. Separation-of-powers Lochnerism distorts this ideal into a judge-made constitutional order requiring interbranch isolation (except on the part of the judiciary), with the Supreme Court increasingly defining the roles of Congress, the president, and the agencies according to higher-law principles of its own making. This Article demonstrates that this scheme is both ahistorical and dangerous, threatening to upend the United States’ tripartite system of government
The Equal Pay Act’s Hidden Loophole: Eliminating Prior Compensation As A “Factor Other Than Sex”
No full textThe Equal Pay Act of 1963 (EPA or the “Act”) prohibits employers from engaging in sex-based wage discrimination. The Act includes four exceptions that allow an employer to circumvent liability, the last of which allows for pay disparities when the “differential [is] based on any other factor other than sex.” The language of this exceedingly broad exception raises questions among courts on what “other than sex” entails—specifically, whether a court can rely on an employee’s prior compensation to justify a pay disparity between employees of the opposite sex. This Note examines how federal circuit courts have interpreted this catchall exception.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has adopted a restrictive interpretation, holding that prior compensation can never qualify as a “factor other than sex,” regardless of context. In contrast, the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Seventh and Fourth Circuits have concluded that prior compensation may constitute a permissible “factor other than sex.” The U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Second, Sixth, Eighth, Tenth, Eleventh, and Federal Circuits have taken a middle-ground approach. This Note advocates for the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation that prior compensation does not qualify as a “factor other than sex” and argues that the U.S. Supreme Court should interpret the statute accordingly