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1712-1715 HDFC, INC. v. Lambert
No full textLandlord commenced a licensee/squatter holdover proceeding against the tenant, the daughter of the deceased prior tenant, seeking possession of a Project Based Section 8 apartment. The tenant asserted succession rights. The primary legal issue was whether the tenant\u27s omission from the prior tenant\u27s annual HUD recertification forms precluded her succession claim, given the building\u27s Project Based Section 8 status. The court found that such an omission created a rebuttable presumption, not an absolute bar. After a trial where the tenant presented substantial documentary and testimonial evidence of co-occupancy that was largely unrefuted, the court ruled in favor of the tenant, dismissing the landlord\u27s petition with prejudice on the grounds that the tenant had established her succession defense
LO. BUILDINGS LLC v. Brown
No full textIn this holdover proceeding, the tenant moved to dismiss, alleging the landlord failed to use the required Notice of Petition form mandated by 22 NYCRR § 208.42(b) and Administrative Order 163/19. The court found that the landlord\u27s omission of the phrase or are deaf or hard of hearing from the interpretation services section constituted a substantive and fatal defect, akin to a defective predicate notice. Citing precedent, the court held the Notice of Petition was not amendable, thus granting the tenant\u27s motion and dismissing the proceeding. The landlord\u27s cross-motion was not considered
17 Eldridge Street Corp. v. Saavedra
No full textThe landlord commenced a nonpayment proceeding. The tenant moved for summary judgment to dismiss the petition, arguing the predicate rent demand was fatally defective because it lacked the required Good Cause Eviction Law (GCEL) notice under RPL § 231-c. The landlord conceded the omission but cross-moved to amend the petition. The court found the GCEL notice requirement mandatory for rent demands under RPAPL § 711(2). Adhering to the rule that predicate notices are unamendable, the court granted the tenant\u27s motion, dismissing the petition without prejudice, and denied the landlord\u27s cross-motion as moot. The tenant substantially won
Grenpoint Preservation L.P. v. Bennett
No full textHandwritten opinion. This licensee holdover proceeding in a Project Based Section 8 building concluded with a stipulated settlement. The trial judge so-ordered the facts and determined the tenant, the deceased tenant\u27s biological son, was eligible for succession. This was despite the tenant never being listed on the household composition, based on evidence of two years co-residency and a thwarted attempt by the landlord to add him. The court, relying on *Marine Terrace Associates v. Kesoglides*, found that an attempt by the landlord to add the successor, if rebuffed, along with familial relationship and co-residency, suffices for succession in the 2nd Department
Eon Charles v. Green
Get PDFHandwritten opinion. The court dismissed the holdover proceeding due to a defective predicate notice that failed to comply with GCEL, despite being dated March 10, 2024. Citing 1303 Needham Realty LLC v. Brown, the court applied GCEL\u27s requirements to proceedings commenced after April 20, 2024. Judge Arrindell held that GCEL\u27s notice provisions became effective August 18, 2024, and there was no exemption for predicate notices served before April 20, 2024. The court, relying on Chinatown Apts. v. Chu Cho Lam, deemed the defect unamendable and denied the petitioner\u27s request for adjournment. Judge Arrindell\u27s ruling aligned with prior judicial notes, reinforcing that noncompliant notices invalidate proceedings under GCEL
Sales v. Justiniano
Get PDFIn this case, tenants sought declaratory relief and damages due to violations of the certificate of occupancy and rent-impairing violations. The landlord\u27s motion to dismiss the case based on improper service was denied after the court found proper service had been completed. Additionally, a preliminary injunction was granted, requiring the landlord to address repair violations and stop refusing to schedule necessary repairs. The judge showed strong support for the tenants\u27 claims of unsafe living conditions
GVS PROPERTIES IV LLC v. GILMAN
Get PDFIn this holdover case, the landlord sought eviction based on claims of nuisance and breach of lease, citing unsanitary conditions and a flood caused by the tenant. However, the court found that the alleged uncleanliness had been remedied before trial and that a single flooding incident did not constitute a legal nuisance. Additionally, as the tenant\u27s rent-controlled status meant no lease was in evidence, the breach of lease claim was dismissed for failure to state a cause of action. The case was ultimately dismissed
Scienter Potentia Est: The Case for the Presumption of Use Standard in Insider Trading
Get PDFIs it possible to accidentally insider trade? The Supreme Court has held that scienter is a necessary element of all § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 actions, but the federal appeals courts are split on how the scienter requirement applies to insider trading cases. In a non-insider- trading § 10(b) case, the Supreme Court stated that § 10(b) scienter requires intentional misconduct. Although the Supreme Court has not heard a case specifically about the scienter element in the context of insider trading, those who support a use requirement claim that the § 10(b) scienter element requires the plaintiff to show that the insider used the MNPI in the decision to trade.
Those who support a possession standard reason that possession of MNPI creates an unfair informational advantage, which is sufficient reason to prohibit an insider from trading. They also argue that it is impractical to require a plaintiff to prove a defendant actually used the MNPI in the decision to trade. This Note argues that possession of MNPI should create a rebuttable presumption of use for the purposes of insider trading liability under the § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 scienter requirement. This standard best balances the Supreme Court’s clarification that fraud under 10(b) includes intentional conduct with the practicality of the knowing possession standard