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Machado v. Machado
No full textIn this licensee holdover proceeding, the Appellate Term affirmed the Civil Court\u27s orders which granted the landlord summary judgment of possession of a condominium apartment and denied the tenant\u27s motion to renew. The landlord sought to evict an adult daughter. The tenant\u27s argument that a familial relationship exempts her from eviction as a licensee was rejected as improperly raised and lacking merit, as the RPAPL contains no such exemption. The court also found renewal properly denied because the purportedly new material was available at the time of the original motion and would not alter the prior decision
Latchman v. Richards
No full textLandlord initiated a summary holdover proceeding after issuing a 60-day notice of termination. Tenant moved to dismiss, arguing the landlord accepted rent from HRA between the termination date (April 30, 2025) and the petition service date (May 23, 2025), thereby vitiating the predicate notice. Landlord failed to submit opposition or address the documentary evidence. The court granted the tenant\u27s motion, dismissing the proceeding without prejudice, as the landlord\u27s acceptance of rent during the window period rendered the predicate notice invalid
Procedural Justice in Parallel Lawsuits
Full text linkThe American public places a high value on access to justice and having the opportunity to be heard. These values can either be upheld or diminished by routine procedural rules. The first-to-file rule is an example of an innocuous procedural rule that is a barrier to justice. Under the first-to-file rule, when two parallel suits are filed in different federal district courts, the first-filed suit will proceed, and the second-filed suit will ordinarily be dismissed or transferred to the venue of the other suit. Transfers often terminate an individual’s case because most people cannot afford to litigate far from home. By contrast, wealthy corporate litigants are unbothered by transfers. So, although the first-to-file rule is facially neutral, its application favors sophisticated litigants who can file suit more quickly than unsophisticated litigants. Nonetheless, in a David versus Goliath situation, courts will not consider the relative size and financial ability of the parties in deciding whether to transfer a case.
Not only is the first-to-file rule biased toward sophisticated, wealthy litigants, it is out of step with other venue-transfer analyses. When federal district courts hear motions to transfer under the federal change-of-venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1404, or motions for forum non conveniens, they can consider the relative means of the parties. This Article therefore proposes eliminating the first-to-file rule and addressing parallel suits under the federal change-of-venue statute. This will allow courts to assess the relative financial means of the parties and, where there is a disparity, to prioritize the venue chosen by the party with lower means
Misusing Eminent Domain: Pretextual Takings for a Traditional Public Use
Full text linkEminent domain is a powerful tool at the disposal of local, state and federal governments. The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution imposes two conditions on this sovereign power: the taking must be for “public use,” and the condemner must pay “just compensation” to the property owner. There are minimal guardrails in place to police potential misuse of the eminent domain power in the courts. The U.S. Supreme Court equates “public use” with “public purpose” and applies a deferential standard of review to a condemner’s determination that a taking serves a public purpose. Nonetheless, the Court in Kelo v. City of New London asserted that courts should inquire whether a condemnation’s purported public purpose is pretext to confer a purely private benefit and, if so, that taking would be unconstitutional.
However, the Supreme Court has not clarified whether courts should consider a condemner’s pretextual motive if the taking otherwise satisfies a purely public use, such as a park. Some lower courts review a condemner’s motivation underlying the taking. They ask whether the actual goal was to prevent unwanted use of land that the condemner was unwilling or unable to stop by other means. If so, those courts find that the taking fails to satisfy the Public Use Clause. Other lower courts hold that it is enough that the property provide a public amenity, despite the condemner’s asserted pretextual reason for the condemnation.
This Note argues that courts should review plausible claims of pretext, even for traditional public use takings, under a “rational basis plus” standard of review that follows a two-step analysis. Step one requires courts to decide whether there is evidence that the condemnation came after a proposed, unwanted commercial use. Step two requires courts to consider whether the asserted public purpose is simply pretextual for thwarting the alleged proposed use under a rational basis plus standard of review. This review will prevent condemners from using eminent domain in bad faith to take private property for a public amenity, thereby avoiding zoning and other land use processes
Brighton Realty LLC v. Berger
Full text linkIn this holdover nuisance case, the tenant moved to dismiss for improper service. The landlord\u27s process server testified to substitute service on a person allegedly residing at the apartment, but the tenant asserted she lived alone and knew no such individual. The court found the process server\u27s testimony not credible, citing his failure to maintain GPS records, logbooks, or adhere to terms of prior consent orders mandating compliance with legal service procedures. The court emphasized that his complete lack of records, inconsistent testimony, and prior disciplinary issues undermined the validity of service. Consequently, the court sustained the traverse and dismissed the proceeding for lack of personal jurisdiction. Practice Note: Courts scrutinize service rigorously, and process servers\u27 failure to maintain statutorily required records or adhere to consent orders can prove fatal to a landlord\u27s case
Nazor v. Sydney Sol Group, Ltd.
Full text linkIn this loft tenant action, the court modified the lower court\u27s order, reinstating claims for rent overcharge, unjust enrichment, and breach of warranty of habitability. The court held that court-ordered use and occupancy payments are not voluntarily paid rent under MDL § 302(b), allowing these claims to proceed in a related action. The court also reinstated a claim for accounting of the security deposit and attorneys\u27 fees, finding the landlord failed to prove non-commingling. However, claims for harassment, retaliatory eviction, and constructive eviction were dismissed
Kings Vil. Corp. v. Pascal
Full text linkThe court granted the tenant\u27s motion to dismiss the nonpayment petition, finding the rent demand defective due to the inclusion of substantial lump-sum charges lacking specific periods of accrual. While the court noted that fees and non-rent charges are permissible in co-op nonpayment cases if allowed by the proprietary lease, the large Prior Agent lump sums for maintenance, assessment, and parking rendered the demand insufficient to fairly appraise the tenant of the arrears, thus undermining the proceeding. The dismissal was without prejudice
Westchester Capital Co., LLC v. Richardson
Full text linkThe court dismissed the landlord\u27s holdover petition, granting the tenant\u27s motion to dismiss. The court found the petition fatally defective for failing to plead the tenant\u27s protected status as a non-purchasing tenant under the Martin Act. Additionally, the predicate 90-day notice was deemed insufficient as it vaguely alleged a poor history of making rent payments on time without specific details, failing to establish good cause for eviction required by the Martin Act. The court denied the landlord\u27s cross-motion to amend and the tenant\u27s summary judgment motion as moot
WILMINGTON TRUST, NA v. ABDUL
Full text linkIn a post-foreclosure holdover, the landlord\u27s motion to reargue was granted, restoring the proceeding after the court initially misapprehended that the landlord lacked standing as a one-step removed purchaser. The court clarified that as the direct recipient of the Referee\u27s Deed following a foreclosure sale, the landlord possessed standing under RPAPL §713(5). Despite procedural defects in the reargument motion, which were excused, the tenant\u27s motion to dismiss the landlord\u27s monetary claims was granted due to the landlord\u27s failure to include mandatory language seeking such claims in the Notice of Petition, prejudicing the tenant
Matter of Stuyvesant Town-Peter Cooper Vil. Tenants Assn. v. New York State Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal
Full text linkIn this Article 78 proceeding, the court reversed a Supreme Court decision that had annulled DHCR\u27s approval of the landlord\u27s applications for rent increases based on Major Capital Improvements (MCIs). The court found that DHCR\u27s interpretation of its own regulations concerning the timeliness of the MCI applications for large-scale projects and the sufficiency of proof that the work was both necessary and comprehensive was rational and entitled to judicial deference. The court upheld DHCR\u27s determination, thereby allowing the landlord to proceed with the rent increases