Seton Hall University Libraries

Faculty Senate, Seton Hall University

Admissions Committee Report

Faculty Senate Seton Hall University

UCCC February report

Graduate Studies Committee Report

Hornlein, Brandon M.

Flitsanov, Emmanuel

Wisowaty, Jessica

 
xi 
For over 50 years, Seton Hall University School of Law has been the 
home to a law journal focused on legislation and matters of public 
policy.  At its inception, it was the Legislative Bureau, an academic 
seminar that partnered with New Jersey state legislators and published 
legislation-related scholarship.  Later, it became the Legislative Journal, 
a non-partisan student-run journal that retained its focus on legislative 
scholarship.  The Journal is now in its new era as the Journal of
Legislation & Public Policy (JLPP).  We hope our readers will appreciate 
this close nexus between legislative choices and public policy. 
We are excited to kick off Volume 49 with Book 1.  The printed Book 
is home to scholarship generated from our Spring 2024 Symposium, An
Innocence Centered View of New Jerseys Post Conviction Jurisprudence. 
Published in the digital version of Book 1, are three student Comments 
written by several of our remarkable members.
The topic for our Spring Symposium was born when the Journals 
Volume 48 Symposium Editor, Labiba Salim,1 was inspired by her role 
as a research assistant to Professors D. Michael Risinger & Lesley C. 
Risinger.  Together, they formulated a plan to host a symposium on the 
exoneration of the wrongly convicted and the post-conviction regime. 
Many top lawyers, professionals, and scholars in the criminal law field 
attended our symposium to speak on this important topic.  The fruits of 
these efforts culminated in our Symposium, An Innocence Centered View
of New Jerseys Post Conviction Jurisprudence.  Many speakers submitted 
articles, now published in this Book.
The scholarship within this Book further illuminates the issues 
involving wrongful convictions within the State of  New Jersey. New 
Jerseys treatement of wrongfully convicted parties, suspension of 
habeas corpus, as well as ethical and constitutional considerations 
within the states post-conviction regime are addressed in this Book.  
The authors propose meaningful solutions to improve New Jerseys 
treatment of the wrongfully convicted. 
 
 1 Labiba Salim is a 2024 graduate of Seton Hall University School of Law. She is 
currently serving as a judicial law clerk in the New Jersey Judiciary. She is a proud 
member of the Seton Hall Legislative Journal. 
 
xii
This Book opens with Introduction to the Symposium with
Illustrative Cases, and a List of Factors Contributing to the Problems of
New Jerseys Post Conviction Procedures,2 an article by Professors Lesley 
C. Risinger and D. Michael Risinger.  This article outlines the serious 
consequences New Jerseys system has on the wrongfully convicted and 
outlines factors which contribute to New Jerseys failure to efficiently 
and accurately give relief to the innocent.  In another article by the 
Professors Risinger, The History of New Jerseys State Constitutional
Guarantee Against Suspension of State Habeas Corpus and Its
Unconstitutional Suspension in 2009,3 they trace the evolution of New 
Jerseys habeas corpus provisions and applications over time.  In 
Professor Robert F. Williams article, What Is Suspension of the Writ of
Habeas Corpus,4 and Judge Edwin Sterns article, Habeas Corpus,5 they 
provide meaningful dialogue with their perspectives as to how habeas 
corpus is treated in New Jersey. Professor Bernard K. Freamons article, 
Is The State Constitutional Guarantee Of The Privilege Of Habeas Corpus
Suspended In N.J.?,6 charts the reality of the application of habeas corpus 
in New Jersey.  
The Professors Risinger continue this discussion in their article, 
Towards an Innocence Centered Post Conviction Regime in New Jersey,7
where they examine the problems with New Jerseys post-conviction 
regime and offer proposals for reform. Professor Michael J. Saks article, 
The Continuing Risk of Forensic Error and Fraud,8 examines the issues 
with our use of forensic technology in achieving convictions. The 
Professors Risinger conclude in their article, Compensation for the
Convicted Innocent in New Jersey: Problems and Recommended
Solutions,9 by examining New Jerseys Mistaken Imprisonment Act and 
offer proposals for reform. Closing our Articles out are Professor Jeffrey 
S. Gutmans article, An Empirical Assessment Of New Jerseys Mistaken
Imprisonment Act,10 and Professor Donald A. Dripps article, Beat my
Teeth Out and then Kick me in the Stomach for Mumbling  Denying
 
2 See infra page 1. 
3 See infra page 47. 
 4 See infra page 67. 
5 See infra page 71. 
 6 See infra page 75. 
 7 See infra page 82. 
 8 See infra page 135. 
 9 See infra page 158. 
 10 See infra page 233. 
 
xiii
Compensation to the Innocent who Pleaded Guilty,11 they take a 
quantitative approach to analyze the consequences of New Jerseys 
post-conviction regime. 
The topics discussed in this symposium have far reaching 
consequences for New Jerseys treatment of the wrongfully convicted 
and the overall pursuit of justice. Legislators and Judges should take 
note of the thoughtful opinions and analyses presented within. 
To close this Foreword, we thank all our Spring Symposium 
participants and the authors for their time, effort, and expertise.  We 
sincerely hope that all will enjoy reading this Book. 
 
Brandon M. Hornlein
Executive Editor, Volume 49
Emmanuel Flitsanov
Business and Publications Editor, Volume 49
Jessica Wisowaty
Managing Editor, Volume 49
 
  
 
 
 
 11 See infra page 256. 


English

Foreword

Freamon, Bernard K.

75 
IS THE STATE CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE OF
THE PRIVILEGE OF HABEAS CORPUS SUSPENDED IN
N.J.?
BERNARD K. FREAMON*
D. Michael Risinger and Lesley C. Risinger do an excellent job in
recounting the historical evolution of habeas corpus as a remedy for 
constitutional violations in criminal cases in New Jersey.  Like the U.S. 
Constitution, the New Jersey Constitution contains a suspension clause, 
which provides that [t]he privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall 
not be suspended, unless in case of rebellion or invasion the public 
safety may require it.1  The language of New Jerseys suspension clause 
is almost identical to the language of the suspension clause in the U.S. 
Constitution.  It has been argued that the U.S. Constitutions suspension 
clause is a directive to all superior courts of record, state as well as 
federal, to make the habeas privilege routinely available.2  Whether this 
interpretation is true or not, only four states had habeas corpus 
guarantees in their constitutions at the time of the 1787 Constitutional 
Convention.  Eight states, including New Jersey, had no guarantee, and 
Rhode Island, the thirteenth state, had no constitution and thus no 
written guarantee.3  Zachariah Chafee, Jr., who called the clause 
guaranteeing the availability of the writ of habeas corpus the most 
important human rights provision in the Constitution,4  argued that the 
states did not have guarantee clauses in their constitutions because it 
was thought unnecessary, the right being firmly established in the 
common law.5  Nonetheless, by 1844, five of the eight states that had 
* Professor of Law and Director Institute for Race and the Law Roger Williams 
University School of Law; Professor of Law Emeritus, Seton Hall University School of 
Law.
1 N.J. CONST. ART. 1 ¶ 14.  
 2 Francis Paschal, The Constitution and Habeas Corpus, 1970 DUKE L.J. 605, 607 
(1970) [https://doi.org/10.2307/1371661].  
3 Dallin H. Oaks, Habeas Corpus in the States1776 1865, 32 U. CHI. L. REV. 243, 247
(1965) [https://doi.org/10.2307/1598691].  
 4 Oaks, supra note 3 at 248 (quoting Zachariah Chafee, Jr., The Most Important
Human Right in the Constitution, 32 B.U.L. REV. 143, 144). 
 5 Amanda Tyler, Suspension as an Emergency Power, 118 YALE L. J. 600, 627 (2009) 
(Madisons notes report that John Rutledge was for declaring the Habeas Corpus 
76 SETON HALL JLPP [Vol. 49:1 
been without habeas corpus guarantees in their constitutions (plus 
Rhode Island) wrote such clauses into their constitutions and all of them 
used phrasing that was almost exactly like, if not identical to, the 
phrasing found in the federal constitution.6  New Jerseys suspension 
clause came into being with its constitution of 1844 and the clause has 
remained in the state constitution since then, without change in 
language. 
As the Risingers paper makes clear, New Jerseys 1947 
Constitution abolished New Jerseys impossibly complex and 
labyrinthine legal system and greatly improved access to justice in the 
state.7  The suspension clause in the 1844 constitution was brought 
forward, unchanged, by the 1947 Constitutional Convention and 
adopted by the voters in November, 1947, becoming effective on 
January 1, 1948.8  This meant that the caselaw interpreting the 1844 
suspension clause continued to be applicable after the effective date of 
the 1947 Constitution.  There is no evidence that the members of the 
convention gave any thought to modifying that provision.  The decisions 
of the courts in New Jersey prior to 1947 were unclear as to whether 
habeas corpus was the appropriate remedy for any New Jersey prisoner 
claiming that he or she had been unlawfully detained in violation of the 
constitutions guarantees of liberty and due process.9  This is likely 
because a provision of the 1877 statute authorizing the filing of a writ of 
habeas corpus prohibited [a]ny person committed or restrained of his 
liberty by virtue of a final judgment of a competent tribunal of civil or 
criminal jurisdiction or by virtue of any process issued pursuant thereto, 
. . ..10  As the Risingers point out, courts often circumvented such 
provisions by declaring that unconstitutional acts occurring during a 
criminal trial or on appeal deprived the court of jurisdiction.11  The 
 
inviolableHe did not conceive that a suspension could ever be necessary at the same 
time through all the States. (quoting THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 
438 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) (emphasis omitted))). 
 6 Oaks, supra note 3, at 249. 
7 See D. Michael Risinger & Lesley C. Risinger, The History of New Jerseys State
Constitutional Guarantee Against Suspension of State Habeas Corpus and Its
Unconstitutional Suspension in 2009, 49 SETON HALL J. LEGIS. & PUB. POLY 47, 5055 (2025) 
(quoting Bernard K. Freamon, The Origins of the Anti Segregation Clause in the New
Jersey Constitution, 35 RUTGERS L.J. 1279, 1325 (2004)).   
 8 RICHARD J. CONNORS, THE PROCESS OF CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION IN NEW JERSEY: 1940-
1947 (1970); see also Stewart G. Pollock, Foreward: Celebrating Fifty Years of Judicial
Reform under the 1947 New Jersey Constitution, 29 RUTGERS L.J. 675, 675-688 (1998),
https://www.nj.gov/state/archives/docconst47.html#page1 [https://perma.cc/26VH-
EWPJ]. 
9 See, e.g., In re Tremper, 8 A.2d 279 (N.J. Ch. Ct. 1939). 
 10 N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A:67-14(b).  
11 See Risinger & Risinger, supra note 7 at 4950. 
2025] FREAMON 77 
statute did allow the filing of a writ on behalf of a prisoner sentenced to 
death, but this was at the discretion of the trial judge.12 The 1947 
Constitution streamlined the functions of the judiciary in New Jersey.  
There is no instance prior to the adoption of the 1947 Constitution, to 
my knowledge, where a New Jersey court concluded that the 
constitutionally-mandated privilege of habeas corpus had been 
suspended.  
The Risingers account of the rules and the caselaw governing 
habeas corpus after the adoption of the 1947 Constitution is also 
accurate.  Courts made it clear that habeas corpus was an appropriate 
remedy where the prisoner claimed to be unlawfully detained because 
of a denial of constitutional rights during the prosecution or appeal of a 
criminal case.13  The Risingers note that, beginning in the mid-1950s, 
judges began to complain about a rising flood of allegedly groundless 
habeas corpus petitions.14  In 1958, Chief Justice Weintraub appointed a 
Supreme Court Committee on the Post-Conviction Rights of Indigents 
and that committee issued a comprehensive report in 1962 that became 
the basis for a shift in the administration of post-conviction cases from 
a habeas format to a post-conviction relief petition format, modeled 
on the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act, promulgated in 1955 by 
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.15  It 
is important to note that these events occurred at the same time that 
there was a tremendous increase in criminal prosecutions of African-
Americans in the trial courts of many northern American cities and 
states.16  The prison populations in these states began to swell with 
convicted young African-American men and courts were overwhelmed 
 
 12 N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A:67-14(c).  
13 See, e.g., State v. Cynkowski, 92 A.2d 782 (N.J. 1952); State v. Lenkowski, 94 A.2d 
845 (N.J. App. Div. 1953).  Indeed, in Worbetz v. Goodman, 136 A.2d 1, 3 (N.J. App. Div. 
1957),  Judge (later Chief Justice) Hughes, in affirming the order of a trial judge who 
conducted a full evidentiary hearing in habeas, observed that the judge had behaved in  
. . . the full performance of that obligation to which our courts have been exhorted with 
increasing emphasis in recent times, the exercise of zeal in the procedural protection of 
legal and constitutional rights, particularly those involving human freedom.  (citing 
State v. Piracci, 82 A.2d 213 (N.J. App. Div. 1951); State v. Ballard, 83 A.2d 539 (N.J. App. 
Div. 1951), affd 88 A.2d 537 (N.J. 1952); Cynkowski, 92A.2d 782; Lenkowski, 94 A.2d 
845).  
 14 Risinger & Risinger, supra note 7, at 58. 
 15 Unif. Post-Conviction Proc. Act §§ 194901 to 194911. For an account of the 
work of the Supreme Court committee, see Report of the Supreme Court Committee on
Post Conviction Rights of Indigents, 85 N.J.L.J. 557, 577 col. 5 (Oct. 25, 1962). 
 16 The best account of the tremendous national upsurge in the incarceration of 
African Americans that began in the early 1960s is MICHELLE ANDERSON, THE NEW JIM CROW:
MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS, THE NEW PRESS (2010); see also MARC 
MAUER, RACE TO INCARCERATE (1999).  
78 SETON HALL JLPP [Vol. 49:1 
with their habeas petitions and, later, petitions for post-conviction 
relief.17  
These events form the backdrop for the committees 
recommendations and the adoption of the New Jersey Rules of Court 
3:22 et seq.in New Jersey.  The post-conviction rules adopted at the 
committees impetus were designed to provide defendants with a final 
opportunity to challenge the fairness and reliability of a criminal 
conviction.18  The rules are said to be New Jerseys analogue to the 
federal writ of habeas corpus.19  Rule 3:22-2 declares that a petition for 
post-conviction relief is cognizable if based on one of five grounds, 
including [s]ubstantial denial . . . of defendants rights under the 
Constitution of the United States or the Constitution or laws of the State 
of New Jersey; [l]ack of jurisdiction; imposition of an excessive 
sentence; and [a]ny ground heretofore available as a basis for collateral 
attack upon a conviction by habeas corpus or any other common law or 
statutory remedy.20  The rule contains the usual statements indicating 
that a petition under the rule is a prisoners exclusive remedy to 
challenge a criminal conviction, while not being a substitute for an 
appeal, and that issues raised in the criminal proceedings cannot be 
relitigated in post-conviction relief proceedings unless the ground 
could not have been reasonably raised in prior proceedings, or 
enforcement of the preclusion bar would result in fundamental 
injustice[,] or denial of relief would be contrary to a new rule of 
constitutional law under either the federal or state constitutions.21  The 
rule imposes a bar preventing relitigation of issues expressly 
adjudicated during the proceedings resulting in a conviction or in any 
post-conviction proceeding.  It also imposes a five-year statute of 
limitations (running from the date of conviction) and a one-year 
limitation on the filing of any successive petition (running from the date 
of denial of the first or any subsequent denial of an application for post-
conviction relief).22  The rule plainly states that the time periods 
specified therein shall not be relaxed, except as allowed by the rule.23  
 
17 See notes at supra note 13; Risinger & Risinger, supra note 7. 
 18 N.J. R. Ct. [hereinafter R.] 3:22 (comments in RULES GOVERNING THE COUTS OF THE 
STATE OF NEW JERSEY (with Comments and Annotations by Sylvia B. Pressler (1969-2010) 
& Peter G. Verniero) (2022) at 915).  
19 Id. (citing State v. Preciose, 609 A.2d 1280, 1284 (1992)). 
 20 R. 3:22-2.  
 21 R. 3:22-3, 4. 
 22 R. 3:22-4(b), 12.  
 23 The only relaxation allowed is for defendants excusable neglect in failing to 
meet the five-year time bar on the first petition if there is a reasonable probability that 
if the defendants factual assertions were found to be true enforcement of the time bar 
2025] FREAMON 79 
The Risinger paper argues strenuously that these strictly enforced 
and rigid time limitations effectively work an unconstitutional 
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus in New Jersey.  This is an issue 
that has not been exhaustively researched or argued in courts and it is 
very appropriate to consider it in an academic setting.  Judge Edwin H. 
Stern, P.J.A.D. (ret.), an eminent authority on the role and purpose of 
post-conviction relief in New Jersey, has filed a paper arguing that the 
rules do not work a suspension of the writ.24  He rightly points to several 
places in the rules, and in the caselaw interpreting the rules, where there 
is a clear warrant to protect a convicted persons right to collaterally 
attack an unjust conviction, including a conviction obtained because of 
the ineffective assistance of counsel.25  He also rightly agrees that, under 
New Jerseys progressive and forward-looking 1947 Constitution, the 
interests of fundamental justice should always be a polestar in the 
litigation of any post-conviction proceeding.26  He further argues that 
the Risinger paper cites not a single case in support of its claim that the 
privilege of habeas corpus has been suspended by the court rules, 
especially those rules put in place since 2009, imposing draconian and 
strictly enforced time limits in post-conviction relief matters.27  He 
suggests that the argument in the Risinger paper be presented to the 
Criminal Practice Committee, the juridical body responsible for 
recommending any change in the rules.  
I agree with Judge Stern that the Risinger paper cites no state court 
authority supporting its claim that the privilege of the writ in New Jersey 
has been suspended.28  We know also that the federal habeas statutory 
scheme similarly imposes strict time limits on the filing of a federal 
habeas petition after exhaustion of state judicial remedies and similarly 
limits the prisoners ability to file a successive petition.29  Like the 
situation in the New Jersey courts, there is little caselaw in the federal 
 
would result in a fundamental injustice.  R. 3:22-12(a)(1)(A).  There is no allowance for 
an extension of time on any second or subsequent petition.   
 24 Edwin H. Stern, Habeas Corpus Opinion, 49 SETON HALL J. LEGIS. & PUB. POLY 71 
(2025). 
25 See id. at 73 (citing State v. Porter, 80 A.3d 732 (2013)). 
26 Id. at 75.  
27 Id.; see R. 3:22-4, 12 (as amended July 16, 2009). 
 28 I am also not convinced by the Risingers citation to the language from Preciose as 
authority for a fundamental injustice doctrine.  I do agree, as does Judge Stern, that a 
New Jersey court should not tolerate affirmance of a conviction where there has been a 
fundamental miscarriage of justice.  The source of that principle predates the adoption 
of our constitution.  I would argue that it is to be found in the common-law inspired 
office of the traditional writ of habeas corpus and any set of rules that prevents such an 
assertion would be unconstitutional. 
 29 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 
80 SETON HALL JLPP [Vol. 49:1 
courts discussing . . . standards defining suspension of the writ or of 
circumstances under which suspension has occurred.30  The Court in 
Boumediene observed that the absence of caselaw might be attributable 
to the fact that Congress has been very careful not to enact legislation 
that would give rise to a claim of suspension of the writ.31  The 
conclusion that Congress had exercised such care was brought into 
serious question in the Guantanamo cases, which involved legislation 
that stripped the federal courts of jurisdiction to consider habeas 
petitions brought by prisoners in the Guantanamo facility.32
The federal courts have made similar inquiries with regard to the 
restrictions on the filing of habeas petitions imposed by AEDPA.33
Unlike in our state courts, there have been several federal court 
decisions that have suggested that a Suspension Clause violation might 
arise if a prisoner had no postconviction opportunity (either in the lower 
federal courts or on original writ to the Supreme Court, and either in an 
initial or numerically successive federal petition) to raise a particular 
constitutional claim.34  When there are fact situations or a combination 
of an unusual legal posture and a fact situation suggesting actual 
innocence or a fundamental miscarriage of justice, either in the 
adjudication of guilt or in sentencing, and a prisoner in New Jersey is 
foreclosed from presenting his or her claim in a post-conviction relief 
petition because the court is prohibited from relaxing the rules, this may 
very well be, in practical effect, a suspension of the writ.  A close 
examination of the federal cases might shed light on whether there has 
been a suspension of the writ in New Jersey where a prisoner, without 
 
 30 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 773 (2008); see also INS. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 
301 n. 13 (noting difficult[y] of resolving question of what the Suspension Clause 
protects), both cited and quoted in HERTZ & LIEBMAN, 1 FED. HABEAS CORPUS PRAC. & PROC.,
§7.2[d] (2024). 
 31 HERTZ & LIEBMAN, 1 FED. HABEAS CORPUS PRAC. & PROC., §7.2[d] n. 69 (citing 
Boumediene, 553 U.S. 723). 
 32 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004) (At its historical core, the writ of 
habeas corpus has served as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive detention, 
and it is in that context that its protections have been strongest[,] quoting and citing St. 
Cyr, supra, 533 U.S. at 301).  There was also a serious question raised by the 
governments actions in immigration cases. See St. Cyr, supra note 30 and several cases 
involving INS regulations.  See, e.g., Calcano-Matinez v. INS, 533 U.S. 348 (2001); 
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). 
 33 28 U.S.C. § 2241, et seq.
 34 HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 30, n.129 (citing cases).  There are a number of 
federal cases suggesting a potential Suspension Clause violation where a prisoner is 
unable to present a competence-to-be-executed claim. See, e.g., Martinez-Villareal v. 
Stewart, 118 F.3d 628, 63132 & nn.3-5; id., at 635 (Nelson, J. concurring) (arguing that 
AEDPA unconstitutionally and unambiguously suspends the writ of habeas corpus as to 
competence to be executed claims). 
2025] FREAMON 81 
fault, is barred from filing a successive petition for post-conviction relief 
because of the rules strict time bar and the courts inability to relax the 
rule.  There certainly is no question that New Jersey courts and the 
Supreme Court Committee charged with revising our rules must be 
vigilant in making sure that access to the writ of habeas corpus, or its 
post-conviction analogue, remains untrammeled and available to all 
prisoners who seek it.  Concern about inviting a floodgate of frivolous or 
meritless petitions might arise but there are other ways to handle the 
problem of frivolous petitions. 
In my view, the courts are not as cognizant as they should be about 
the problem of race in the administration of criminal justice in our state.  
We worry about the potential for suspension of the writ but, 
unfortunately, judges do not seem to be aware of the importance of post-
conviction remedies when a large percentage of the petitioners coming 
before them are from minority and marginalized communities.35  The 
use of habeas corpus is often a barometer for detection of larger social 
or political problems in the community in such circumstances.  Any 
study of the problem should not ignore this fact. We now know that 
there are a number of prisoners in the state prison system who are 
actually innocent or incarcerated because of serious deficiencies in our 
system of justice.36  The post-conviction remedies rules are especially 
important in providing access by such prisoners to justice.  I commend 
the Risingers for bringing this issue to our attention. 
 
 
 35 I include undocumented aliens and asylum seekers in the group I have described 
as marginalized.  
36 See, e.g., Wrongful Convictions, EQUAL JUST. INITIATIVE, 
https://eji.org/issues/wrongful-convictions/ [https://perma.cc/HJ3J-QT8V] (last 
visited Dec. 16, 2024).  


Is the State Constitutional Guarantee of the Privilege of Habeas Corpus Suspended in N.J.?

Risinger, D. Michael

Risinger, Lesley C.

Compensation for the Convicted Innocent in New Jersey: Problems and Recommended Solutions

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The nuclear rivalry between the United States and Soviet Union during the Cold War transformed the nature and conduct of world politics that exits even to this day. In this class, we will discuss nuclear arsenals and force structures, nuclear jargon, nuclear ethics and psychology, arms control, strategic and civil defense, and the effects of a possible nuclear exchange. In addition, we will also address strategies of deterrence and nuclear weapons decision making. We will also examine the implications stemming from both the vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons

Balestrieri, Brendan J., Ph.D.

Seton Hall University 
eRepository @ Seton Hall 
Diplomacy Syllabi School of Diplomacy and International Relations 
Spring 2025 
DIPL 3120 Nuclear Weapons and International Security 
Brendan J. Balestrieri Ph.D. 
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