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Protéger les briques : réflexions sur les aménagements hydrauliques des rues et des places de Mésopotamie du Nord à l’Âge du Bronze
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The industrial cost of fixed exchange rate regimes
No full textInternational audiencePremature deindustrialization in most emerging and developing economies is one of the most striking stylized facts of the recent decades. In this paper, we provide solid empirical evidence supporting that the choice of a fixed exchange rate regime accelerates this phenomenon. Relying on a panel of 146 developed, emerging, and developing countries over the 1974–2019 period, we show that fixed exchange rate regimes have had a negative, significant, and robust effect on the size of the manufacturing sector—developing countries being the most affected by the industrial cost of such a regime. Additional gravity model regressions show that the impact of fixed regimes passes through the trade channel. In particular, this regime has kept countries with low relative productivity in a state of structural dependence on imports of manufactured products to the detriment of the emergence of a strong local manufacturing sector
Unpacking the green box: Endogenous preferences and environmental policy stringency in European Countries
No full textInternational audienceThis paper identifies the determinants of the OECD Environmental Policy Stringency (EPS) index using a panel of 21 European countries for the period 2009-2019. If there is a large literature on the macroeconomic, political, and social determinants of EPS, the analysis of people’s preferences towards environmental policies is still burgeoning. Thus, the main goal of this paper is to estimate the effects of environmental preferences on the EPS indicator. Due to the endogeneity of preferences, we have applied an instrumental variable framework to estimate our empirical model. Our most important result is to show that environmental preferences have a positive and significant effect on the level of the EPS indicator once the endogeneity bias has been taken into account: on average, a rise in the prevalence of environmental preferences of 1% in a country will increase the aggregate EPS indicator by at least 0.25%. Furthermore, it should be noted that the channels through which environmental preferences influence the EPS operate primarily through market and technological instruments. In these two cases, the estimated elasticities are almost four times higher than for the aggregate index. Our results have important policy implications
Compounds and Raiders: A Strategic Model of Self-Protection in the End Times
No full textInternational audienceThis paper examines the rationality of elite bunker-building as a response to anticipated societal collapse. Indeed, the phenomenon of “prepping” for “the Event” can be framed as self-insurance and relies on a transactional view of humanity, if one is to ensure the control of a compound and fight off potential assailants. We draw on economic decision modeling to analyze how the necessity of internal control by the leader, resentment or the perception of potential loot by outsiders interact with fortification strategies. We introduce a “Machiavelli index” to represent hostility and show that excessive investment in defense can be counterproductive and provoke attack. Maximum bunkerization may not be optimal compared to a degree of cooperation, redistribution, and efforts to reduce perceived inequality. Survival in the end times may depend less on walls and more on legitimacy, reciprocity, and strategic restraint
Temporal patterns of adolescent screen time and compulsive internet use in Moroccan high school students
No full textInternational audienceObjective: Although compulsive internet use reflects interactions between personal vulnerabilities and situational triggers, adolescents' day-to-day screen time patterns, especially in non-Western contexts, remain understudied. We aim to examine temporal patterns of screen time among Moroccan adolescents and their associations with compulsive internet use (CIU) and sociodemographic factors. Methods: This study uses an intensive daily design to capture short-term fluctuations in screen use across a week, identifying weekday-weekend shifts and other dynamics. A total of 334 Moroccan high school students (Mage = 16.02 years, 52 % female) from three public schools in urban and rural areas reported their daily screen time and CIU over seven consecutive days, their platform-specific usage and their scores on the CIUS. Latent class analysis (LCA) was used to identify subgroups with distinct weekly trajectories, and latent growth modeling (LGM) was used to assess temporal change. Linear mixed-effects models tested predictors, including age, sex, CIUS scores, school type, device preference, and primary internet activity. Results: Two distinct usage profiles emerged: steady-low and weekend-high. The weekend-high profile was more common among older girls and showed strong Sunday peaks. Mixed-effects and latent class models showed that higher CIUS scores, being female, and the day of the week (especially Sunday, with an increase of 74 min compared to weekdays) predicted heavier, multi-platform engagement. Conclusions: Moroccan adolescents show heterogeneous temporal patterns of screen use, with compulsive use linked to heavier, weekend-centered engagement. Prevention efforts should target overall exposure and high-risk time windows, especially on weekends
Dolphins and sea monsters in mosaics from the Hellenistic to the Imperial periods: two aspects of the sea, beneficial and frightening
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Arqueología, historia y etnografía de El Loa. Actas del primer simposio de Patrimonio Cultural de El Loa
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Répression étatique et responsabilité pénale des manifestants en Iran
No full textIranian security forces — notably the police (FARAJA), the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and the Basij (a paramilitary militia affiliated with the IRGC, often used to disperse protesters) — are regularly accused by human rights organizations of playing a role in an extremely violent crackdown. This repression is characterized by the unlawful use of live ammunition and metal pellets, as well as the systematic deployment of tear gas, water cannons, and batons. Direct gunfire targeting peaceful and unarmed demonstrators has been documented. This police violence has resulted in the deaths of thousands of people, as well as the blinding and maiming of hundreds of protesters in Iran. These acts form part of a widespread and systematic attack against the civilian population in Iran, particularly against the women and men who have demanded freedom, equality, and dignity.The repression has also extended to healthcare facilities, with attacks on hospitals, the use of gas inside these structures, and violence against medical personnel. Moreover, the authorities have carried out large-scale arbitrary arrests, targeting not only protesters but also journalists, observers, and individuals disseminating images of the gatherings. These practices are accompanied by strict control of information, which goes beyond blocking social media and internet shutdowns to include disruptions of mobile networks and landline services, effectively isolating the country from the rest of the world. Furthermore, the Iranian regime has demonstrated extreme brutality by opening fire on crowds, causing numerous casualties and turning the repression into a veritable bloodbath.On the judicial front, protesters after each wave of demonstrations face prosecution on charges such as “acts against national security,” “sabotage,” or “enmity against God” (moharebeh), offenses punishable by particularly severe penalties. This article seeks to analyze the criminal risks faced by protesters in Iran, in light of the functioning and specific features of the Iranian legal system.Les forces de sécurité iraniennes — notamment la police (FARAJA), le Corps des Gardiens de la Révolution islamique (GRI) et le Basij (une milice paramilitaire liée à GRI, souvent utilisée pour disperser les protestataires) — sont régulièrement mises en cause par des organisations de défense des droits humains pour leur rôle dans une répression d’une extrême violence. Celle-ci se manifeste par l’usage illégal de balles réelles et de projectiles métalliques, ainsi que par le recours systématique au gaz lacrymogène, aux canons à eau et aux matraques. Des tirs visant directement des manifestants pacifiques et non armées, ont été documentés. Cette violence policière a entraîné la mort de milliers de personnes ainsi que l’aveuglement et la mutilation de centaines de manifestants en Iran. Ces actes s’inscrivent dans le cadre d’une attaque généralisée et systématique contre la population civile en Iran, notamment contre les femmes et les hommes qui ont réclamé la liberté, l’égalité et la dignité.La répression s’étend également aux établissements de santé, avec des attaques contre des hôpitaux, l’utilisation de gaz à l’intérieur de ces structures et des violences à l’encontre du personnel médical. Par ailleurs, les autorités procèdent à des arrestations arbitraires à grande échelle, visant non seulement les manifestants, mais aussi les journalistes, les observateurs et les personnes diffusant des images des rassemblements. Ces pratiques s’accompagnent d’un contrôle rigoureux de l’information, qui ne se limite pas au blocage des réseaux sociaux et aux coupures d’Internet, mais s’étend également aux réseaux de téléphonie mobile et aux lignes fixes, isolant ainsi de facto le pays du reste du monde. Par ailleurs, le régime iranien fait preuve d’une cruauté extrême en ouvrant le feu sur la foule, provoquant de nombreuses victimes et transformant la répression en un véritable bain de sang.Sur le plan judiciaire, les manifestants après chaque mouvement s’exposent à des poursuites pour des chefs d’accusation tels que « actes contre la sécurité de l’État », « sabotage » ou encore « inimitié envers Dieu ou Moharebeh », infractions passibles de peines particulièrement lourdes. Le présent article se propose d’analyser les risques pénaux encourus par les manifestants en Iran, à la lumière du fonctionnement et des spécificités du système juridique iranien