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    1344 research outputs found

    La complexité de l'éthique au sein des organisations : de l'exigence normative à l'exigence de responsabilité

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    La complexité de la notion d’éthique s’impose dès que l’on considère attentivement l’intention simpliste d’épuiser la question au travers de règles censées garantir la fiabilité éthique des organisations. Ceci, en particulier du fait de l’importance primordiale des routines pour comprendre dans quelle mesure l’éthique résulte prioritairement des pratiques vécues et répétées des acteurs au quotidien et non de la seule et le plus souvent impuissante, si ce n’est délétère incantation concernant les principes.The complexity of ethics looms ahead as soon as one considers the simplistic attitude which consists in aiming at imposing rules and procedures in order to secure that an organization “is ethical”. Routines play a particularly important role in the daily work of organizations, and represent the most fundamental basis for ethics understood on the basis of practices and uses – thus, contrasting with the generally taken for granted understanding of ethics on the basis of norms and formal “commandments”. Far from helping people in “behaving ethically”, rules and norms provoke many deleterious effects on real organizational ethics

    How field members interactions contribute to the structuration of an organizational field. A pluralistic approach

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    International audienceThere is an increasing interest for the role of social positions to understand evolutions and change within organizational fields. This paper advances a new approach to understand how actors manage their connections within an organizational field and how this influences their ability to shape the field. To illustrate this process, we explore the Socially Responsible Investments field circa 2004-2005, at a time it had emerged but had not stabilized yet

    On Signalling and Screening in Markets with Asymmetric Information

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    The two games that are typically used to model markets with asymmetric information are the signalling game and the screening game. In the signalling game, an equilibrium may not be efficient because of the arbitrariness of off-the-equilibrium-path beliefs. In the screening game, a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium may fail to exist because of " cream-skimming " deviations. Perhaps surprisingly, I show how equilibrium generically exists and is efficient in a game that combines signalling and screening. The signalling part assures the existence of equilibrium, whereas the screening part prevents non-efficient allocations from being supported as equilibrium allocations

    Structuring Guidelines for Web Application Designers - A Meta-model

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    International audienceCompanies develop and maintain complex web sites. Literature provides them with many guidelines for these tasks. However this knowledge is disseminated in many information sources and difficult to apply. This paper is an attempt to address the following research question: How to structure the existing guidelines helping website designers in order to facilitate their application? The contribution is twofold: i) we propose a meta-model allowing a rich representation of these guidelines, ii) we feed this model with several hundreds of guidelines thanks to a deep extraction and structuration. Future research will consist in enriching the UWE (UML-based Web Engineering) method with this knowledge base leading to a quality based approach

    Migration as a Window into the Coevolution between Language and Behavior

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    International audienceUnderstanding the causes and consequences of language evolution in relation to social factors is challenging as we generally lack a clear picture of how languages coevolve with historical social processes. Research analyzing the relation between language and socioeconomic factors relies on contemporaneous data. Because of this, such analysis may be plagued by spurious correlation concerns coming from the historical co-evolution and dependency of the relationship between language and behavior to the institutional environment. To solve this problem, we propose migrations to the same country as a microevolutionary step that may uncover constraints on behavior. We detail strategies available to other researchers by applying the epidemiological approach to study the correlation between sex-based gender distinctions and female labor force participation. Our main finding is that language must have evolved partly as a result of cultural change, but also that it may have directly constrained the evolution of norms. We conclude by discussing implications for the coevolution of language and behavior, and by comparing different methodological approaches

    Task complexity and shared value orientation: exploring the moderators of a social dilemma in team social networks

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    International audienceAlthough it is often in the interest of individuals to implement networking strategies that erode their team’s social capital, it is unclear under what conditions such a social dilemma is more or less likely to occur. We focus on brokerage and closure as two dimensions of social structure where tension arises between individual networking strategies and team performance. Adopting a multilevel perspective, and focusing on closed teams with the presence of a clear leader, we analyze two complementary moderators of this social dilemma that are fundamental to the existence of teams: the task complexity facing the team under consideration, and the individualist versus collectivist shared value orientation of its members. We find that an increase in either of these makes the social dilemma more likely to occur. Counterintuitive conclusions pertaining to these moderators are discussed

    Do people contribute more to intra-temporal or inter-temporal public goods?

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    We introduce a dynamic public goods game, where an individual's investment in the public good at a given round provides benefits to other individuals in the next round, and the individual himself benefits from investments in the public good made by his current group members in the previous round. Subjects turn out to be more generous in this inter-temporal context, than in a standard public goods experiment where contributions and transfers are exchanged at the same period. Furthermore, when known, benefits from the past investment are positively related to the individual's current investment in the public good

    Brazil : self-inflicted pain

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    The Brazilian economy grew 7.5% in 2010, when Mr. Lula finished his second mandate as president with a popularity rate of 85%. Six years later, his successor, Ms. Rousseff, is suspended from the presidency under an impeachment trial, while the economy endures a recession of 3.8% of the GDP for the second consecutive year. In this article I argue that the current economic crisis is the result of ill-advised economic policies. Ms. Rousseff’s government altered each one of the tripod of policies implemented by Mr. Cardoso in the 1990s, which had been successful in maintaining macroeconomic stability (namely, the inflation targeting regime, the floating exchange rate and the fiscal austerity). Also, Ms. Rousseff’s government greatly expanded the improperly designed industrial policies that were reintroduced in Brazil during the second mandate of Mr. Lula, which created distortions in the economy and a large fiscal burden for the government. The acting president, Mr. Temer faces great difficulties to put the economy back in order, since unpopular measures are required that are very hard to be implemented in the midst of the current political turmoil

    Task ordering in incentives under externalities

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    In a two-task team project with observable task outcomes, optimal incentives prioritize tasks differently depending on task externalities. When the tasks are independent, Principal follows a decreasing order by placing more essential task first. A task is more essential if its failure compromises the overall project's chance of success from a task-specific cutoff level by a greater percentage. This definition has no systematic relations to the variance of task outcomes. In particular, a more risky task can be less essential or more essential.Under externalities, essentiality and impact jointly determine the optimal ordering. A task with much higher impact can be performed early even if it is less essential. Optimal task ordering thus raises subtle new issues and forms an integral part in team incentives. Our analysis provides some contrast with recent team incentives results

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