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Interest Rates and Investment Under Competitive Screening and Moral Hazard
No full textThis paper studies the effect of (market) interest rate changes on investment under competitive screening and moral hazard. Lower (higher) rates ease (hinder) the provision of incentives to entrepreneurs with positive NPV projects to invest in their best project but hinder (ease) banks' efforts to distinguish them from entrepreneurs with negative NPV projects. This might result in a hump-shaped investment curve. Under low rates, screening through limit pricing leaves insufficient profits to low-wealth entrepreneurs to invest in their best project, and consequently, several project qualities might co-exist in equilibrium. Several testable and other implications on the effectiveness of unconventional monetary policy to boost investment are discussed
Materiality in Institutions. Spaces, Embodiment and Technology in Management and Organization.
No full textInternational audienceThis book aims at clarifying the role of materiality, spaces, digitality and embodiment in institutional dynamics from the perspective of Management & Organization Studies. Presenting a rich set of theoretical, methodological and epistemological advances on materiality and institutions, it also gives voice to distinctive and diverse perspectives on materiality in institutions, structuring chapters into four major topics: artefacts and objects, digitality and information, space and time, body and embodiment. This book sparks discussion and debate about ontological dimensions of Management & Organization Studies, including post-discursive, visual, phenomenological and material
Optimal quality improvements and pricing strategies with active and passive product returns
No full textInternational audienc
Consignment contracts with cooperative programs and price discount mechanisms in a dynamic supply chain
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A new branch-and-bound algorithm for the maximum edge-weighted clique problem
No full textInternational audienceWe study the maximum edge-weighted clique problem, a problem related to the maximum (vertex-weighted) clique problem which asks for finding a complete subgraph (i.e., a clique) of maximum total weight on its edges. The problem appears in a wide range of applications, including bioinformatics, material science, computer vision, robotics, and many more. In this work, we propose a new combinatorial branch-and-bound algorithm for the problem which relies on a novel bounding procedure capable of pruning a very large amount of nodes of the branch-and-bound tree. Extensive computational experiments on random and structured graphs, encompassing standard benchmarks used in the literature as well as recently introduced real-world large-scale graphs, show that our new algorithm outperforms the state-of-the-art by several orders of magnitude on many instances
Optimal Redistributive Taxation in Credit Markets with Adverse Selection
No full textI study optimal redistributive taxation in credit markets with adverse selection. Under symmetric information, the tax system is non-distortionary and unambiguously benefits high-risk types at the expense of low-risk types. Under asymmetric information, a range of taxes exists that creates Pareto improvements relative to the (zero-tax) market allocation by increasing aggregate investment. For sufficiently high taxes, an increase in the safe interest rate can be accompanied by an increase in investment
Experimental evidence on deceitful communication: does everyone have a price ?
No full textThis paper introduces a new task to elicit individual aversion to deceiving, defined as the lowest payoff for which an individual agrees to switch from faithful to deceitful communication. The core task is a modified version of the Deception Game as presented in Gneezy (Am. Econ. Rev. 95 (1): 384-395: 2005). Deceitful communication brings about a constant loss for the receiver, and a range of benefits for the sender. A multiple-price-list mechanism is used to determine the senders communication strategy contingent on the various benefits from deception. The results show that 71% of the subjects in the sender role will implement pure or threshold communication strategies. Among them, 40% appear to be process driven, being either "ethical" or "spiteful". The other 60% respond to incentives in line with the fixed cost of lying theory; they will forego faithful communication if the benefit from deceiving the other is large enough. Regression analysis shows that this reservation payoff¤ is independent of the risk aversion and social preferences of the subject; it would thus capture an inner preference for "behaving well"
Le rôle de la contagion physique négative dans l'achat d'un produit d'occasion vendu en ligne
No full textInternational audienceLa perception d’une contagion physique négative a été identifiée dans la littérature comme un frein à l’achat de produits d’occasion dans un contexte hors ligne. Compte tenu du développement de l’achat d’occasion sur Internet, cet article étudie l’effet de la saillance du contact entre le propriétaire précédent et le produit sur l’achat de produits d’occasion en ligne. Une première expérimentation montre un effet de contagion physique négative sur l’intention d’achat, effet médiatisé par le risque perçu physique. Or, de nombreux acteurs de l’occasion sur Internet adoptent des stratégies de présentation visant à accentuer la similitude avec le neuf. Une deuxième expérimentation montre que la similitude avec un produit neuf permet de réduire ce risque perçu physique pour les individus non-experts de la catégorie de produits, tandis qu’elle dégrade la qualité perçue pour les experts. Dans les deux expérimentations menées, l’effet du dégoût, qui joue un rôle important dans les circuits de distribution physiques, s’avère non significatif
The maximum clique interdiction problem
No full textInternational audienceGiven a graph G and an interdiction budget k, the Maximum Clique Interdiction Problem asks to find a subset of at most k vertices to remove from G so that the size of the maximum clique in the remaining graph is minimized. This problem has applications in many areas, such as crime detection, prevention of outbreaks of infectious diseases and surveillance of communication networks. We propose an integer linear programming formulation of the problem based on an exponential family of Clique-Interdiction Cuts and we give necessary and sufficient conditions under which these cuts are facet-defining. Our new approach provides a useful tool for analyzing the resilience of (social) networks with respect to clique-interdiction attacks, i.e., the decrease of the size of the maximum clique as a function of an incremental interdiction budget level. On a benchmark set of publicly available instances, including large-scale social networks with up to one hundred thousand vertices and three million edges, we show that most of them can be analyzed and solved to proven optimality within short computing time