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The Random Design Argument
Get PDFThe “random design argument” is a popular mode of justification, used to prove that scientific theories are true. The first part of this argument is that, if God had designed X, the features of X would approximate randomness. The second part of this argument is that random design can therefore be used, in the form of a null hypothesis, as a proxy for design. If the null hypothesis can be falsified, then design is falsified and contingency is confirmed. The random design argument has two important problems that have gone unrecognized. First, though presented as a finding of empirical science, it relies on theological claims. Second, though presented as a null hypothesis, there is no justification that random design is the logical complement of the scientific theory in question. Despite its failings, the random design argument has a long history of use for justifying and proving scientific hypotheses. This paper documents several areas where the random design argument has been used (both currently and historically) as well as the logical problems with the argument
The Unlearnable Checkerboard Pattern
No full textDetecting some patterns is a simple task for humans, but nearly impossible for current machine learning algorithms. Here, the "checkerboard" pattern is examined, where human prediction nears 100% and machine prediction drops significantly below 50%
Generalized Information
Get PDFGeneralized Information (GI) is a measurement of the degree to which a program can be said to generalize a dataset. It is calculated by creating a program to model the data set, measuring the Active Information in the model, and subtracting out the size of the model. Active Information allows GI to be usable with both exact and inexact models
Exploring Alternate Notations for Partial Differentials
Get PDFPrevious work has extended the algebraic manipulability of total differentials. Here, we explore alternate notations for partial differentials which will allow for their algebraic manipulability
The Consciousness Unit (CU) Model
No full textThe present paper attempts to handle the question how an unconscious mental state (MS) is transformed into a conscious-MS, by developing an outline of a new model, the conscious unit (CU) model. The essential assumption of this model is as follows. In the cognitive system there is an inborn, special linking-mechanism that links to a MS a CU, i.e., a unit of consciousness (or a stream of such units when the represented by the MS is complex). As a result, the individual becomes aware (conscious) of the represented by the MS. This model was applied successfully to certain empirical observations and to several problems, which were directed toward the higher-order (HO) theories of consciousness [especially the higher-order thought (HOT) theory]
Damned if You Do and Damned if You Don't
Get PDFWe argue that a number of biology (and evolution) textbooks face a crippling dilemma. On the one hand, significant difficulties arise if textbooks include theological claims in their case for evolution. (Such claims include, for example, ‘God would never design a suboptimal panda’s thumb, but an imperfect structure is just what we’d expect on natural selection.’) On the other hand, significant difficulties arise if textbooks exclude theological claims in their case for evolution. So, whether textbooks include or exclude theological claims, they face debilitating problems. We attempt to establish this thesis by examining 32 biology (and evolution) textbooks, including the Big 12—that is, the top four in each of the key undergraduate categories (biology majors, non-majors, and evolution courses). In Section 2 of our article, we analyze three specific types of theology these texts use to justify evolutionary theory. We argue that all face significant difficulties. In Section 3, we step back from concrete cases and, instead, explore broader problems created by having theology in general in biology textbooks. We argue that the presence of theology—of whatever kind—comes at a significant cost, one that some textbook authors are likely unwilling to pay. In Section 4, we consider the alternative: Why not simply get rid of theology? Why not just ignore it? In reply, we marshal a range of arguments why avoiding God-talk raises troubles of its own. Finally, in Section 5, we bring together the collective arguments in Sections 2-4 to argue that biology textbooks face an intractable dilemma. We underscore this difficulty by examining a common approach that some textbooks use to solve this predicament. We argue that this approach turns out to be incoherent and self-serving. The poor performance of textbooks on this point highlights just how deep the difficulty is. In the end, the overall dilemma remains
