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Get PDFCoercive Control and the Limits of Criminal Law
Get PDFDomestic violence does not always include physical violence. While abusive relationships may be punctuated with physical violence, it is the dynamic of control that constitutes the crux of the abuse. This dynamic is characterized by behaviors designed to dominate, degrade, and discipline, including emotional and financial abuse, isolation, rulemaking, and surveillance. These nonviolent forms of abuse are collectively referred to as coercive control, and their impact can be debilitating and devastating for survivors of domestic violence. Despite what we know about domestic violence, the criminal legal system focuses its efforts on discrete incidents or encounters between the abuser and the survivor - most commonly physical assaults. For years, domestic violence scholars and activists have advocated for the criminalization of coercive control in order to resolve this fundamental mismatch between the criminal legal system\u27s blunt tools and the highly-individualized nature of domestic violence. These arguments have been buoyed by the recent passage of coercive control prohibitions internationally, including in England, Scotland, and Ireland. In the United States, several state legislatures are currently considering similar measures
This Article argues that criminalizing coercive control will do far more harm than good. Analyzing the domestic violence movement\u27s prior attempt to use criminal law to address coercive behavior - the adoption of mandatory arrest and no-drop prosecution policies - underscores how, yet again, the most vulnerable survivors and their families will bear the brunt of these new criminal laws. As with mandatory policies, coercive control criminal laws will be coopted by abusive partners and used against survivors. These effects will be most pronounced among survivors who do not embody the archetypal straight, white, scared, femme victim. The domestic violence movement must learn from our mistakes rather than double down on the same flawed logic. We must stop sacrificing survivors in the name of expanding the carceral state
In re Guardianship of Jones, 138 Nev. Adv. Op. 6 (Nev. Ct. App. Feb. 24, 2022)
Get PDFThis case is about whether the district court properly granted attorney fees to guardians from the estate of the protected person under NRS 159.344. Donna and Robyn, daughters of the appellant and protected person, Jones, acted as her temporary guardians for a period in 2019 before their sister Kimberly was appointed general guardian. The dispute involves the attorney fees accumulated during Donna and Robyn’s guardianship period.
Jones first argued that the award itself was improper due to the presumption against such fees payable from the protected person’s estate. The Court rejected this argument, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by awarding attorney fees because it properly considered the relevant NRS 159.344 factors, and determined that the fees were just, reasonable, and necessary. Jones next argued that the amount awarded was excessive due to the guardianship’s short duration. The Court again rejected Jones’s argument, holding that the district court acted reasonably, given the complexity of the work involved, as complexity was the proper factor, not duration. The Court of Appeals affirmed
Joint Authorship and Dramatic Works: A Critical History
Get PDFThis Article examines the evolution of copyright law pertaining to collaborative authorship and finds that much of the core legal doctrine in this area arose from disputes involving dramatic works. This fresh look at theatrical collaborations reveals a rich history that calls into question the modem judicial presumption that dramatic writing is the product of individual genius. Examining the history of Anglo- American law\u27s response to collaboration in dramatic works offers valuable insight into the development of multiple concepts related to authorship-in particular, the rules governing derivative works, works made for hire, and joint works. It also demonstrates that the jurisprudence of collaborative playwriting has led courts to develop an unduly narrow judicial interpretation of joint authorship.
Part I examines the ubiquity of collaborative writing in the Elizabethan theater and traces its decline during the English Civil Wars (1642-51) and the Restoration, accompanied by a contemporaneous shift in cultural preference toward sole authorship that was fueled by the concept of the romantic author. Part II demonstrates the role that dramatic works played in the jurisprudence of authorship in English and American courts during the nineteenth century. Part III addresses the role of dramatic works in shaping the federal courts\u27 attempts to resolve competing authorship claims under the Copyright Act of 1909 in the absence of clear legislative guidance for distinguishing among joint works, derivative works, and works made for hire. Part IV examines the federal courts\u27 restrictive interpretations of joint authorship under the Copyright Act of 1976 in the specific context of dramatic works and the courts\u27 reluctance, in many cases, to extend those interpretations to other categories of works. Part V suggests that the persistent influence of romantic authorship has led federal courts to favor sole authorship over collaborations, and draws a contrast with contemporary English courts\u27 refusal to embrace this trend, concluding that the American courts\u27 preference for solitary authorship of dramatic works conflicts not only with the federal statutes, but with the history of dramatic writing as well
Uber Tech., Inc. v. Royz, 138 Nev. Adv. Op. 66 (Sept. 29, 2022)
Get PDFThe Nevada Supreme Court is bound to the United States’ Supreme Court decision in Schein regarding contacts governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). Therefore, when parties enter into an arbitration agreement that clearly and unmistakably delegates the arbitrability threshold question to the arbitrator, the district court must refer the case to arbitration even if the district court concludes the dispute is not subject to the arbitration agreemen
Civil Rights Law Equity: An Introduction to a Theory of What Civil Rights Has Become
Get PDFThis Article argues that civil rights law is better understood as civil rights equity. It contends that the four-decade-long project of restricting civil rights litigation has shaped civil rights jurisprudence into a contemporary version of traditional equity. For years commentators have noted the low success rates of civil rights suits and debated the propriety of increasingly restrictive procedural and substantive doctrines. Activists have lost faith in civil rights litigation as an effective tool for social change, instead seeking change in administrative forums, or by asserting political pressure through social media and activism to compel policy change. As for civil rights litigation, activists have, most damningly, ignored it. This Article makes a preliminary case for understanding civil rights jurisprudence as a contemporary version of traditional equity, available in limited circumstances to address extraordinary violations of rights. Civil rights litigation has become a limited tool: inappropriate for driving social change, unreliable for litigants involved in everyday disputes, and mostly incapable of articulating and developing rights through precedent. Judges are the powerful, central figures in this litigation. And the rights landscape is structured by the capabilities and demands of the kind of equity regime civil rights litigation has become. What emerges is a vision of the courts as protectors of the status quo in social and political relationships