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Martin v. Martin, 138 Nev. Adv. Op. 78 (Dec. 01, 2022)
Get PDFIn this decision authored by Justice Stiglich, the Court held that a property settlement incident to a divorce decree is enforceable when it requires a divorcing veteran spouse to make payments from military disability pay. Although federal law prohibits state courts from awarding veteran disability pay in a divorce, the Court found an indemnification provision in a property settlement resulting in the payment of disability pay was enforceable because the parties had previously negotiated and agreed to the terms. While the Court would not have been able to award veteran disability pay as part of a property settlement, the divorcing spouses had a right to make this agreement and a right to have it enforced. Additionally, the Court determined the lower court did not abuse discretion by awarding pendant lite attorney fees
Community Accountability
Get PDFThis Essay takes a close look at how the idea of community accountability is used in current transformative and restorative justice efforts, situating the concept within the history of delegalization, or a collection of different efforts to reclaim conflict resolution and public safety from the state. In fact, these efforts to reclaim the authority and means of redressing harm from legal systems may track earlier efforts to reclaim dispute resolution from the state. In Part I, we situate both transformative and restorative justice movements in the history of delegalization while noting essential differences between the objectives of these two reform movements. In Part II we analyze the phrase “community accountability” in transformative justice and restorative justice, respectively, and identify potential benefits and harms
From Bags to Riches: Gaming\u27s NIL Sponsorship Indicative of Need for Federal Oversight in College Sports
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In re Parental Rights as to G.R.S., 139 Nev. Adv. Op. 16 (July 6, 2023)
Get PDFA parent’s rights to their children cannot be terminated because a parent struggles with substance abuse but is able to safely and effectively parent their children
Reimagining “Reasonableness” Under Section 330(a) in a World of Technology, Data, and Artificial Intelligence
Get PDFTransformations in the legal industry’s supply chain caused by legal technology and innovative service delivery models have triggered the need for courts to reimagine how to assess the reasonableness of legal fees under 11 U.S.C. § 330. In nearly every other industry, when there are changes or fluctuations in supply chain costs, it is typical for the market price paid by end-users or consumers to fluctuate as well. Market forces organically dictate the reasonableness of the market prices in light of current production cost and demand. In contrast, the legal industry hasn’t kept up with a unified, market-driven supply cost and demand approach when deciding how to use technology to serve client needs. To date, clients haven’t consistently forced lawyers to evaluate the cost of new technology against the efficiency benefits that the technology may have when compared to human labor. This article posits that it’s time to factor in the choice to use, or not to use, technology when determining the reasonableness of fees and expenses under 11 U.S.C. § 330. We believe that the newest technology should be part of our toolbox—in particular, artificial intelligence (AI).
To provide a more robust picture of § 330 and its roots, Part 1 discusses the legislative history of § 330. Part 2 maps the evolution of the case law since the enactment of § 330. Part 3 highlights how technological advancements and innovations in today’s legal industry call for a change to a court’s current § 330 assessment. Part 4 discusses how various constituents in the legal industry might call for change to make it a reality. Finally, Part 5 talks about how the practice of bankruptcy law will benefit if courts’ § 330 analysis starts account for advancements in legal technology
Terror and Tenderness in Criminal Law
Get PDFThe criminal legal system is at a crossroads. Calls for abolition are met with calls for modest adjustments or maintenance of the status quo. What frequently emerges from these polarities is a promise that police, prosecutors, judges, and other government actors will use their vast discretion to reduce the harmful excesses of criminal legal practices. Initiatives like “compassionate release,” “second look sentencing,” and the progressive prosecutor’s pledge to “charge with restraint” are examples of this promise to exercise discretion with care. In word choice and design, these discretionary reforms suggest tempering harsh criminal legal practices with leniency and individualized consideration—a promise of tenderness.This Article argues that the current wave of reforms deploys discretionary relief in a manner that provokes unwarranted optimism while masking the state’s power to invoke terror through policing, prosecution, and punishment. An emotional sleight of hand, discretionary relief--sometimes cast as leniency--entrenches the excessiveness of criminal legal systems in at least three ways. First, discretionary leniency is merely a continuation of a pattern of strategic mercy documented in English law as early as the thirteenth century when pardons were issued to those sentenced to death in order to assuage public outcry over excessive punitiveness. Second, reforms that rely on discretionary leniency reinforce well-worn beliefs about merit—who merits punishment and who merits mercy. This liberal conceptualization of meritocracy shifts responsibility for the harshness of criminal legal practices onto the shoulders of defendants, a phenomenon that masks racial and other disparities in criminal systems. Third, discretionary-based reforms do not change substantive law or procedure. Instead, they rely on the leadership qualities of the discretionary decision-maker. This further entrenches the neoliberal tenet that reforming unjust or inequitable institutions can be accomplished by simply finding the right person for the job. This reliance on good people making good decisions truncates discussion of more sweeping changes that would place structural and legal limits on the state’s power to police, prosecute, and punish