5322 research outputs found
Sort by
B.Y. and A.F. v. Dist. Ct., 140 Nev. Adv. Op. 32 (Apr. 25, 2024)
Get PDFIn a per curium opinion, the Nevada Supreme Court found an abuse of discretion in the lower court’s denial of an ex parte temporary guardianship petition. The considerations outlined in NRS 159A were not met, therefore, the lower court improperly denied the petition. NRS 159A.053(4) presumes that petitions for guardianship are in the best interest of the child under certain conditions. This presumption is rebuttable at any time, but an ex parte motion need not be denied merely because an opponent cannot rebut it before a decision is rendered. Further, NRS 159A.053(3) requires that an affidavit describing the emergency supports an ex parte petition for temporary guardianship. The lower court’s evaluation of the emergency here improperly relied on a misunderstanding of who filed the petition. For these reasons, the Court granted the petition for a writ of mandamus in part to reconsider the original petition for temporary guardianship
Sisolak v. Polymer 80, Inc., 140 Nev. Adv. Op. 30, 546 P.3d 819 (Apr. 18, 2024)
Get PDFIn 2021, the Nevada Legislature promulgated, and Governor Sisolak signed into law, NRS 202.253(9), NRS 202.3625, and NRS 202.363 as an extension to the federal Gun Control Act (“GCA”). The statute criminalizes the sale or transfer of unfinished firearms lacking serial numbers, known as “ghost guns.” Respondent, Polymer80, Inc., is a Nevada company whose primary business is the sale of unfinished firearm components. Respondent sued Governor Sisolak and other named defendants claiming that the new ghost gun statute was vague and therefore unconstitutional. The district court agreed with Polymer80, granted summary judgment, and declared the statute unconstitutional. Appellants appealed to the Nevada Supreme Court arguing the statute was enforceable because it was easily understood in common firearm parlance. The Justices agreed with Appellants and in a 7-0 decision reversed the district court ruling enjoining use of the statute. Finally, the Court determined the district court erred in its concern of arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement on the basis of being general intent statutes
Nevadans for Reprod. Freedom vs. Washington (Ballot Issue) [State of Nevada], 140 Nev. Adv. Op. 28 (Apr. 18, 2024)
Get PDFThe Nevada Constitution gives the people the authority to place an initiative on the ballot to make law directly by proposing legislation and constitutional amendments. Initiative petitions that comply with Nevada\u27s single-subject requirement, provide a legally sufficient description of its effect, and include a revenue source if it requires state expenditure of funds meets the requirements need to place the initiative on the ballot. Accordingly, the Nevada Supreme Court reversed the lower court’s decision to block the initiative from being placed in the 2024 ballot
Tough Turtle Turf, LLC v. Scott, 139 Nev. Adv. Op. 47 (Nov. 2, 2023)
Get PDFThe Nevada Supreme Court ruled that NRS 613.195(1) and (6), when taken together, do not require a district court to always modify an overbroad noncompete covenant. However, the district court must modify an overbroad noncompete covenant whenever possible
Holland v. Anthony L. Barney, Ltd., 139 Nev. Adv. Op. 49 (Nev. Ct. App.) (Nov. 22, 2023)
Get PDFAppellant Gail Holland (“Holland”), an individual, brought this action to appeal the Eighth Judicial District Court’s granting of summary judgment for constructive trust and quiet title to Respondent, Anthony L. Barney, Ltd. (“Barney, Ltd.”).2,3 The asset in contention, real property located at Loma Portal Avenue (“Loma Portal”) in Northwest Las Vegas, has been litigated over the span of 15 years in both state and federal courts after Holland’s ex-husband, Gloyd Green (“Green”), embezzled money from the Howard Family Trust (“Howard Trust”) in part to buy the aforementioned property. Following a complex procedural history discussed below, the instant case asked the Court of Appeals whether the District Court erred when it made a ruling for Respondent-Creditor that contravenes preceding bankruptcy4 and divorce5 (family court) judgments. In a 3-0 decision authored by Judge Bulla, the Court reversed and remanded the District Court’s ruling
Aguilar v. Lucky Cab Co., 140 Nev. Adv. Rep. 1 (Jan. 4, 2024)
Get PDFThe Court looked at the “amount of the offer” an offeror must pay to obtain NRCP 68(d)(2) dismissal and how that turns on the way the offeror drafts the offer. In particular, the Court identified the differences between an “inclusive” and “exclusive” offer by an offeror and how that changes the recoverable amounts by the offeree. An “inclusive” offer includes all allowances in the exact number written in the offer of judgment. Conversely, exclusive language is not necessarily the number in the offer of judgment. Instead, exclusive language tells the offeree that the offer does not allocate (exclude) a valuation or their costs, expenses, interest, and allowable attorney fees. Additionally, the Court held that acceptance of an offer effectively renders the offeree a prevailing party. Accordingly, the Court held that the district court erred in dismissing the case without Lucky Cab paying the pre-offer costs and interests that were promised and that Agular would otherwise be entitled to as a prevailing party due to Lucky Cab Co. and Adugna Demesash’s (collectively “Lucky Cab”) settlement language, which was an exclusive offer
Chittenden v. Just. Ct. of Pahrump Twp., 140 Nev. Adv. Op. 5 (Jan. 25, 2024)
Get PDFThe court addresses the statutory requirement for a preliminary hearing within 15 days of a defendant’s initial appearance on felony or gross misdemeanor charges, unless good cause exists for delay. The court determines that the justice court must balance the defendant’s right to pretrial liberty with the state’s interests and court needs when assessing good cause, requiring on-record justifications for any delays and efforts to expedite hearings. In this case, appellant Chittenden filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in district court seeking a dismissal of the charges against her because the justice court scheduled her preliminary hearing 76 days after her initial appearance, while she remained in custody. The district court denied her petition finding that good cause existed for the extreme delay, to which Chittenden appealed the decision. The court concludes that the district court abused its discretion when it found good cause for the delay yet affirmed the district court’s denial of Chittenden’s petition for extraordinary writ relief on other grounds
