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Judd v. State, 140 Nev. Adv. Op. 21 (Mar. 14, 2024)
Full text linkUnder NRS 207.190(2), criminal coercion is punishable as a felony if it is carried out using physical force or the immediate threat of physical force. However, absent the use of immediate threat of physical force, coercion is punishable as a misdemeanor. Here, the court determined that the phrase “physical force” in NRS 207.190(2) should be limited to physical force against an individual and not merely against property
Mass Surrender in Immigration Court
Full text linkIn theory, the Department of Homeland Security bears the burden of proof when it seeks to deport a person from the United States. But the government rarely has to meet it. This Article presents original data from live observation in Immigration Court, documenting that almost all respondents in deportation proceedings admit and concede the charges against them, even when they have attorneys, without getting anything in return from the government. Focusing especially on the role of immigrant defense lawyers, the Article explores why this is happening. It critiques the legal standards of proof used in Immigration Court, while also exploring normative ambiguities about the role of immigration lawyers in deportation proceedings. Together, these factors are effectively depriving many immigrants of the vigorous legal defense that they deserve
McCord v. State, 139 Nev. Adv. Op. (Dec. 28, 2023)
Full text linkIn the case of McCord vs. State, the Nevada Supreme Court clarified the interpretation of NRS 482.275(4) regarding license plates.2 The court ruled that a license plate frame partially covering the plate does not constitute “foreign material” making the plate illegible. Furthermore, it established that such a circumstance does not provide probable cause for a traffic stop. This decision addressed the issue of what constitutes a violation of the license plate visibility law, directly impacting the legitimacy of the traffic stop done by the Washoe County Sheriff’s Office on Mr. McCord and the subsequent evidence obtained, leading to the reversal of McCord’s conviction
In re I.S. v. State, 140 Nev. Adv. Op. 18 (Mar. 28, 2024)
Full text linkThe Supreme Court of Nevada determined that 62C.230’s incorporation of NRS 62C.200(1)(b)’s prosecutorial-consent requirement does not violate the separation of powers doctrine because (1) the juvenile court’s authority is solely statutorily derived and (2) dismissal and referral of a juvenile for informal supervision under NRS 62C.230 does not constitute an exercise of the juvenile court’s sentencing discretion. Moreover, the Court determined that I.S.’s appeal here was not moot because there is a presumption of collateral consequences under a juvenile delinquency adjudication until the juvenile reaches age 18 and/or their juvenile record is sealed
Religious Accommodations in the Dobbs Era
Full text linkGiven the deep political divide in the U.S. and the emotional response to the abortion issue, workplaces may become hostile environments that harm workers based on their pro- or anti-abortion views or their out-of-work activism. Besides hostile environments, some workers may suffer workplace discipline based on their speech at work or refusals to engage in certain job requirements. Disciplining employees for engaging in workplace speech or refusal to perform parts of their jobs may violate workers’ rights under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which requires that employers grant religious accommodations in the workplace if doing so does not create an undue hardship on the employer’s business.
Plaintiffs increasingly sue their former employers for failure to grant them religious accommodations. There are four main types of religious accommodation: permission to wear clothing that otherwise would violate dress/appearance codes, scheduling changes that permit the employee to respect their sabbath, freedom to express religious views on controversial topics such as abortion, and excuse from job responsibilities that are offensive to the employee’s religious views. The expression and job responsibilities cases, which are often brought by non-profit religious rights organizations, are part of a larger move for greater religious rights in the U.S.
The United States Supreme Court recently decided Groff v. DeJoy, a scheduling religious accommodation case that ostensibly has nothing to do with abortion, but that may have a major effect on cases brought by religious employees whose opposition to abortion and contraception has interfered with their ability to do and/or keep their jobs.
This article analyzes the four most common employee requests for accommodations and discusses the current law of religious accommodation as refined in Groff v. DeJoy. It suggests ways to analyze free expression cases to protect all employees and the business, and it concludes that where employees request permission to avoid certain job duties, courts should adopt principles from the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). If courts do not adopt these suggestions, Congress should amend Title VII by explicitly defining the terms “reasonable accommodations” and “undue hardship” and by clarifying whether an employer can prove “undue hardship” by demonstrating that the job duty the religious employee seeks to avoid is an “essential function” of the particular job
Palmer (Christopher) v. State of Nevada, 130 Nev. Adv. Op. 41 (Jun. 27, 2024)
Full text linkThe Nevada Court of Appeals determined that the District Court violated Christopher Deangelo Palmer’s Sixth Amendment right to a public trial by excluding his entire family from the courtroom during the complaining witness’s testimony without satisfying the four-factor test established in Waller v. Georgia. The Court found that the reasons provided for the partial closure, such as maintaining courtroom control, the misbehavior of Palmer’s brother, and Palmer’s recorded jail calls, did not constitute substantial reasons for the closure of the court. The District Court failed to consider reasonable alternatives to the closure and did not make sufficient findings to support its decision. This violation is a structural error, and as such, the Nevada Court of Appeals reversed Palmer’s judgment of conviction and remanded for a new trial