East/West: Journal of Ukrainian Studies
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Review of Vadym Adadurov. “Napoleonida” na skhodi Ievropy: Uiavlennia, proekty ta diial\u27nist\u27 uriadu Frantsii shchodo pivdenno-zakhidnykh okrain Rosiis\u27koi imperii na pochatku XIX stolittia. : [Napoléonide in the East of Europe: Representations, Plans, and Activities of the French Government in Relation to the Southwestern Border Regions of the Russian Empire at the Beginning of the Nineteenth Century]
No full textHistorians As Enablers? Historiography, Imperialism, and the Legitimization of Russian Aggression
Full text linkThis essay raises the issue of historians’ responsibility to the communities that they study. While some purported version of history has been central to the Kremlin’s justifications for Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, the region’s historians have failed to make a stand against this misuse of history. Moreover, in many instances they endorsed and disseminated the Kremlin’s narratives about Ukraine’s past and present. Aiming to explain the anti-Ukrainian biases that have become well entrenched in both Western academia and Western public opinion, this essay examines the regional subfield of area studies, to which Ukrainian studies are usually relegated, as well as the expectations and agenda of the Western-educated public. I argue that the subfield is dominated by Russian studies and frequently uncritically adopts the positions, concepts, and explanations of Russia’s imperialist ideologists. At the same time, Western public opinion, while opening up to the historical injustices committed by Western empires, still sees the world through retrograde imperial lenses. The essay also discusses in detail what happens when researchers shaped by both these trends write Ukrainian history. Looking for ways forward, I suggest rethinking the issue of intellectual responsibility and “de-imperialization” of Ukraine’s Western historiography
«Москалі», «сєпари» та «ватніки»: багатоликий ворог в українських сатиричних піснях війни на Донбасі
Full text linkThis article examines representations of the enemy in the Ukrainian satirical songs pertaining to the Russo-Ukrainian war in the Donbas. I focus primarily on the output of Orest Liutyi (the stage persona of Antin Mukhars\u27kyi) and the semi-anonymous Mirko Sablich (Mirko Sablic) collective. Using the method of multimodal discourse analysis, I examine how the enemy opposing the Ukrainian Army is portrayed in the song lyrics and the accompanying music videos. Considering the complex nature of the conflict and the lack of uniformity in the backgrounds of the warring parties, I am particularly interested in who and why is identified as the enemy in the songs. The enemy appears in several guises: “moskal\u27s”—Russian or pro-Russian aggressors from outside Ukraine; “separs”—Ukrainian collaborators who support, often through military efforts, the separation of the Donbas from Ukraine; and “vatniks”—passive anti-Ukrainian individuals who live in Ukraine and whose inaction is perceived to be harmful to Ukraine’s wartime efforts. Whereas these songs call upon Ukrainians to repel the external enemy (“moskal\u27s”) in armed combat, no clear strategy is suggested for how the internal enemies (“separs” and “vatniks”) should be dealt with or, in some cases, even identified. As a result, Liutyi and Sablic, while positioning themselves as “counterpropaganda” projects, risk labelling as “the enemy,” and thus alienating, the audiences most susceptible to propaganda, who could otherwise benefit most from their myth-debunking efforts.У статті розглянуто репрезентацію ворога в українських сатиричних піснях про російсько-українську війну на Донбасі. Дослідження зосереджено переважно на творчості Ореста Лютого (сценічний псевдонім Антіна Мухарського) та напіванонімного колективу «Мірко Сабліч» («Mirko Sablic»). За допомогою методу мультимодального дискурс-аналізу проаналізовано óбрази ворога української армії в текстах пісень та відповідних музичних кліпах. Через комплексну природу конфлікту та строкатий склад спільнот, що беруть участь у конфлікті, особливий інтерес становить те, кого й чому в піснях ідентифікують як ворога. Вороги постають у кількох іпостасях: «москалі» – росіяни або проросійсько налаштовані іноземці; «сєпари» – українці-колаборанти, які підтримують (часто воєнними діями) відділення Донбасу від України; та «ватніки» – пасивні жителі України з антиукраїнською позицією, дії яких розцінюються як шкідництво проти воєнного опору України. Тоді як досліджувані пісні закликають українців протистояти зовнішнім агресорам («москалям») у бою, чіткого плану дій стосовно ворогів усередині країни («сєпарів» і «ватніків») вони не пропонують, подекуди навіть не конкретизуючи, як цих ворогів ідентифікувати. Відтак Орест Лютий та «Мірко Сабліч», позиціонуючи себе як «контрпропагандистські» проєкти, водночас можуть сприяти відчуженню та тавруванню «ворогами» найбільш сприйнятливої до пропаганди публіки – тих, кому їхня робота з розвінчування міфів могла би принести найбільшу користь
Translating Ukrainian War Poetry into English: Why It Is Relevant
Full text linkThis article explores the English translations of contemporary Ukrainian war poetry featured in the two anthologies Lysty z Ukrainy (Letters from Ukraine, 2016) and Words for War: New Poems from Ukraine (2017), through the prism of Jacques Derrida’s concept of “relevant.” It argues that although the economy of the original poems could not always be sustained, these translations nonetheless remain relevant primarily thanks to what they do rather than what they say. After contextualizing the recent (re)emergence of war poems as a genre of Ukrainian literature and providing an overview of the two translation anthologies, the article compares the Ukrainian originals with their English translations and discusses the various translation challenges. It then returns to Derrida’s own case study to extend the modifier “relevant” beyond its “economic” parameters to apply it more broadly to translation’s socio-political significance. It concludes with a discussion of how the two anthologies in question reflect the state of the reception of contemporary Ukrainian literature in the English-speaking world and how the translations they feature inform our understanding of the (un)translatability of poetry
Odesa in Diachronic and Synchronic Studies of Urban Linguistic Landscapes of Ukraine Conducted between 2015 and 2019
Full text linkDiachronic and synchronic studies of linguistic landscapes of central streets and markets were conducted in five cities in Ukraine with different language use preferences in 2015 and 2017–19. The relationship between a monolingual state language policy and the reality of language use in public spaces was investigated. This study focuses on the dynamics of the linguistic landscape of Odesa, a Russian-speaking city with a weak historical connection to the state of Ukraine, and compares them with the linguistic landscapes of central Kyiv, Dnipro, Zaporizhzhia, and Lviv. Linguistic landscape data are complemented with semi-structured interviews investigating de jure policies, de facto practices, and beliefs of individuals who make their language choices in public signage, often contesting the official language policy regulations. Linguistic data can deliver messages about power, values, and the salience of languages used in public places. This mixed-methods research is grounded in a critical ethnographic approach to the study of language policy, politics, and planning. The linguistic landscape in Odesa, a polyethnic city, is exceptionally dynamic in reflecting the de facto language policy in the city. The effects of globalization and language commodification were marked by compliance with the official policy on the central street, but proof of inhabitants’ identity with the Russian language as the lingua franca was evident as the data collection site moved away from the city centre. This synchronic and diachronic studies of languages in Odesa is compared with the languages spoken in four Ukrainian regions and marks a proportional increase in the presence of two main languages—Ukrainian and Russian—independent of the Ukrainization efforts of the state at the time of war. It also suggests that an increase in the use of English, as observed in Odesa, is a way to avoid using the state language
