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Patent Textualism
No full textThe Supreme Court today embraces textualism—the practice of interpreting legal text by reference to how an ordinary person would have understood that text at the time it was promulgated. Yet, when it comes to patent cases at the Court interpreting the statutory provision governing patent eligibility, textualism has rarely been used as an interpretive tool. This Article, besides highlighting this contradiction, will consider how textualism’s application to this foundational aspect of the patent statute would change patent law.
This Article will analyze the Supreme Court’s adoption of textualist principles in other fields and then evaluates the application of textualism to the field of patent law. In particular, this Article will consider the extent to which the Supreme Court has interpreted the patent statute consistent with the tenets of textualism. There is surprisingly little prior analysis of textualism applied to the patent statute—no one else has systematically analyzed the Court’s use of textualism in the patent field. Thus, this Article will be the first to identify the Court’s failure to apply textualism consistently to the patent statute.
The most notable exception to the Court’s general practice of using textualism to interpret the patent statute relates to the statutory provision governing patent eligibility. Because this provision defines the types of inventions that are and are not eligible for patenting, it serves as the gateway to the patent system. It is the foundation for the whole patent system. Despite its importance, this Article’s analysis will show the Court has interpreted this provision using interpretive tools the Court has generally rejected in other fields to reach interpretations of the patent statute that are inconsistent with textualism.
This Article will conclude by highlighting how a textualist approach to interpreting the statutory provision governing patent eligibility would broaden eligibility. In other words, a textualist approach will expand the scope of which types of inventions are eligible for patenting. More importantly—regardless of whether one views expanded eligibility as an advance—textualism would return political power over the doctrine of patent eligibility to the political branches of our government, while also providing needed clarity over the question of what is and is not eligible for patenting
Testing Coleman’s Socioeconomic Status Model And Its Role In Language Development
No full textSocioeconomic Status (SES) is widely used to predict child outcomes, yet its measurement varies widely across studies. This study examines Coleman’s (1998) theoretical model of SES, comprising of Human, Financial and Social Capital, using Confirmatory Factory Analysis (CFA) and Exploratory Structural Equation Modeling (ESEM). Additionally, it evaluates the model’s ability to predict vocabulary scores and aims to access its incremental validity over the widely used Hollingshead Socioeconomic Index (HSEI). Data was collected from 306 caregivers of children aged 15-30 months (m = 23.37; 71.6% Caucasian) via Prolific. CFA results indicated that Coleman’s model was not a good fit for the data. However, ESEM analysis demonstrated a strong fit with two correlated error terms, revealing a three-factor structure that was different from Coleman’s original model. The new model identified three factors: human capital (caregivers’ education level and years of education), wealth/prestige capital (caregivers’ income, income-to-needs ratio, net worth, status and prestige), and neighborhood capital (neighborhood education, income, and poverty). However, neither the new SES model nor HSEI significantly predicted vocabulary scores in this sample. These findings highlight the complexity of SES measurement and underscore the need for a robust theoretical framework in assessing its impact on child development
Retail Innovation Through AI: Benefits and Liabilities
No full textThis article investigates the transformative capabilities of artificial intelligence (AI) within the retail industry. We highlight significant opportunities for product customization, innovation, and enhanced supply chain efficiency, while also examining complex legal challenges associated with AI-generated content. In particular, concerns in the copyright realm are highlighted— including documented biases against AI-produced works. Recognizing these issues, retailers should adopt proactive legal strategies, ensure transparency, and consider hybrid human-AI collaborative approaches. Strategically addressing these issues will help maximize consumer and business benefits while mitigating legal exposure
California Public Defense Workloads and Staffing
No full textThis report assesses the current workloads and staffing of California public defense providers. The report concludes that California’s public defense attorneys are almost universally burdened by workloads that far exceed nationally recommended standards. Additionally, compared to district attorneys’ offices in the same jurisdictions, public defender offices typically have 20-45% fewer attorneys.
This report also details how public defense providers in California also lack the appropriate support staff – investigators, social workers, paralegals, and administrative assistants – necessary to efficiently and effectively represent their clients. At their current workload and staffing levels, public defense attorneys simply cannot do all that their job requires. As a result, public defense attorneys across California are forced to skip or delay critical work for some clients in order to focus on other clients’ cases. California’s less-populous, more rural counties, often have greater attorney vacancies, which exacerbate these problems.
The obligation to provide constitutionally adequate public defense services lies with the state. California stands almost alone among states in failing both to create public defense standards and to provide sufficient funding to ensure that every accused person receives effective assistance of counsel. This report recommends that the state take immediate action to support county-based public defense systems and ensure that they can deliver the constitutionally-adequate representation that every Californian deserves.https://scholar.smu.edu/deasoncenter/1018/thumbnail.jp
Let’s Jettison Some Executive Perks: Exploring the SEC and IRS Approaches to Personal Use of Corporate Aircraft
No full textIn 2023, 46% of the S&P 500 companies provided personal use of corporate aircraft to their chief executive officers, and 31% provided this perk to other named executive officers. This type of executive compensation has notoriously garnered much attention from the media, given the large amount of investor money spent on personal travel and the environmental impacts of flying private. In addition, the line between personal travel and business travel is often blurred, and the media has tracked flight paths of corporate aircraft to speculate that some flights may be incorrectly categorized as business trips when the jets land and take off from resort destinations where an executive may have a second home.
The United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), separate government agencies with distinct focuses, both seek to promote fairness in the United States through disclosures and taxation. The SEC has often scrutinized executive perquisites and aims to provide investors with accurate disclosures so they can make informed investment decisions. The IRS recently reported that it plans to audit corporate aircraft reporting at large companies and subsequently audit high-net-worth individuals who may receive this perk from large companies. ESG concerns—an especially controversial topic today—have also shaped how people view private jet travel, with reports estimating that private jets emit five to fourteen times more pollution per passenger than commercial flights. Additionally, emissions attributable to the wealthy, those who frequently fly private, account for more climate change effects than those of low-income earners
High Crimes in Low Airspace: The Rise of Drones in Cross-Border Drug Trafficking
No full textCan the United States effectively regulate its airspace when criminal actors exploit it without entering traditional territorial channels? Mexican drug trafficking organizations increasingly deploy drones to deliver narcotics across the U.S.–Mexico border. These flights often occur at low altitudes, at night, and in remote areas, which renders them nearly undetectable by conventional enforcement methods. Yet, no statute squarely addresses the use of drones in cross-border drug trafficking. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) regulates drones under the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, but its mandate is safety, not interdiction. The result? A growing technological asymmetry: criminal cartels innovate, while the law remains outdated.
International law fares no better. Treaties like the 1988 United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (Vienna Convention) criminalize drug trafficking and encourage international cooperation; however, they assume traditional actors and manual modes of transport. What happens when the trafficker is an autonomous system launched from sovereign soil and recovered by accomplices on the other side? The principle of territoriality falters and jurisdictional lines blur, while traffickers face minimal risk. If the drone crashes, there is no mule to arrest. If it succeeds, the payload is delivered efficiently, silently, and lucratively.
This Comment argues that drug trafficking via drones poses an urgent threat to national sovereignty and public health.
Current legal frameworks are insufficient and structurally unprepared for the strategic and operational realities of drone smuggling. The response must be multi-layered: statutory reforms that explicitly prohibit drone-based drug delivery, enhanced surveillance and detection systems; airspace restrictions near the border, and international agreements adapted to drones. However, these solutions are not enough. As long as the United States remains the largest consumer of opioids in the world, enforcement solutions will amount to a stopgap. Supply will always meet demand.
If left unaddressed, the legal void surrounding drug trafficking via drones could establish a dangerous precedent, an argumentum ex silentio. The silence of the law becomes its own kind of permission. The longer regulatory inertia persists, the more the airspace above the U.S.–Mexico border risks becoming contested and controlled by drug traffickers
A Blunt Reality: How § 922(g)(3) of the Gun Control Act Violates the Second Amendment Rights of Marijuana Users
No full textOver 98% of Americans live in a state that has some form of legal marijuana, with over half of Americans having used the drug at least once. The United States also has a strong historical tradition of individual gun ownership for the purposes of self-defense, with gun ownership currently at its highest level in decades. In this modern era of both rising gun ownership and marijuana usage, could it truly be the case that any American who uses cannabinoids forfeits her presumptively protected constitutional right to firearm possession? The answer depends upon whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3) unconstitutionally infringes on the Second Amendment as applied to locally lawful users of this federally unlawful substance.
The purpose of this article is to examine the constitutionality of § 922(g)(3) as applied to marijuana users through the “historical tradition” test that the Supreme Court established in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen and recently clarified in United States v. Rahimi. This article does so through analysis of the historical record and of federal court cases confronting this question, including the Fifth Circuit’s opinion in United States v. Connelly, which is arguably the most prominent post-Rahimi circuit opinion directly confronting this issue. This article also examines arguments in United States v. Hemani, which—arising out of the Fifth Circuit and bound by Connelly—was recently granted certiorari by the Supreme Court. The logical conclusion of this article’s cogitation of the Second Amendment’s text, history and tradition is that § 922(g)(3) is indeed unconstitutional as applied to marijuana users, and the Supreme Court should adopt the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning and evaluation as outlined in Connelly to hold the law unconstitutional as applied in Hemani and to other marijuana user