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Partnership for the Americas: Western Hemisphere Strategy and U.S. Southern Command
No full textSince its creation in 1963, United States Southern Command has been led by 30 senior officers representing all four of the armed forces. None has undertaken his leadership responsibilities with the cultural sensitivity and creativity demonstrated by Admiral Jim Stavridis during his tenure in command.
Breaking with tradition, Admiral Stavridis discarded the customary military model as he organized the Southern Command Headquarters. In its place he created an organization designed not to subdue adversaries, but instead to build durable and enduring partnerships with friends. His observation that it is the business of Southern Command to launch “ideas not missiles” into the command’s area of responsibility gained strategic resonance throughout the Caribbean and Central and South America, and at the highest levels in Washington, DC.
Pursuing his vision for the Americas with limited resources, Admiral Stavridis made the most of every ship, airplane, Soldier, Sailor, Airman, Marine, and Coastguardsman committed to the region, employing each on constructive missions designed to create goodwill and mutual respect.
Perhaps Jim Stavridis’ most enduring contribution to Southern Command is the newly constructed headquarters complex in Miami. The new building, which finally creates a permanent lodgment for the command in the city that the Admiral correctly describes as the “Gateway to the Americas,” is a testimonial to his persistence, persuasiveness, and credibility within the Department of Defense and the U. S. Congress. More than a building, the new headquarters is tacit recognition of the importance of the command and acknowledgment that Miami is the single right location for the institution that, as much or more than any other, expresses our commitment to peace and stability in this hemisphere.
Admirals and Generals leave their marks on the organizations they command in different ways. Some solve the problems of the day; others set courses that will influence events and relationships for decades. Clearly, Admiral Stavridis is in the latter category. He has set wheels in motion that will transform our American culture to a culture of the Americas. xii PARTNERSHIP FOR THE AMERICAS
This thoughtful book should be required reading for those who recognize that the security of the United States, and indeed our destiny, are inextricably intertwined with those of our neighbors to the south.
General Charles E. Wilhelm United States Marine Corps (Retired)https://digitalcommons.ndu.edu/ndupress-books/1002/thumbnail.jp
Civil-Military Relations in China: Assessing the PLA’s Role in Elite Politics
No full textThis study reviews the last 20 years of academic literature on the role of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in Chinese elite politics. It examines the PLA’s willingness to support the continued rule of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and to obey directives from top party leaders, the PLA’s influence on the selection of China’s top civilian leaders, and the PLA’s ability to shape the domestic political environment. Over the last two decades the discussion of these three issues has largely been shaped by five trends identified in the literature: increasing PLA professionalism, bifurcation of civil and military elites, a reduced PLA role in political institutions, reduced emphasis on political work within the PLA, and increased military budgets. Together, these trends are largely responsible for the markedly reduced role of the PLA in Chinese elite politics.
The theoretical models of Chinese civil-military relations that exist within the literature during the period divide into three distinctive categories. “Traditional models” including the Factional, Symbiosis, Professionalism, and Party Control models, dominate the literature from 1989 to 1995. Scholars worked to integrate information becoming available as the PRC opened to the world into these already existing models of Chinese civil-military relations. However, evolving political dynamics within the PRC following Tiananmen marginalized the utility of the models. From 1995 to 1997 many scholars argued that these traditional models should not be considered mutually exclusive but complementary. This concept of a “combination model” was short lived as it became increasingly apparent that even a combination of traditional models had little predictive or even explanatory power in light of rapidly changing political dynamics. Two new models, the Conditional Compliance and State Control models, emerged in the period of 1997–2003. Both incorporated elements of the traditional models while attempting to address the implications of new political and military dynamics in the PRC.
Examining the predictions of these models against four case studies involving major developments in civil-military relations, we found that although each model had some descriptive and explanatory power, none possessed strong predictive ability. The traditional models help explain the PLA’s reaction to intensified Party control following Tiananmen, but none was able to predict how Chinese civil-military relations evolved subsequently. Civil-military models offered their most specific (and ultimately least accurate) predictions regarding the leadership succession from Deng Xiaoping to Jiang Zemin. Most models predicted a strong role for the PLA in the succession that did not materialize. This was the period when traditional civil-military models began to run up against the reality of changing political dynamics within the PRC. When the PLA was forced to withdraw from most commercial activities in the mid-1990s, the models predicted a far slower, more contentious, and less complete divestiture than ultimately occurred. Most analysts correctly predicted that the PLA would have only limited involvement in the leadership transition from Jiang Zemin to Hu Jintao following the 16th Party Congress in 2002, but subsequent explanations for why the transition went smoothly emphasize different factors. The models did agree in their emphasis on the importance of greater political institutionalization in reducing PLA influence and highlighted the implicit role and future potential importance of the PLA in elite politics, especially if divisions among the civilian leadership produce a political crisis in the future.
Based on this assessment, we conclude that existing models serve a useful role in identifying key variables for analysis in the study of Chinese civil-military relations. However, most of the literature has been descriptive and interpretive rather than predictive. The widespread practice of using elements of multiple models to analyze civil-military relations makes it difficult to assess the validity of individual models or to generate falsifiable predictions, thus limiting the predictive ability of current models. Although China is a much more open society today, lack of reliable information continues to make the study of civil-military relations in China difficult, forcing analysts to rely on indirect evidence and dubious sources to speculate about the military’s influence on elite politics and about the relationships between top civilian and military leaders.
Since 2003 the literature on Chinese civil-military relations has successfully exploited new sources of information to offer useful analysis of the PLA’s relationship with the Chinese economy and society at large.Yet there has been a notable lack of effort to develop, employ, or test new theoretical models that could help produce a new unified theory of Chinese civil-military relations. Future work may find fertile ground in exploring the nature of official and unofficial interactions between the PRC’s bifurcated civilian and military elite, comparing how broader trends in China’s civilian government are implemented in the PLA, or conducting a more genuinely comparative analysis with the experiences of other one-party states, transitioning democracies, or other Asian states.https://digitalcommons.ndu.edu/china-strategic-perspectives/1017/thumbnail.jp
U.S. Withdrawal from the Antiballistic Missile Treaty
No full textAs President George W. Bush made these remarks in a speech at the National Defense University (NDU) on May 1, 2001, National Security Council (NSC) Senior Director for Proliferation Strategy, Counterproliferation, and Homeland Defense Robert Joseph listened attentively. Within just 4 months of taking office, President Bush was articulating one of his key national security priorities: setting the conditions for the United States to move full steam ahead on developing, testing, and eventually deploying a wide range of missile defense technologies and systems—a priority that in all likelihood would mean U.S. withdrawal from the 1972 Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty.https://digitalcommons.ndu.edu/wmd-case-studies/1001/thumbnail.jp
Ballistic Missile Defense: Past and Future
No full textTo help put the potential value of a national missile defense system in perspective, consider three scenarios, one modeled on a historical event, the other two hypothetical. These three scenarios make a point argued by proponents of continued exploration and deployment of ballistic missile defense systems: that it is essential to give future Presidents of the United States options for defending the homeland against missile attack.https://digitalcommons.ndu.edu/ndupress-books/1003/thumbnail.jp
Bio-Inspired Materials and Devices for Chemical and Biological Defense
No full textThis report addresses materials for synthetic matrices of chemical and biological defense using a conceptual platform known as the abiotic networked threat system (ANTS). This system is based on lessons learned from biology, incorporating abiotic homologues to biological recognition events and metabolic pathways to provide programmable capabilities to sense and respond to environmental threats.https://digitalcommons.ndu.edu/defense-tech-papers/1029/thumbnail.jp
Somalia’s Endless Transition: Breaking the Deadlock
No full textIn January 2009, Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed succeeded Abdullahi Yusuf as pres- ident of Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government (TFG). Sheikh Sharif took office following the conclusion of United Nations (UN)–brokered peace negotiations in Djibouti between a warlord-dominated TFG and moderate opposition forces that led the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) in 2006. It was hoped that Sheikh Sharif would move forward with the long list of transitional tasks required to establish a permanent government for the country and extend control over areas seized by al Shabab.1 To his credit, Sheikh Sharif’s appointment led to the withdrawal of Ethiopian forces from the country, and eliminated al Shabab’s ability to use Ethiopian occupation as a rallying cry. TFG supporters also point to ongoing efforts to reinvigorate the constitutional process, draft a citizenship law, make senior-level appointments in a revived judicial system, establish an independent central bank, utilize port revenues for public service delivery, and craft political cooperation deals with the regional administration in Puntland (northeast Somalia) and other militias opposed to the insurgency.https://digitalcommons.ndu.edu/strategic-forums/1055/thumbnail.jp
The Surge: General Petraeus and the Turnaround in Iraq
No full textWhen General David H. Petraeus, USA, took command of Multi-National Force–Iraq (MNF–I) on February 10, 2007, beginning his 3d tour and 28th month in Iraq, the situation was grim. Increasing sectarian violence had led to an escalation of killings of civilians in Iraq, with up to 150 corpses being found daily in Baghdad.1 The government of Prime Minister Nouri alMaliki was viewed by almost everyone as ineffective at best, and the U.S. military strategy was not well defined and clearly not working. Iraq appeared to be sliding out of control toward civil war or disintegration, and the United States appeared to be headed inexorably toward defeat— another Vietnam. Popular sentiment held that the best course of action was to cut our losses and disengage from a fight we were losing. General George Casey, USA, the outgoing commander of MNF–I, had supported a gradual drawdown of U.S. forces and a handoff of security tasks to Iraqi forces even as the situation got worsehttps://digitalcommons.ndu.edu/icaf-case-studies/1001/thumbnail.jp
NATO Command Structure: Considerations for the Future
No full textThis paper explores potential future reforms of the NATO command structure. The intent is to stimulate thought on the current structure’s fit to oversee the forces and operations of a growing array of NATO missions.https://digitalcommons.ndu.edu/defense-tech-papers/1033/thumbnail.jp
Assessing the Health of Army Laboratories: Funding for Basic Research and Laboratory Capital Equipment
No full textIn this paper, the authors respond to requests from the office of the Army S&T Executive to address the adequacy of the funding provided to equipment and basic research in an effective S&T laboratory.https://digitalcommons.ndu.edu/defense-tech-papers/1036/thumbnail.jp
Joint Force Quarterly 59 (4th Quarter, October 2010)
No full texthttps://digitalcommons.ndu.edu/jfq-full-issue/1055/thumbnail.jp