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Challenges to Leadership: Responding to Biological Threats
No full textThis paper seeks to identify certain gaps and overlaps in existing structure and mechanisms and to advance potential solutions that can be implemented. It examines two issues of concern: Federal Coordination Structure and Federal/State Coordination and recommends that a more comprehensive set of planning and response exercises be developed in order to better understand and develop a doctrine of incident leadership suitable for a biological crisis.https://digitalcommons.ndu.edu/defense-tech-papers/1022/thumbnail.jp
Buy, Build, or Steal: China’s Quest for Advanced Military Aviation Technologies
No full textAlthough China continues to lag approximately two decades behind the world’s most sophisticated air forces in terms of its ability to develop and produce fighter aircraft and other complex aerospace systems, it has moved over time from absolute reliance on other countries for military aviation technology to a position where a more diverse array of strategies can be pursued. Steps taken in the late 1990s to reform China’s military aviation sector demonstrated an understanding of the problems inherent in high-technology acquisition, and an effort to move forward. However, a decade later it remains unclear how effective these reforms have been. Where are the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) and China’s military aviation industry headed? What obstacles must be overcome for China to join the exclusive ranks of those nations possessing sophisticated air forces and aviation industries capable of producing world-class aircraft?
This study identifies potential aviation technology development and procurement strategies, presents a general model of the options available to developing countries, and applies that model to explain Chinese procurement and aviation technology acquisition efforts over the last 60 years. The model articulates three main technology procurement avenues: purchase (buy), indigenous development (build), and espionage (steal), and three subavenues: reverse engineering (combining buy/steal and build), coproduction (combining buy and build), and codevelopment (combining buy and build, with an emphasis on build). It examines the costs, benefits, and tradeoffs inherent in each approach. Four variables influence decisions about the mix of strategies: (1) a country’s overall level of economic development, in particular the state of its technical/industrial base; (2) the technological capacity of a country’s military aviation sector; (3) the willingness of foreign countries to sell advanced military aircraft, key components, armaments, and related production technology; and (4) the country’s bargaining power vis-àvis potential suppliers.
In applying the model, we divide the evolution of China’s military aviation industry into five periods based on China’s changing access to foreign suppliers of military aircraft and aviation technology. Soviet assistance (1950–1960) provided the foundation for China’s military aviation industry, which cut its teeth coproducing Soviet fighter, bomber, and transport aircraft. Given Western embargoes, Moscow offered the only viable path to advanced aviation technology and provided assistance on favorable terms to support its communist ally. The second period (1960–1977) is marked by the Sino-Soviet split, which eliminated Chinese access to cutting-edge aviation hardware. China continued to produce and make modest refinements to 1950s vintage Soviet aircraft designs, using reverse engineering to fill in gaps where technical information was lacking. In the third period (1977–1989), China gained some access to Western aviation components and technologies and sought to apply them to a variant of the J–8 (a twin engine fighter based on a modified MiG–21 design) and the JH–7 (a fighter-bomber with a British engine). The fourth period (1989–2004) is marked by Western bans on arms sales to China in the wake of Tiananmen, Sino-Soviet rapprochement (leading to sales of advanced Russian fighters and coproduction arrangements), and a brief but important window of access to Israeli technologies. Covert access to advanced Western fighters and espionage (in both traditional forms and via computer network operations) also began to make more contributions.
In the fifth period (2004–present), China has enjoyed increased access to foreign commercial aviation technologies and has benefited from a “spin-off, spin-on” dynamic in gaining commercial access to dual-use technologies and applying them for military purposes. However, China’s legitimate access to advanced military-specific technologies has been reduced as Western sources of supply remained closed and Russia has become more reluctant to provide advanced aviation technology due to China’s reverse engineering of the Su-27, fear of future competition for export markets, and concerns about China’s long-term strategic direction.
China has used coproduction, selected purchases of advanced aircraft, reverse engineering, and foreign design assistance to build a capable military aviation industry with a significant indigenous design and production capacity. The Chinese military aviation industry can now produce two fourth-generation fighters roughly equal to those in advanced air forces: the J–10 (indigenously developed with Israeli assistance) and the J–11B (based on coproduction and reverse engineering of the Su-27). Both aircraft still rely on imported Russian turbofan engines. Test flights of the new J–20 stealth fighter prototype demonstrate Chinese ambitions to build fifth-generation fighters, but the extent to which the J–20 will match the performance of state-of-the-art Russian and Western fighters is unclear. Significant technical hurdles in engine design, avionics, and systems integration are likely to delay operational deployment of the J–20 until about 2020. This would be about 15 years after the F–22 entered U.S. Air Force service, supporting an overall assessment that the Chinese military aviation industry remains 15–20 years behind.
Producing state-of-the-art fighters requires an aviation industry to master a range of highly advanced, military-specific technologies. The historical development of China’s military aviation industry reflects an ongoing tension between the desire for self-reliance in defense and the need for access to advanced foreign technologies. China’s legitimate access to cutting-edge Western military technologies will likely remain curtailed and Russian reluctance to supply advanced military technologies will likely grow. These assumptions support two important conclusions. First, the Chinese military aviation industry will have to rely primarily on indigenous development of advanced “single-use” military aviation technologies in the future. The Chinese government is pursuing a range of “indigenous innovation” and technology development programs, but mastering advanced technologies becomes more difficult and expensive as a country moves closer to the technology frontier. This leads to a second, related conclusion: China will likely rely more heavily on espionage to acquire those critical military aviation technologies it cannot acquire legitimately from foreign suppliers or develop on its own.https://digitalcommons.ndu.edu/china-strategic-perspectives/1015/thumbnail.jp
Chinese Military Transparency: Evaluating the 2010 Defense White Paper
No full textThe People’s Republic of China (PRC) State Council Information Office released the seventh edition of its biennial defense white paper, “China’s National Defense in 2010,” on March 31, 2011. This document aims to communicate the latest information on China’s military development, strategy, capabilities, and intentions. China began publishing defense white papers in 1998, partly as a means of increasing transparency in response to regional concerns about the growing capabilities and actions of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Despite the systematic release of these documents, many of China’s neighbors and other regional powers continue to express concerns about China’s lack of military transparency. The Chinese maintain that they are becoming more open over time and highlight the importance of transparency about strategic intentions rather than capabilities.https://digitalcommons.ndu.edu/strategic-forums/1043/thumbnail.jp
Conventional Prompt Global Strike: Strategic Asset or Unusable Liability?
No full textThe Conventional Prompt Global Strike (CPGS) concept calls for a U.S. capability to deliver conventional strikes anywhere in the world in approximately an hour. The logic of the CPGS concept is straightforward. The United States has global security commitments to deter and respond to a diverse spectrum of threats, ranging from terrorist organizations to near-peer competitors. The United States might need to strike a time-sensitive target protected by formidable air defenses or located deep inside enemy territory. Small, high-value targets might pop up without warning in remote or sensitive areas, potentially precluding the United States from responding to the situation by employing other conventional weapons systems, deploying Special Operations Forces (SOF), or relying on the host country.https://digitalcommons.ndu.edu/strategic-forums/1049/thumbnail.jp
Whither the Medvedev Initiative on European Security?
No full textFrom a Euro-Atlantic perspective, relations with Russia since the collapse of the Soviet Union have proven challenging. On numerous occasions, the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) have reached out to the Russian Federation in an attempt to build a cooperative security framework. While inroads have been made over the years, the overall relationship has been hit or miss, leading to regular resets of bilateral U.S.-Russia relations and periodic efforts by NATO to reengineer its relationship with Russia. In 2011, in the wake of an upswing following the U.S.-Russia reset policy launched by the Barack Obama administration and the positive spin on NATO-Russia relations in the aftermath of the 2010 Lisbon Summit, experts and decisionmakers already wonder whether the reset will continue to move forward or whether relations with Russia will again run aground on longstanding differences. For most of the successful results in the past two decades, there have been downturns. In reality, the Euro-Atlantic community and Russia have collectively failed to create a European security framework addressing shared challenges through common responses for the post–Cold War era. Some ambitious attempts have raised hopes, but none has led to building the community of trust needed to lay the past to rest once and for all.https://digitalcommons.ndu.edu/transatlantic-currents/1002/thumbnail.jp
The Evolving Threat of al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
No full textThe United States faces an important strategic question in northwest Af- rica: what level of activity by al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) would constitute a sufficient threat to U.S. national security interests a more aggressive political, intelligence, military, and law enforcement AQIM already poses the greatest immediate threat of transnational terrorism in the region, and its operational range and sophistication continue to expand. Since 2007, the group has professed its loyalty to Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda’s senior leadership and claimed responsibility for dozens of attacks in the subregion. These attacks have included the use of suicide bombers, improvised explosive devices, kidnapping operations, and assassinations.https://digitalcommons.ndu.edu/strategic-forums/1044/thumbnail.jp
Assessing Army Power and Energy for the Warfighter
No full textThis paper reviews some of the landscape of research and development on power and energy as it pertains to the needs of the Army warfighter. It focuses on the battlefield and considers questions related to vehicles, dismounted soldiers, and forward operating bases. The context of the study is twofold: the National need to reduce the use of petroleum-based fuels and the Army’s need to reduce the logistical burden and hazards moving said fuels on the battlefield.https://digitalcommons.ndu.edu/defense-tech-papers/1027/thumbnail.jp
Risk-Informed Decisionmaking for Science and Technology
No full textThis paper discusses risks and impact areas in relation to decisionmaking and the development of metrics or a figure of merit for decisionmaking. The metrics are then applied to three examples of interest to the Army, Air Force, and DHS.https://digitalcommons.ndu.edu/defense-tech-papers/1032/thumbnail.jp
Strengthening the IAEA: How the Nuclear Watchdog Can Regain Its Bark
No full textYukiya Amano recently became the new Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the world’s nuclear watchdog. Amano, an experienced Japanese diplomat, faces a challenging agenda: stalled investigations into the clandestine nuclear activities of Iran and Syria, the need to ensure high levels of safety and security as more countries opt for nuclear power, the dangers associated with the spread of technologies readily diverted to build nuclear bombs, a threat of nuclear terrorism not taken seriously by all IAEA members, and a Board of Governors too often split between developed and developing countries.https://digitalcommons.ndu.edu/strategic-forums/1059/thumbnail.jp
Improving the Army’s Next Effort in Technology Forecasting
No full textThis paper makes the case for approaches to be pursued when the Army conducts its next comprehensive S&T forecasting effort.https://digitalcommons.ndu.edu/defense-tech-papers/1035/thumbnail.jp