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Defining Weapons of Mass Destruction
No full textIn January 2005, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld directed that U.S. Strategic Command become “the lead combatant commander for integrating and synchronizing DOD [Department of Defense] in combating WMD [weapons of mass destruction].” This assignment was in response to the White House’s December 2002 National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction.The Secretary’s memorandum, however, raised a thorny definitional problem with clear bureaucratic implications: what are weapons of mass destruction? Unfortunately, that is not an easily answered question. There are numerous definitions of WMD with some official or semi-official standing (more than 40 are identified in this paper), although most are variations of 1 of 5 basic definitions. In fact, even DOD has adopted alternative and fundamentally inconsistent definitions, including some different from the one used by the White House in its strategy and policy documents.https://digitalcommons.ndu.edu/wmd-occasional-papers/1004/thumbnail.jp
Enhancing Army S&T Vol. II: The Future
No full textChapter I of this volume is an introduction, and Chapter II offers an updated view of the work discussed in Vol. I with an emphasis on the relative roles played by the Army laboratories that manufactured the systems. The close collaboration between the two groups was judged by the authors to be the key to the successful outcomes. This chapter presents updated findings and recommendations of the previous studies in Vol I.https://digitalcommons.ndu.edu/defense-tech-papers/1016/thumbnail.jp
Raising Our Sights: Russian-American Strategic Restraint in an Age of Vulnerability
No full textThe United States and Russia have sought to reduce the danger of nuclear war by limiting offensive strategic capabilities through negotiated agreements, relying on mutual deterrence based on reciprocal threats and the corresponding fear of retaliation. Although nuclear arsenals have been pared, this is fundamentally the same way the United States and Soviet Union sought to reduce the danger of nuclear war during the Cold War, when both were impelled to do so because they were adversaries and able to do so despite being adversaries. It is ironic—not to say unimaginative—that although the two are no longer adversaries, they stick to a path chosen when they were. This current approach is inadequate given new strategic vulnerabilities brought on by technological change. Both the opportunity and the need now exist for a different, more ambitious approach to avoiding strategic conflict—one designed for new possibilities as well as new vulnerabilities. The United States and Russia can and should raise their sights from linear numerical progress to qualitative transformation of their strategic relationship.https://digitalcommons.ndu.edu/strategic-forums/1038/thumbnail.jp
Offshore Control: A Proposed Strategy for an Unlikely Conflict
No full textAs America ends its military commitment to Iraq and continues its drawdown in Afghanistan, a lively discussion has emerged on what future challenges the Nation faces. High on every list is the requirement to deal with a rising China. In his remarks to the Australian Parliament on November 17, 2011, President Barack Obama stated, “As we end today’s wars, I have directed my national security team to make our presence and mission in the Asia Pacific a top priority.” As part of this rebalancing to Asia, the administration has stated that it seeks “to identify and expand areas of common interest, to work with China to build mutual trust, and to encourage China’s active efforts in global problem-solving.” Clearly, the United States seeks prudent and coordinated political, economic, and military actions to further integrate China into the international system.https://digitalcommons.ndu.edu/strategic-forums/1034/thumbnail.jp
Proliferation Security Initiative: Origins and Evolution
No full textOn December 9, 2002, the United States and Spanish navies cooperated to interdict a North Korean vessel, the So San, in the Arabian Sea.1 The operation initially appeared to be an unqualified success, a textbook example of interdiction to prevent proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), related materials, or delivery systems. According to press reports, the United States began tracking the vessel when it first left North Korea, believing that it was carrying a cargo related to Scud ballistic missiles. The So San flew no flag, making it a stateless vessel under international law, subject to interception and boarding by warships on the high seas.2 The United States asked the Spanish navy to stop and search the So San when the ship reached the patrol area of Combined Task Force (CTF) 150, then under Spanish command. The mission of CTF 150 was “to promote maritime security in order to counter terrorist acts and related illegal activities” in the Gulf of Aden, Gulf of Oman, Red Sea, and Indian Ocean.3 Thus, the United States proposed—and Spain agreed—to use a tool developed to combat global terrorism in a counterproliferation mission.https://digitalcommons.ndu.edu/wmd-occasional-papers/1003/thumbnail.jp
Chemical and Biological Defense Test and Evaluation (T&E) Future Challenges
No full textThe objective of this study was to identify emerging technical, methodological, and infrastructure challenges for future Chemical and Biological Defense Test and Evaluation investment, and to serve as a prequel to the development of a full strategic T&E Roadmap.https://digitalcommons.ndu.edu/defense-tech-papers/1012/thumbnail.jp
The Iron Triangle Manifested: U.S. Air Force Tanker Lease 2001–2005 Case Study
No full textThe proposed lease of the KC–767 tanker aircraft was one of the most infamous procurement scandals of the post–Cold War era. Interactions within the military-industrial-congressional complex led to legislation permitting the Air Force to lease tankers from Boeing using an operating lease rather than standard procurement. Following the outcry from Congress, industry, the media, and numerous watchdog groups, Congress and the Department of Defense (DOD) launched a wave of investigations and hearings. During the lease debate, participants reached a number of compromises documented in congressional legislation. However, this was not sufficient to continue the lease process. After nearly 4 years, Congress cancelled the tanker lease and directed the Air Force to pursue a traditional procurement approach.https://digitalcommons.ndu.edu/icaf-case-studies/1000/thumbnail.jp
PRISM Vol. 3, No. 3
No full textThis issue of PRISM examines military support for democracy, the challenges of counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy, and the effectiveness of interagency coordination in complex operations. Additional articles critique traditional state-building models, highlight systemic failures in development initiatives, and discuss best practices for advising institution-building efforts. Lessons from Afghanistan provide new approaches to operational assessments, while an analysis of Kenya’s involvement in Somalia warns of strategic risks. The issue also considers the financial trade-offs between security and broader national priorities.
In From the Field, an assessment of Village Stability Operations and the Afghan Local Police offers insights into local security initiatives. An interview with former Colombian President Álvaro Uribe Vélez explores counterinsurgency and governance lessons from Colombia. Book Reviews examine hybrid warfare, transnational threats, and the role of private security companies in modern military operations.https://digitalcommons.ndu.edu/prism-full-issue/1010/thumbnail.jp
Joint Force Quarterly 64 (1st Quarter, January 2012)
No full texthttps://digitalcommons.ndu.edu/jfq-full-issue/1049/thumbnail.jp
Reflections on Over Fifty Years in Research and Development; Some Lessons Learned
No full textThis paper presents some thoughts about research in science and technology gleaned from Dr. Lyons’ more than 50 years working in scientific and engineering research – first in chemical industry, then at two different government laboratories, and later some years in S&T policy. It elaborates on a paper by Richard Chait in which he interviews three former S&T executives in the DoD on how to manage a research laboratory. Its objective is to provide some insights on what it is like to work in a scientific research establishment.https://digitalcommons.ndu.edu/defense-tech-papers/1020/thumbnail.jp