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Joint Force Quarterly 83 (4th Quarter, October 2016)
No full texthttps://digitalcommons.ndu.edu/jfq-full-issue/1030/thumbnail.jp
Reflections on U.S.-Cuba Military-to-Military Contacts
No full textThe strategic import of U.S.-Cuba relations was underscored by President Barack Obama’s historic visit to Cuba from March 20–22, 2016, and his comment that he had come to Cuba “to bury the last remnant of the Cold War in the Americas.” Geography also reinforces the strategic importance of both countries to one another. Cuba sits astride the intersection of the three large bodies of water dominating the approaches to the southern United States. The large island nation is in a position to block, complicate, or facilitate U.S. border control efforts in many ways. Partnering with Cuba also might allow the United States to benefit from Cuba’s notable record of using soft power effectively in the Western Hemisphere and beyond.https://digitalcommons.ndu.edu/strategic-forums/1017/thumbnail.jp
Fifty Shades of Friction Combat Climate, B-52 Crews, and the Vietnam War
No full text“Four elements make up the climate of war: danger, exertion, uncertainty, and chance,” wrote Prussian military philosopher Carl von Clausewitz in his seminal On War. He observed that collectively, those four elements comprised the notion of friction, which he defined as “the only concept that more or less corresponds to the factors that distinguish real war from war on paper.” Friction has disrupted the implementation of war plans since the dawn of civilization, and despite efforts to minimize its effects, it will continue to do so.https://digitalcommons.ndu.edu/ndu-case-studies/1006/thumbnail.jp
Frontier Security: The Case of Brazil
No full textOver the past three decades Brazil has greatly improved its ability to monitor and control its long border. Achieving better management of the complex frontier security problem required a great deal of patience, trial and error, organizational adaptation, and good leadership. The Brazilian experience yields a number of important lessons for Brazil and for its neighbors in the Western Hemisphere. Improving performance required subordination of military priorities to civilian authorities; the repositioning of forces; better military-police cooperation; interagency and international cooperation; investment in technologies to give Brazil an advantage in the contest for best situational awareness; a long-term commitment; and guiding strategy documents supported by both civil and military authorities. Of overarching significance is the way the Brazilian military was able to reestablish the confidence of civilian leaders in the aftermath of decades of military rule. The result was a Brazilian military that is more professional, more respected, and better resourced than before. For the United States, the evolution of Brazilian frontier security is not only a developing good news story for hemispheric relations, but also a learning opportunity, since similar security problems have not always been so well managed in the United States.https://digitalcommons.ndu.edu/inss-strategic-perspectives/1022/thumbnail.jp
North Korea 2025: Alternate Futures and Policy Challenges
No full textNational Defense University (NDU), the National Intelligence Council (NIC), and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) held a symposium in November 2015 that brought leading experts together to explore four alternative futures for the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, also known as North Korea). The futures were: 1) A Status Quo Peninsula in a Changing Northeast Asia; 2) Korea Reunified; 3) A Reforming DPRK; and 4) The DPRK Must Be Stopped! This report summarizes key findings from this non-attribution symposium, which focused on the interests and potential actions of external powers rather than DPRK internal dynamics.https://digitalcommons.ndu.edu/conferences-and-events/1001/thumbnail.jp
The Return of Foreign Fighters to Central Asia: Implications for U.S. Counterterrorism Policy
No full textCentral Asia is the third largest point of origin for Salafi jihadist foreign fighters in the conflagration in Syria and Iraq, with more than 4,000 total fighters joining the conflict since 2012 and 2,500 reportedly arriving in the 2014–2015 timeframe alone. As the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) continues to lose territory under duress from U.S.-led anti-ISIL coalition activities, some predict that many may return home bent on jihad and generating terror and instability across Central Asia. Yet several factors indicate that such an ominous foreign fighter return may not materialize. Among these factors are that a majority of Central Asians fighting for ISIL and the al-Nusra Front in Syria and Iraq are recruited while working abroad in Russia, often from low-wage jobs under poor conditions making the recruits ripe for radicalization. In addition, many of those heading for jihad in Syria and the Levant expect that they are on a “one way journey,” some to martyrdom but most for a completely new life, and do not plan a return.https://digitalcommons.ndu.edu/inss-strategic-perspectives/1021/thumbnail.jp
Posing Problems Without an Alliance: China-Iran Relations after the Nuclear Deal
No full textThe signing of a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in July 2015 to address international concerns about Iran’s nuclear program has led to bullish predictions about the future of Sino-Iranian relations. Under the deal, Iran is expected to limit its uranium enrichment and make other changes to its nuclear program in exchange for the removal of international sanctions. China is expected to be a prime beneficiary of the deal as Chinese firms take advantage of greater access to the Iranian market, especially in the energy sector. Some U.S. analysts also contend that the two countries could forge deeper strategic relations as well, involving coordination designed to weaken U.S. influence—or what both states see as U.S. “hegemonism”—in the region.https://digitalcommons.ndu.edu/strategic-forums/1022/thumbnail.jp
The Soviet Biological Weapons Program and Its Legacy in Today’s Russia
No full textIn its first Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Case Study, the Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction (CSWMD) at the National Defense University examined President Richard M. Nixon’s decision, on November 25, 1969, to terminate the U.S. offensive biological weapons program.1 This occasional paper seeks to explain why the Soviet government, at approximately the same time, decided to do essentially the opposite, namely, to establish a large biological warfare (BW) program that would be driven by newly discovered and powerful biotechnologies. By introducing the innovation of recombinant DNA technology—commonly referred to as genetic engineering—the Soviets were attempting to create bacterial and viral strains that were more useful for military purposes than were strains found in nature.https://digitalcommons.ndu.edu/wmd-occasional-papers/1000/thumbnail.jp
Lessons Encountered: Learning from the Long War
No full textLessons Encountered: Learning from the Long War began as two questions from General Martin E. Dempsey, 18th Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: What were the costs and benefits of the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, and what were the strategic lessons of these campaigns? The Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University was tasked to answer these questions. The editors composed a volume that assesses the war and analyzes the costs, using the Institute’s considerable in-house talent and the dedication of the NDU Press team. The audience for this volume is senior officers, their staffs, and the students in joint professional military education courses—the future leaders of the Armed Forces. Other national security professionals should find it of great value as well.https://digitalcommons.ndu.edu/books-and-book-chapters/1008/thumbnail.jp