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The Proliferation Security Initiative in 2017: U.S. Interagency Perspectives
No full textIn 2003, President George W. Bush unveiled the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) in a speech in Krakow, Poland. The initiative was announced as a commitment among endorsing nations to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery systems. What started with 11 like-minded nations that endorsed the PSI Statement of Interdiction Principles had grown to 105 endorsers in 2016. This was achieved without treaties, ratifications, or other formal agreements as a basis for membership. The initiative continues to be based on a political commitment rather than on legal obligations. In the United States, what started in a Republican administration under President Bush continued to be supported by a Democratic administration led by President Barack Obama. With his Prague speech in April 2009, President Obama reiterated U.S. support of the PSI as an essential tool in U.S. foreign policy for fighting WMD proliferation.https://digitalcommons.ndu.edu/wmd-proceedings/1005/thumbnail.jp
Managing Military Readiness
No full textUnderstanding the limits of the Nation’s ability to generate and deploy ready military forces is a basic element of national security. It is also the element most likely to be taken for granted or assumed away despite ample historical evidence of the human and operational costs imposed by such an error. As budgets shrink and threats grow more diverse, national security leaders need a specific accounting of the readiness limits of the force and the consequences of those limits as well as the insight to make timely and effective mitigation decisions.https://digitalcommons.ndu.edu/inss-strategic-perspectives/1019/thumbnail.jp
A Short History of Biological Warfare: From Pre-History to the 21st Century
No full textThis short monograph reviews the history of biological warfare (BW) from prehistory to the present. It covers what we know about the practice of BW and briefly describes the programs that developed BW weapons based on the best available research. To the extent possible, it primarily draws on the work of historians who used primary sources, relying where possible on studies specifically focused on BW. By broadening our knowledge of BW, such studies have enabled us to write about the topic with more accuracy and detail than could have been done even a few years ago.https://digitalcommons.ndu.edu/wmd-occasional-papers/1001/thumbnail.jp
The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Negotiations: A Case Study
No full textOn July 16, 1945, the United States conducted the world’s first nuclear explosive test in Alamagordo, New Mexico. The test went off as planned; a nuclear chain reaction, in the form of an explosion, could be created. Less than a month later, nuclear weapons were used to support Allied efforts to end World War II.https://digitalcommons.ndu.edu/wmd-case-studies/1006/thumbnail.jp
Peril and Promise: Emerging Technologies and WMD
No full textEmerging technologies are transforming life, industry, and the global economy in positive ways, but they also have significant potential for subversion by states and nonstate actors. National security experts, lawmakers, and policymakers have become increasingly concerned about the interactions among a number of emerging technologies that could alter and increase the threats from weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Many emerging technologies have an indirect impact on the WMD space, but only a handful are likely to have direct enabling effects for state and nonstate actors seeking WMD. Such technologies are expected to have serious effects on both the nature of the WMD challenges faced by policymakers and options for countering WMD. Emerging technologies may create new WMD development pathways and/or enhance access to existing ones, leading to increased capabilities of state and nonstate actors to develop and use WMD. Moreover, these technologies might one day lead to a meaningful paradigm shift in how policymakers define WMD, view the threat of WMD, and counter WMD in the future. To assess the impact of various emerging technologies, it is important to understand how they may be game-changers for state and nonstate actors actively seeking to develop WMD and for policymakers attempting to prevent the proliferation and the use of WMD. Policymakers with responsibilities for countering WMD need answers to the following questions: What are the national security risks posed by emerging technologies? What are their enabling effects for the WMD space? What new opportunities or solutions do these emerging technologies offer to national security problems and/or the challenge of countering WMD? How will these emerging technologies impact traditional tools and approaches for countering WMD? What new types of governance do we need to mitigate the risks?
In its multi-year study entitled Emergence and Convergence led by Dr. Natasha Bajema and Dr. Diane DiEuliis, the WMD Center will explore the risks, opportunities, and governance challenges for countering WMD introduced by a diverse range of emerging technologies. On 13–14 October 2016, the WMD hosted a workshop at the National Defense University to explore the risks, opportunities, and governance challenges for the WMD space caused by emerging technologies—in particular, additive manufacturing, advanced robotics, nanotechnology, nuclear technology, and synthetic biology. About 100 participants from government, academia, industry, and the nonprofit sector took part in the workshop over the 2 days. This report provides a summary of the proceedings followed by a more in-depth treatment of the discussion for each technology group.https://digitalcommons.ndu.edu/wmdcenter-research/1000/thumbnail.jp
Chinese Military Reforms in the Age of Xi Jinping: Drivers, Challenges, and Implications
No full textChina’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has embarked on its most wide-ranging and ambitious restructuring since 1949, including major changes to most of its key organizations. The general departments were disbanded, new Central Military Commission (CMC) departments created, and a new ground force headquarters established. Seven military regions were restructured into five theater commands aligned against regional threats. Commanders will be able to develop joint force packages from army, navy, air force, and conventional missile units within their theaters. PLA service headquarters are transitioning to an exclusive focus on “organize, train, and equip” missions and will no longer have a primary role in conducting operations. However, the PLA is still figuring out how the new relationships among the CMC, services, and theaters will work in practice.
The restructuring will also reduce the size of the PLA by 300,000 soldiers, cutting the ground forces and increasing the size of the navy and air force. The restructuring reflects the desire to strengthen PLA joint operations capabilities—on land, at sea, in the air, and in the space and cyber domains. The centerpiece of the reforms is a new joint command and control structure with nodes at the CMC and theater levels that will coordinate China’s responses to regional crises and conduct preparations for wartime operations. A Strategic Support Force has been established to provide command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance support to commanders and will oversee space, cyber, and electronic warfare activities. A Joint Logistics Support Force will provide logistics support to units within the theaters. The creation of a joint command system complements other recent changes supporting joint operations—including joint training, logistics, and doctrinal development.
The reforms could result in a more adept joint warfighting force, though the PLA will continue to face a number of key hurdles to effective joint operations. If the reforms are successful, the PLA could field a joint force more capable of undertaking operations along the contingency spectrum, including high-end operations against the U.S. military, allied forces in the Western Pacific, and Taiwan. Key obstacles include continued ground force dominance, interservice rivalry at a time of slowing budget growth, and lack of combat experience for most PLA personnel. Several years of joint exercises and training will be needed for PLA officers and units to gain experience in operating under the new system. This could impede China’s ability to conduct major combat operations during this period.
Several potential actions would indicate that the PLA is overcoming obstacles to a stronger joint operations capability. Useful indicators of progress would include more joint assignments going to non– ground force officers, expansion and deepening of joint training, and evidence that the theater commands are exercising operational control over air, naval, and conventional rocket forces. Additional reforms to the officer assignment and military education systems will be announced in 2017, and will play a critical role in cultivating the military leaders necessary to conduct effective joint operations in a restructured PLA.
The reforms are also intended to increase Chairman Xi Jinping’s control over the PLA and to reinvigorate Chinese Communist Party (CCP) organs within the military. The reforms emphasize Xi’s role in making all major decisions, reversing the delegation of authority to the two vice chairmen under Hu Jintao. However, Xi will still have to rely on trusted agents within the PLA to supply military advice and execute decisions. The restructuring strengthens supervision of the military by giving auditing, discipline inspection, and military legal mechanisms more independence and having them report directly to the CMC. Xi is also trying to increase ideological control by emphasizing the importance of political work and the military’s “absolute obedience” to the Party.
Xi Jinping’s ability to push through the reforms indicates that he has more authority over the PLA than his recent predecessors. Xi has been able to wield sticks and carrots to break the logjam of institutional and personal interests that stymied previous reform efforts. The ultimate effectiveness of efforts to strengthen CCP control will depend on Xi’s ability to devote sufficient attention to supervising the military and on the loyalty of the officers who will implement the control mechanisms. If Xi’s leadership falters or if a slowing Chinese economy can no longer provide resources for military modernization, PLA leaders may grow dissatisfied with Xi’s efforts to strengthen CCP control over military affairs and to emphasize political ideology.
The restructuring could create new opportunities for U.S.-China military contacts. The PLA now has closer counterpart positions for some senior U.S. billets, such as Chief of Staff of the Army. This could provide an opportunity for more productive exchanges. The creation of a new joint command system and the role of the theater commanders in directing operations will require adjustments to existing confidence-building and communications measures to ensure that U.S. and Chinese forces can communicate effectively during a crisis.https://digitalcommons.ndu.edu/china-strategic-perspectives/1009/thumbnail.jp
Joint Force Quarterly 85 (2nd Quarter, April 2017)
No full texthttps://digitalcommons.ndu.edu/jfq-full-issue/1028/thumbnail.jp
Shifting Human Environment: How Trends in Human Geography Will Shape Future Military Operations
No full textIn January 2014 the Center for Technology and National Security Policy was asked to examine some major trends within the domain of human geography, developments that will have important influence on the type of environments future military forces will be operating in. Experts were identified to address the following key topics: Population, migration and the development of megacities Technology change and education Ideological and cultural factors in conflict Irregular and hybrid threats Growth of transnational crime organizations and activities
One goal of this effort was to provide useful information to DoD policy makers engaged in future force planning and “futures thinking.” The papers contained in this volume all deal with major developments and trends in the human arena that are likely to change the way military forces must operate in the future. Each paper contains a section addressing anticipated implications for future military operations. And by presenting these papers as a package, the reader is encouraged to move beyond a simple recognition of particular trends, and consider how these factors may interact to shape a more complex and surprising future operating environment.1
As economic growth has spread to more and more of the developing world, an unprecedented level of migration to large urban centers has occurred in response. The first paper by Bartone and Sciarretta explores the rise of these “megacities,” and what they mean for the future of U.S. defense policy. According to the United Nations, by 2025 there will be 37 megacities worldwide, up from 27 today. Up until now, the U.S. military has attempted to avoid operating in hostile urban environments whenever possible. Bartone and Sciarretta show that the military needs to develop significant urban warfare capabilities in order to effectively carry out future missions.
Albert Sciarretta’s paper on ideology and decision making examines how bias shapes and informs the decisions that government and non-government groups make. Sciarretta reviews the various types of biases and ideologies that leaders have, including religious, pragmatic, and cultural beliefs systems. Understanding what these ideologies are, how they influence thought processes, and who possesses them is critical in order to develop strategies to face emerging threats.
One way that future adversaries are likely to employ force is through a mix of conventional warfare, irregular tactics, weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, cyberattacks, and criminal behavior called hybrid warfare. James Keagle’s paper on hybrid threats explores the nature of hybrid threats and ways in which the U.S. can counter them. Understanding the hybrid threat is critical for, as Keagle explains, hybrid threats are often located in the global commons that the U.S. has sought to control. This paper is especially timely, as Russia has employed elements of hybrid warfare in its assault on Ukraine. As more and more actors turn to the tactics associated with hybrid warfare, the U.S. military must develop capabilities and strategies to counter them.
Celina Realuyo’s paper addresses the rising threat the U.S. will face from transnational criminal enterprises. New opportunities, such as cyberspace, now allow transitional criminal elements to spread their operations further and faster than before. While the globalized economy has created previously unimaginable wealth and opportunities, it has also come with a dark side. Transnational criminal groups and international terrorists have used the same infrastructure to enrich themselves and promote their interests around the world. As transnational criminal networks become wealthy, they will seek to infiltrate and corrupt government institutions, creating in effect “criminal states” that protect and promote the interests of the gangs that control them. Transnational criminal networks have also found common cause with terrorist groups, with both operating in the same “governance gaps” that permit their behavior. A renewed whole of government approach to transnational criminal gangs will be necessary in order to combat this emerging threat.
Robinson, Armbruster, and Snapp’s contribution on the future of education details how changes in technology and approaches are reshaping education, not only in the U.S. but around the world. New approaches to education, such as flipped classrooms, competency based education, massive open online courses (MOOCs), and mobile learning are challenging educational institutions to rapidly adapt. In addition, advanced technology makes education more affordable and accessible to more people, and further advances are expected to radically re-order the educational landscape. Virtual classrooms, augmented reality, 3D printing, and gamification are all challenging the traditional model of education. U.S. military leaders need to understand how these changes will both impact our society and how they will affect the rest of the world.
Taken together, these papers describe an increasingly networked, technologically sophisticated and complex world that the U.S. military will have to operate in. By being aware of these trends, national security leaders and decision makers will be better equipped for the awesome task of anticipating future force challenges and requirements.https://digitalcommons.ndu.edu/defense-tech-papers/1001/thumbnail.jp
Violating Reality: The Lavelle Affair, Nixon, and the Parsing of the Truth
No full textOn December 20, 2010, the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) denied the Pentagon’s request, endorsed by President Barack Obama, to advance posthumously Air Force Maj Gen John D. Lavelle to the retired list in the rank of general.1 Thirty-eight years earlier, Air Force Chief of Staff Gen John D. Ryan had fired the four-star Lavelle as the Seventh Air Force commander in Saigon for allegedly conducting unauthorized airstrikes against North Vietnam and ordering the falsification of mission reports. Senate hearings in September 1972 deemed Lavelle guilty of both offenses, resulting in his demotion to major general following retirement. Yet a careful reading of documentary and taped evidence, much of it recently discovered and not available at the time of the original Senate hearings, reveals that General Lavelle neither violated the rules of engagement (ROE) that prescribed America’s air war at the time of his dismissal nor falsified mission reports. Accordingly, Lavelle should have his rank restored, and the so-called Lavelle affair should serve as a cautionary tale for political and military leaders alike who question the proper conduct of “civil-military relations” in the complex and often confounding era of modern limited war.https://digitalcommons.ndu.edu/nwc-case-studies/1000/thumbnail.jp