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PRISM-19
No full textThis special issue of PRISM is about the different perceptions and reactions to COVID-19 as people and governments experienced the disease, and their diverse understanding of its implications for national and international security.https://digitalcommons.ndu.edu/prism-full-issue/1036/thumbnail.jp
Averting Escalation and Avoiding War: Lessons from the 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis
No full textThis study assesses information-sharing, communication, and policy coordination between U.S. and Taiwan decisionmakers in the 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis, derives key lessons, considers the implications for a future crisis, and makes recommendations to policymakers.https://digitalcommons.ndu.edu/china-strategic-perspectives/1001/thumbnail.jp
Joint Force Quarterly 106 (3rd Quarter, July 2022)
No full texthttps://digitalcommons.ndu.edu/jfq-full-issue/1007/thumbnail.jp
Joint Force Quarterly 104 (1st Quarter, January 2022)
No full texthttps://digitalcommons.ndu.edu/jfq-full-issue/1009/thumbnail.jp
Joint Force Quarterly 105 (2nd Quarter, April 2022)
No full texthttps://digitalcommons.ndu.edu/jfq-full-issue/1008/thumbnail.jp
Russia\u27s Cold War Perspective on Missile Defense in Europe
No full textIn 2001, the United States took a decision to build and deploy a capability to defend against a limited long-range ballistic missile attack. The United States primarily is concerned about the emerging long-range ballistic missile threat from states of proliferation concern•, particularly North Korea and Iran. From the beginning, the United States has made clear that its goal is to defend not only the United States against such missile threats but also its allies, including its European allies.
The United States has moved forward with determination to achieve these goals, including through its withdrawal from the outdated constraints of the ABM Treaty; adoption of a spiral development approach to missile defense; conclusion of agreements with the United Kingdom and Denmark to upgrade early-warning radars at Fylingdales and Thule, respectively; establishment of cooperative development efforts with Japan, Israel, and other nations; and the deployment of radars and ground-based interceptors in Alaska and California. The United States now has a limited operational capability to defend its territory against a simple ballistic missile threat. That capability is focused on defending the United States against the North Korean threat while also providing coverage against the emerging long-range ballistic missile threat from Iran
Crafting Strategy for Irregular Warfare: A Framework for Analysis and Action (2nd Edition)
No full textThe United States, and the West, struggle to understand and respond to irregular warfare, whether by states or nonstate actors. Attempts to master the art have generated much new jargon, ranging from “hybrid war” to “the gray zone,” and most recently “integrated deterrence.” The terminology belies a struggle to overcome entrenched presumptions about war—a confusion that generates cognitive friction with implications for strategy. To inform a better approach, this monograph presents an analytical framework to assess and respond to irregular threats.https://digitalcommons.ndu.edu/strategic-monographs/1002/thumbnail.jp
The East Wind Prevails? Russia\u27s Response to China\u27s Eurasian Ambitions
No full textDeference to Chinese aspirations in Eurasia is integral to Moscow’s pursuit of closer relations with Beijing. Yet China’s pursuit of regional, and ultimately global, influence is at odds with Russia’s longstanding ambition to maintain post-Soviet Eurasia as a strategic glacis and sphere of ‘privileged interests’. Russia has consequently sought to shape and channel Chinese engagement in line with its own interests, with mixed results. Disappointments with the effects of Chinese economic and political influence on Russian equities, limits on Sino–Russian coordination, and the interest of Eurasia’s smaller states contributed to a growing wariness on Russia’s part. The 2022 invasion of Ukraine and attendant confrontation with the West have left Russia more dependent on China, even as China itself has become more realistic about the prospects for Eurasian integration
Perspective: The Rapidly Expanding Need for Biosecurity by Design
No full textAdvancing biotechnologies are revolutionizing not only health and medicine, but also many different sectors such as agriculture, energy, chemistry, and textiles. As synthetic biology is leveraged as a programmable platform for the creation and biodesign of high-value biological medicines, foods, and commodities, the world is facing new territory in terms of ensuring the safety and security of both novel and engineered biological organisms, as well as the biological and digital platforms in which they are designed. Biosecurity practices and policies have traditionally revolved around preventing the misuse of biological pathogens, primarily through controlling access to pathogens. The advent of biodesign capabilities, such as gene editors, gene synthesis capabilities, and genetic engineering, requires a reevaluation of traditional biosecurity policies to mitigate risks associated with such engineering of biological entities. Here, features of “Biosecurity by Design” approaches are described, including the application of risk/benefit analysis and risk mitigation, post-COVID opportunities, and ethical global norms in the progression of biodesign and growing bioeconomies
Gangs No Longer: Reassessing Transnational Armed Groups in the Western Hemisphere
No full textMS-13 (Mara Salvatrucha) in the Northern Triangle of Central America and the Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC; First Command of the Capital), based in S.o Paulo, Brazil, are both tier-one criminal/political/military threats to the stability of the Western Hemisphere.1 These groups—no longer gangs but community-embedded transnational armed groups (CETAGs) in the pantheon of nonstate armed actors—are becoming more deeply enmeshed in the global drug trade, the body politic, and armed conflicts in the hemisphere. These CETAGs, rooted and enduring in their communities of origin, are likely to expand across the hemisphere and are driving multiple types of corruption that President Joe Biden in December 2021 vowed to fight as a core U.S. strategic interest.https://digitalcommons.ndu.edu/inss-strategic-perspectives/1006/thumbnail.jp