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Integrate to Win From Competition Through Conflict: Create a Joint Force Information Warfare Component Commander
No full textΤhroughout the history of warfare, militaries have sought advantages by conducting information warfare (IW) to affect the perception and behavior of adversaries. Advances in IW capabilities are increasing the reach, speed, and effectiveness by which individuals, organizations, and systems can collect, process, disseminate, or act on information—and deny adversaries the same. The United States is not the only power to recognize the importance of IW in achieving national objectives. Russia and China have made great strides in improving and employing their IW capabilities to offset U.S. joint (and allied combined) forces in competition and conflict. Russia’s and China’s ability to employ synchronized IW capabilities rapidly and coherently to gain information advantages across the operational environment has allowed them, in some cases, to seize the initiative or exploit the information environment to counter U.S. military superiority
From Sparta to Hostomel: The Enduring Role of Joint Forcible Entry Operations
No full textSince World War II, the U.S. military has relied on global access to intermediate staging bases for the uncontested massing of combat power. However, recent advancements in antiaccess/area-denial (A2/AD) networks by strategic competitors like Russia and China threaten this capability. This article examines the historical context and current challenges of Joint Forcible Entry Operations (JFEO), emphasizing their necessity in future conflicts despite these threats. Analyzing the Russian military’s unsuccessful air assault at Hostomel Airport during the 2022 invasion of Ukraine provides critical insights into the complexities and risks associated with JFEOs. While the inherent risks of forcible entry operations have intensified, they remain viable if strategically adapted. Recommendations include dispersing lift assets, enhancing mobility and precision fire capabilities, and task-organizing flexible follow-on forces to ensure operational success. By blending historical perspectives with modern operational realities, this article contributes to the understanding of JFEOs and highlights the importance of adaptability in maintaining the effectiveness of forcible entry operations against contemporary threats
The Joint Functions: Theory, Doctrine, and Practice
No full textThis article explores the complexities of military conflict and the frameworks used to navigate it. He begins by defining conflict as a serious disagreement that often leads to chaos, emphasizing the need for structure and order in warfare. Historical perspectives, including insights from Carl von Clausewitz, underscore the importance of understanding military functions to enable effective command and operational strategies. Tackett details the seven joint functions outlined in Joint Publication (JP) 3-0: command and control, information, intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection, and sustainment. He highlights the ongoing tension between military theory, doctrine, and practical application, stressing the need for commanders to comprehend the theoretical foundations that inform current doctrine. Tackett traces the evolution of joint functions and how past organizational methods have shaped current military practices. He argues that a thorough understanding of these functions is crucial for operational success. The article calls for a reevaluation of how joint functions are applied in military operations, advocating for a balance that integrates historical lessons with contemporary military needs. Effective operational command organization is vital for synchronizing military efforts and achieving strategic objectives
Small, smart, many and cheaper: Competitive adaptation in modern warfare
No full textQ&A with T. X. Hammes, a nonresident senior fellow in the Forward Defense program of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and a distinguished research fellow in the Center for Strategic Research
Joint Force Quarterly, Issue 113, 2nd Quarter 2024
No full textJFQ is certainly the Chairman’s journal, but it exists solely to give voice to you and your ideas on the joint force, jointness in general, and how best to fight and win our Nation’s wars and secure the peace. For over 30 years, the best and brightest among us have sustained the dialogue within these pages, whether physical or virtual. Help us continue this great tradition by sending us your articles and adding to the growing body of knowledge that is Joint Force Quarterly
Lessons and Legacies of the War in Ukraine: Conference Report
No full textThe international conference titled “Lessons and Legacies of the War in Ukraine” took place on November 17, 2023, at the National Defense University in Washington, DC. Hosted by the University’s Institute for National Strategic Studies, the conference brought together perspectives from practitioners in the U.S. Government and uniformed military, along with experts from academia and the think tank community in the United States, United Kingdom, Ukraine, and Taiwan, to discuss the lessons that the United States and its allies should take from the first year and a half of the effort to repel Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.https://digitalcommons.ndu.edu/inss-strategic-perspectives/1000/thumbnail.jp
China’s Forever War: What If a Taiwan Invasion Fails?
No full textThis Strategic Forum by Dr. Joel Wuthnow, in the INSS Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs, examines the strategic consequences of a failed People’s Republic of China (PRC) attempt to invade Taiwan. Rather than assuming defeat would restore deterrence or compel Beijing to abandon its objectives, the article argues that a failed invasion could lock China into a prolonged, coercive conflict—a “forever war”—marked by sustained military pressure, economic coercion, gray-zone operations, and heightened escalation risks. Drawing on Chinese strategic culture, leadership risk tolerance, and civil-military dynamics, the analysis explores how Beijing might adapt politically and militarily following failure, including shifts in force posture, mobilization, and domestic control. The article also assesses implications for U.S. and allied deterrence strategies, emphasizing the need to prepare not only to defeat an invasion but to manage the long-term security environment that would follow. Ultimately, the piece highlights that preventing conflict requires credible deterrence across all phases of competition.https://digitalcommons.ndu.edu/strategic-forums/1118/thumbnail.jp
Joint Warfighting Concept 2034-2044
No full textThis paper presents a forward‑looking concept of joint warfighting through 2034–2044 that addresses the evolving strategic environment in which the United States must operate. It argues that enduring advances in sensors, precision weapons, and integrated command‑and‑control have ushered in an era of defensive dominance, compelling the U.S. Joint Force to shift toward timely offensive operational maneuver—designed to secure the initiative and enable a tactical defensive advantage. The authors identify key changes across domains: maritime, air, ground, space, electromagnetic spectrum, cyber, and logistics. They emphasize that future wars with peer adversaries like the People’s Republic of China (PRC) will likely be protracted, not short, and will demand that the U.S. force be organized, trained, and equipped for long‑haul campaigns and sustained industrial base effort. The paper outlines six enabling factors for success: (1) fusing and distributing data faster than the adversary; (2) leveraging emerging space‑based capabilities; (3) rapid fielding of mass‑producible offensive and defensive munitions; (4) building persistent integration across the Joint Force and with allies/partners; (5) investing in resilient, rapidly recoverable logistics and cyber networks for forward‑deployed forces and the homeland; and (6) ensuring allies and partners are not left behind. The authors conclude that the U.S. must re‑orient from platforms to weapons, deepen alliances, and adapt its readiness and sustainment posture to prevail in high‑end competition extending into the middle of the century
The Russo-Chinese Alliance and Great Power Competition with Dr. Tom Lynch
No full textThis week, Kelly talks with retired Army Officer and National Defense University Research Fellow Dr. Tom Lynch about the impact of Ukraine\u27s war on great power conflict and US-China competition.https://digitalcommons.ndu.edu/podcasts/1001/thumbnail.jp