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Don’t Let’s Be Beastly to the Germans: The British Occupation of Germany, 1945–49
In this book review, Daniel Cowling offers a compelling examination of the British efforts in post-conflict reconstruction following World War II. Drawing from his doctoral research and archival insights, Cowling narrates the complex dynamics of the British Army of the Rhine and the Control Commission Germany during the occupation. The book is organized into five parts, exploring the foundations of the occupation, the challenges of implementation, the ensuing crises, and the eventual adaptation that led to a successful transition towards German sovereignty. Cowling grapples with the paradox of balancing justice and empathy towards the German populace, raising critical questions about the historical roots of Nazism and the appropriate response to postwar Germany. He details the initial failures of the occupation, attributed to ineffective leadership, colonial attitudes, and inadequate resources, which led to widespread criticism and perceptions of chaos. The review also highlights the resilience of the British efforts as they learned from these missteps, ultimately fostering economic recovery and political stability
CONCESSIONS TO THE LIMITED POWERS: Considerations of Low-Yield Nuclear Weapons, Asymmetrical Capability, and Extended Deterrence
Quite recently, nuclear strategy scholars Kier Lieber and Daryl Press posited that arms’ tables have turned, citing the asymmetry of limited nuclear powers as a reboot of the United States (US)-North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) tactical nuclear playbook during the Cold War. Their key message—that “The United States must take seriously the nuclear capabilities and resolve of its foes”—isn’t lost on us: we previously called for the need to begin serious counter-weapons of mass destruction (WMD) planning for adversarial use of nuclear weapons below the threshold of Armageddon. We must raise an objection, however, to the assertion that states with limited nuclear capabilities are reprising the US’ 20th century strategy of coercion and dissuasion with their handfuls of weapons. Instead, we see a world wherein not only Russia and China, but militarily asymmetrical nuclear aspirants, such as North Korea and Iran, increase their resolve to employ nuclear threats to gain concessions outside previously conceived escalation ladders.https://digitalcommons.ndu.edu/cdtfw-research/1002/thumbnail.jp
From Made in China” to “Created in China”: Intellectual Property Rights in the People’s Republic of China
Five Truths for Foreign Area Officers
Colonel John Collins served in the U.S. Army through three wars and went on to be a revered military strategist and scholar. He founded the Warlord Loop, an organization of defense and security thinkers that remains active today. In 1987, Collins captured five “truths” regarding special operations forces. In so doing, Collins helped define the principles and attributes of special operations forces, which had been misunderstood by the larger conventional military. Foreign area officer (FAO) is another often misunderstood specialty in the military that would also benefit greatly from an exploration of its own truths. This is especially important given the ongoing debate about its future
The Marine Corps the United States Needs
Τhe U.S. Marine Corps is in the process of a bold modernization initiative known as Force Design, and Congress has called for an independent review, assessment, and analysis of this initiative.1 Force Design began during the tenure of the previous commandant, General David H. Berger, and the new commandant, General Eric M. Smith, sworn in last year, endorses it in his official guidance, FRAGO (Fragmentary Order) 01-2024, Maintain Momentum.2 The continuation of Force Design under a new commandant and the congressional attention it is receiving provide opportune circumstances to consider the Marine Corps’ roles and missions
Was 50 Years Long Enough? The All-Volunteer Force in an Era of Large-Scale Combat Operations
Ιn an era of geopolitical competition among major powers, a large-scale war could last longer and result in more casualties than anything the United States has experienced since World War II. It is unclear whether the all-volunteer force (AVF) that the United States has relied on for the past 50 years, with extraordinary and unexpected success, can meet the manpower requirements in quality and quantity and in time to win the large-scale combat operations that the Department of Defense (DOD) is preparing for
The Profession of Arms: What Scholars, Practitioners, and Others of Note Have Had to Say
The article discusses the evolution of military expertise and national security management in the context of modern challenges. James Stavridis, Ervin J. Rokke, and Terry C. Pierce argue that the traditional concept of military expertise, as defined by Samuel Huntington—focused on the management of violence —is outdated. They suggest that today’s military professionals are better described as managers of effects, which includes both kinetic (physical force) and nonkinetic (cyber, soft power) capabilities. They emphasize the importance of civilian leadership in defining strategic objectives while the military manages a broader array of tools to achieve desired outcomes. James Locher adds that the U.S. national security system, designed for the Cold War, is now ineffective for handling complex, contemporary threats like terrorism and cyberattacks. Both perspectives call for reforms to adapt to the evolving strategic environment
Better in Pairs: Divide the Indo-Pacific Theater in Half
This article explores the rationale for dividing the Indo-Pacific Theater into two geographic combatant commands to improve command and control, particularly in the face of growing strategic competition with China. The Department of Defense (DOD) reviews its Unified Command Plan (UCP) every two years, adjusting geographic boundaries and missions. Given the Indo-Pacific\u27s vast size, rising security threats, and operational demands, USINDOPACOM\u27s current structure may be insufficient. The article argues that dividing the theater, similar to the successful dual command model used during World War II in the Pacific, would ease command burdens, enhance strategic effectiveness, and better prepare the U.S. joint force for long-term competition and potential conflict with the People\u27s Republic of China (PRC). The article emphasizes the importance of adapting command structures to modern geopolitical realities. A unified command may struggle to oversee the expanding scope of operations and security responsibilities across this region
Commander’s Critical Information Requirements: Crucial for Decisionmaking and Joint Synchronization
Effective decision-making in modern joint military operations demands timely access to critical information. Commander’s Critical Information Requirements (CCIRs) address this challenge by identifying and prioritizing essential information for operational decisions. This article proposes enhancing CCIR development aligned with decision points across planning horizons using a backward-planning methodology supported by tools like the Decision Support Matrix (DSM). It also explores integrating CCIRs within the intelligence collection and analysis cycle to align intelligence efforts with operational goals across Joint Planning Process (JPP) phases. This article aims to strengthen decision-making processes and enhance operational outcomes in joint military operations
Executive Summary
JFQ is certainly the Chairman’s journal, but it exists solely to give voice to you and your ideas on the joint force, jointness in general, and how best to fight and win our Nation’s wars and secure the peace. For over 30 years, the best and brightest among us have sustained the dialogue within these pages, whether physical or virtual. Help us continue this great tradition by sending us your articles and adding to the growing body of knowledge that is Joint Force Quarterly