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The Elusive Promise of “Over-the-Horizon” Counterterrorism
No full textAmid criticism on the United States withdrawal from Afghanistan, President Biden described the future of U.S. counterterrorism as “over-the-horizon.” This term is derived from long-distance radar technology. It implies that security forces will be postured outside a conflict. Once intelligence reveals a plot, they will cross international borders, execute a strike, and prevent the attack. This has been tried before. In the 1980s and 1990s, national security staff advocated for periodic strikes and raids against terrorists. They failed. This article explores these failures. It examines declassified sources to understand risk-benefit calculations by the White House and finds that the juxtaposition of perceived risks associated with a single strike weighed against benefits derived from cumulative strikes makes presidents reluctant to approve over-the-horizon operations
The Future of Hybrid Warfare
No full textIn the future, NATO should embrace the concept of hybrid warfare and incorporate it into how it deters and defends. Starting with resiliency as the first step, NATO can use its inherent strengths to put adversaries at a disadvantage and strengthen its strategic approach to hybrid warfare
Getting the Best Out of Joint Warfighter Development
No full textThe article explores whether the Department of Defense (DoD) is producing optimal joint warfighters for U.S. military operations. Joint warfighting, crucial for conducting effective joint operations, requires leaders with a joint mindset. The development of skilled joint warfighters hinges on three key elements: balanced Service representation, experienced faculty, and a rigorous curriculum. The Joint Advanced Warfighting School (JAWS) at the National Defense University exemplifies this integration, emphasizing proportional Service representation, faculty with extensive joint experience, and practical exercises to foster collaboration and interdependence. The article stresses the increasing need for joint warfighters capable of planning and executing complex, multidomain operations
Closed-Loop Neuronal-Computational Systems: Potentials And Problems
No full textMicroelectrode arrays can organize cultivated neurons on various scales for closed feedback loops to measurably enhance their computational capacity. A significant step toward advancing computational interfacing of neural networks employs the use of organoid-computing integration (OCI). The use of OCIs can expand capabilities for bio-electronic assimilation via “encoding” cultured neurons (and neuronal systems of multi-scalar organoids) by developing interconnected computerized signaling on surfaces of multielectrode array contacts. It may be that OCIs could afford a valid simulacrum for the functional computational capabilities of neural networks of a living brain, and in so doing may enable insights to both the “hard question” of neuroscience (viz. how conscious and cognitive processes arise in/from a material (biological) system, and if, how and to what extent OCIs impart sentient characteristics to hybrid and/or synthetic systems (in silico). The potential emergence of high-functioning organic-computational intelligence gives rise to a number of neuroethico-legal and social issues, which require address in ways that are herein proposed
Implementing the Chairman’s Guidance on Experiential Learning in PME Classrooms
No full textProfessional Military Education (PME) faces the challenge of teaching timeless military strategy principles while addressing contemporary strategic needs. To address this, the article proposes a three-part simulated negotiation exercise, to be completed over two class sessions, focusing on trilateral nuclear arms control talks involving the United States, China, and Russia. Students are pre-assigned to delegations, provided with strategic readings, and instructed on their state’s negotiation goals. This simulation enhances understanding of major power competition, strategic communication, and international diplomacy, providing hands-on experience in balancing national priorities within a competitive geopolitical environment
Unpacking China’s PLA Restructuring: A Conversation with Dr. Joel Wuthnow
No full textIn this episode of the ChinaPower Podcast, Dr. Joel Wuthnow joins us to discuss China’s recent restructuring of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and particularly the disbanding of its Strategic Support Force and establishment of a new Information Support Force. Dr. Wuthnow explains the major organizational changes involved and how the new force fits into China’s overall military structure. He argues that while the PLA has long recognized the importance of dominating the information domain, this move suggests dissatisfaction with the previous organizational structure and its ability to effectively integrate capabilities for modern information warfare. He explains that these reforms do not indicate an acceleration of China’s military modernization goals or a shift towards a more offensive posture. Finally, Dr. Wuthnow shares his expectations for changes and priorities that may take shape for the PLA in the future.https://digitalcommons.ndu.edu/podcasts/1000/thumbnail.jp
Microgrids for the 21st Century: The Case for a Defense Energy Architecture
No full textThe Department of Defense (DOD) needs a new approach to electrical grid infrastructure to maintain security and access to operational energy. Recent natural disasters and cyber attacks have exposed the vulnerability of the current system, posing threats to military operational readiness. Strategic military facilities currently acquire most of their electric power directly from the national grid, which is increasingly vulnerable to failures. The problems experienced to date could be exponentially worse if targeted by a sophisticated adversary
Accelerating Cyber Leader Development: A Call to Action for Service War Colleges
No full textCyber leaders find their organizations under constant cyber attack from millions of daily intrusions disrupting everything from our electoral system to our social media feeds. Today, cyberspace provides both technological opportunity and vulnerability. The frightening reality is that the Nation is adrift in a dangerous cyberspace domain, a warfighting domain that stores, processes, and analyzes data under the uncertain eye of ill-prepared senior cyber leaders. This article is squarely focused on a recommendation to deliberately develop senior cyber leaders within the Department of Defense (DOD) to win in this dangerous battlespace
China\u27s Theater-Range, Dual-Capable Delivery Systems: Integrated Deterrence and Risk Reduction Approaches to Counter a Growing Threat
No full textChina has engaged in a dramatic buildup of its nuclear forces over the past decade. While much of the attention on China’s new nuclear arsenal has focused on its development and expansion of its strategic nuclear triad, this growth has also included significant numbers of theater-range, dual-capable delivery systems. These forces are not capable of reaching the U.S. mainland but can range U.S. and allied forces and bases across strategically significant swathes of the Indo-Pacific.
This research project assessed the growing threat to the United States and its Indo-Pacific allies posed by these systems. It then considered ways and means to counter and deter this challenge. It also considered possible risk reduction options. The study team organized its work around three main research questions:
1. What is the role of China’s theater-range, dual-capable delivery systems in its strategies and plans for countering U.S. intervention within a future Indo-Pacific security crisis or conflict?
2. What “integrated deterrence” strategy or strategies:
a. Can counter China from utilizing these systems to realize strategic and operational objectives by threatening the United States and its Indo-Pacific allies and partners with nuclear strikes?
b. Can deter China from launching nuclear attacks with these systems in a future regional conflict?
c. If deterrence fails, how can the United States defeat this capability and restore deterrence?
3. What confidence-building and risk reduction approaches can reduce escalation risks and/or limit the threat to the U.S. and its Indo-Pacific allies posed by these systems?https://digitalcommons.ndu.edu/wmdcenter-research/1001/thumbnail.jp