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Garden Path of Boyles v. Kerr and Twyman v. Twyman: An Outrageous Response to Victims of Sexual Misconduct
No full textOn May 5, 1993, the Texas Supreme Court handed down Boyles v. Kerr, which eliminated negligent infliction of emotional distress as a cognizable cause of action in Texas.1 The Boyles court, despite protests from many women\u27s groups,2 decided that a woman surreptitiously videotaped while engaging in sexual intercourse was not entitled to a remedy based upon non-intentional infliction of emotional distress.3 The court encouraged the plaintiff, however, to bring her claim under the intentional tort scheme. 4 Chief Justice Phillips explained that the court\u27s ruling did not deny relief to the plaintiff, a victim of sexual and emotional abuse, but remanded this particular case for resolution on other actionable grounds. 5 This rationalization was given in light of the Texas Supreme Court\u27s explicit recognition of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress in Twyman v. Twyman,6 another sexual exploitation case decided the same day
Disability Discrimination in Employment Law
No full texthttps://digitalcommons.law.udc.edu/fac_books/1006/thumbnail.jp
Johnson v. De Grandy: Mixed Messages On Equal Electoral Opportunity Under Section 2 Of The Voting Rights Act
No full textJohnson v. De Grandy\u27 is Florida\u27s contribution to the burgeoning Supreme Court jurisprudence addressing the redistricting which followed the 1990 Census.2 That round of redistricting has been heavily influenced by Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which Congress amended in 1982 to prohibit election practices that deny minorities an equal opportunity to participate in the political process andelect candidates of their choice to office.3 Because the composition of election districts may have a powerful impact on the ability of racial or ethnic minorities to elect candidates of their choice to office, 4 redistricting is among the practices covered by the anti-dilution principles of Section 2.
Opening The Door To The Grand Jury: Abandoning Secrecy For Secrecy\u27s Sake
No full textThe grand jury in the United States is hailed by its proponents as an indispensable buffer of protection from malicious and unfounded prosecution by the State. Critics, however, liken the investigatory body to a rubber stamp of the prosecutor, analogous to early English grand jurors who were subject to the influences of the Monarch. Criticism of the grand jury often focuses on the grand jury\u27s potential for oppression rather than protection of the individual.\u27 In particular, it is the secrecy of the grand jury that sparks the most debate.\u2
Pre-Initial Hearing Detention: Are The Police Department And Social Services Intake Following The Law?
No full textSubstituting Secure Detention For Shelter Care: An Illegal Deprivation Of Liberty
No full textJudges sitting on the Superior Court of the District of Columbia routinely order children into secure detention who require no more restrictive confinement than that provided by shelter care. Despite a statutory presumption against detention, and a superior court rule that prohibits substituting secure detention for shelter care,\u27 the District inappropriately places children into secure detention simply because there is a lack of bed space in youth shelter houses. The deprivation of liberty that occurs when a juvenile is placed in secure detention rather than shelter care is required neither for the protection of the community nor for the welfare of the child. Moreover, in light of Supreme Court precedent, the use of secure detention as an expedient administrative alternative to shelter care placement violates the detained youth\u27s Fifth Amendment due process liberty interests.\u27 Finally, the Jerry M. v. District of Columbia consent decree grants District of Columbia children a liberty interest which mandates additional protection
Juvenile Detention To Protect Children From Neglect
No full textThe primary purpose of juvenile detention is to protect the community from dangerous young people while they wait for their cases to be heard in court.\u27 From a developmental perspective, juvenile detention should occur less frequently than adult detention because juveniles need to be with family members and are perhaps more vulnerable to emotional harm from incarceration than adults. Recognized risks of detention include exposing naive, previously victimized youth to larger, older juveniles with delinquency histories. Other risks include interference with the juvenile\u27s relationship with family and attendance in school
Clear And Convincing Evidence: The Standard Required To Support Pretrial Detention Of Juveniles Pursuant To D.C. Code Section 16-2310
No full textThis Note examines the appropriate evidentiary standard for pretrial detention decisions in Juvenile Court in the District of Columbia. Currently, there is no authority mandating the standard of proof that is to be applied to the pretrial detention of juveniles. To ensure that all juveniles receive the same protections, one evidentiary standard must be applied at all pretrial detention hearings. Based upon adult and juvenile pretrial detention statutes, the case law construing those statutes, and the standard courts employ in adult civil commitment procedures, the appropriate standard is the clear and convincing evidence standard of proof. In order to afford juveniles the same due process protections afforded adults,\u27 it is apparent that the clear and convincing standard of proof must be applied at pretrial detention decisions in Juvenile Court
