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Heuristics, Cognitive Biases, and Accountability: Decision-Making in Dependency Court
On tens of thousands of occasions each year, state court judges wrongly separate children from their families and place them in foster care. And while a child is in foster care, judges are called on to render hundreds of decisions affecting every aspect of the child’s life. This Article uses insights from social psychology research to analyze the environment of dependency court and to recommend changes that will improve decisions. Research indicates that decision makers aware at the time they make a decision that they will be called upon later to explain it may engage in a systematic, deliberate decision-making process. On the other hand, decision makers given an opportunity to justify a decision after making it reflexively may defend the decision, ignoring or distorting information that would undercut its rationale. This Article argues that decisions in dependency court are harmed by a shortage of predecisional accountability and an abundance of post-decisional opportunities to selfdefensively bolster decisions previously made. The Article draws from social psychology research to recommend concrete changes to promote effective decisionmaking processes in dependency court. Recommendations include opening dependency courts, expanding appeal rights, dispersing decision making authority from a single judge to multiple judges, and using “case rounds,” drawn from medical school and law school clinical education programs, to provide judges with diverse perspectives on decisions with which they are faced. Finally, I recommend directions for empirical research in the unique environment of dependency court
Breastfeeding in Non-Traditional Occupations is Key to Improving Access to Higher-Paying, Skilled Careers
(Un)Reasonable Suspicion: Racial Profiling in Immigration Enforcement After Arizona v. United States
n June 25, 2012, the Supreme Court of the United States issued its landmark decision in Arizona v. United States, 1 striking down three of the four provisions of Arizona’s notorious Senate Bill (“S.B.”) 10702 challenged by the United States Department of Justice as preempted by federal immigration law. Despite agreeing with the government that the majority of Arizona’s attempt to regulate immigration at the state level through S.B. 1070 was impermissible, the Supreme Court let stand the most controversial section of the law, Section 2(B)—the socalled “show me your papers” provision.3 Under Section 2(B), state and local law enforcement officials in Arizona are required to check the immigration status of persons whom they have “reasonable suspicion” to believe are undocumented.4 It is the meaning of “reasonable suspicion” in the context of immigration enforcement—and how state and local law enforcement will apply this requirement—that has given rise to concerns of racial profiling once the law goes into effect. This article examines the “reasonable suspicion” requirement of S.B. 1070’s Section 2(B), and argues that enforcement of this provision will give rise to stops, detentions, and arrests based on constitutionally impermissible factors such as race, color, and ethnicity that will ultimately stymie the efforts of Arizona and other jurisdictions to enact state-level immigration enforcement laws. Part I discusses the enactment of S.B. 1070 in 2010, and the decisions by lower federal courts enjoining major provisions of the law. Part II analyzes the Supreme Court’s decision in Arizona v. United States striking down the majority of S.B. 1070 as preempted by federal immigration law. Part III discusses Section 2(B) and the “reasonable suspicion” standard that permits state and local law enforcement to inquire as to the immigration status of persons they believe may be undocumented. The article concludes with Part IV, which argues that Section 2(B) will ultimately be deemed unconstitutional due to the inability to enforce it in a manner that does not impermissibly rely on racial profiling, and that its demise will lead to more state reliance on cooperative immigration enforcement with federal authorities and bring about the end of attempts to pass state-level immigration enforcement regulation
The Other Missouri Model: Systemic Juvenile Injustice in the Show-Me State
For years Missouri has been touted as a model for juvenile justice. Stakeholders and commentators continually declare that the Show-Me State – with its “Missouri Model” – employs the most modern and innovative ap-proaches when it comes to treatment of court-involved youth. This account is reflected in press coverage, television news shows, and agency white papers. But this is only part of the picture; there is much more happening in Missouri when it comes to juveniles. However, this “other” part of the story seldom has been openly discussed – until now.1. This Article seeks to contrast the rosy picture painted on the national level – one that suggests a model system of juvenile justice from top to bot-tom – with the more troubling day-to-day problems facing youth in Mis-souri’s communities, courts, and institutions of confinement. This examina-tion is rooted in my own recent experiences. Like others who attended the symposium, I am an academic who teaches about the theories underlying Supreme Court decisions like Miller
The Military\u27s Workplace Flexibility Framework
Workplace flexibility is a tool the military may use to support its operations, improve the recruitment and retention of military personnel, and fulfill its obligation to support veterans and military families. The return of combat troops from Iraq provides a valuable catalyst to take stock of the use of workplace flexibility in the U.S. military and employers supporting the military community. While the unique critical needs of the military are an inescapable variable when creating laws and policies, the military must meet the workplace flexibility needs of its services members and their families to maximize the effectiveness and efficiency of the Armed Forces. This article provides an overview of the legal framework for workplace flexibility for the military community, and articulates themes evolving from those laws
Law Clinics and Lobbying Restrictions
“Can law school clinics lobby?” This question has plagued professors for decades but has gone unanswered, until now. This Article situates law school clinics within the labyrinthine law of lobbying restrictions and concludes that clinics may indeed lobby. For ethical, pedagogical, and, ultimately, practical reasons, it is critical that professors who teach in clinics understand these restrictions. This Article offers advice to professors and students on safely navigating this complicated terrain