Legal Scholarship Repository (University of Tennessee College of Law)
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Legal Philosophy for Lawyers in the Age of a Political Supreme Court
No full textLegal Philosophy has long been concerned with the question of what brands a norm as legal, as opposed to a non-legal norm of justice or morality. This central question has occupied the attention of philosophers and lawyers for centuries. Roughly speaking, the Naturalist school contends that legal norms are inextricably intertwined with norms of morality and justice (and in its strongest form contends that law-like pronouncements that are immoral or unjust are not fully laws), while the Positivist school argues that a social construct (often called the Rule of Recognition) brands selected norms as legal, and thus legal norms may be just norms, but need not be. This article contends that Positivism has won the argument, though with the important caveat that a community\u27s Rule of Recognition might condition the legality of norms on their morality or justness. While legal philosophy has of late been seen by some as walled off from legal doctrine, this article contends that modern debates about the legality of unenumerated constitutional rights are debates about the United States\u27 Rule of Recognition. Thus, legal philosophy may have much to say about contemporary legal issues. This article argues that rather than the conventional framing of the central question as the relationship between law and morals, reframing it as between law and justice would improve the subject\u27s comprehensibility and impact. The Supreme Court conservative majority\u27s focus on originalism is less a theory of interpretation than a strategy to selectively narrow the United States\u27 Rule of Recognition, particularly in constitutional cases. The Supreme Court is a substantially political institution, carrying out its work under the guise of interpretation, while in fact furthering a politically conservative agenda. Recognizing this, though unlikely to alter immediately the Court\u27s course, could make a difference in the way that lawyers frame their arguments and how the Court\u27s decisions are evaluate
Perez v. Sturgis Public Schools
No full textThe Individuals with Disabilities Education Act\u27 ( IDEA ) is a law that requires all students with disabilities to be provided with a free and appropriate education. 2 More specifically, IDEA governs how states and public agencies provide early intervention, special education, and related services to disabled youth. 3 However, the remedies available under IDEA are limited. Common remedies for violations of IDEA include tuition reimbursement, compensatory education, and attorney\u27s fees. 4 Because monetary compensation is not available under IDEA, disabled students often have to bring a claim under other federal statutes, such as the Americans with Disabilities Act ( ADA ) in order to receive the full relief they are entitled to.
In Perez r. Sturgis Public Schools,5 the petitioner is a deaf student who attended school in the Sturgis Public School District from ages nine through twenty. 6 Petitioner alleges that the public school system failed to provide him a free and appropriate education, and instead inflated his grades and allowed him to move up grade by grade when he was not ready.7 Petitioner and his family brought an action under IDEA, which ultimately reached a settlement, granting petitioner forward-looking relief, including compensatory education by Sturgis.8 Following the settlement, the petitioner sued in federal district court, seeking compensatory relief under the ADA.9 The district court dismissed the lawsuit, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed, stating that IDEA § 1415 requires the petitioner to exhaust the administrative remedies available through IDEA before bringing an action under another statute.10 The Supreme Court granted certiorari
